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This work uses a GIS-based methodology to develop and map a composite physical exposure, 
social vulnerability, and critical facilities index for New York City populations exposed to the 
current and predicted 100- and 500- year coastal floods. The objective is to illustrate how sea-
level rise may affect future 100- and 500-year coastal floods in New York City, how these 
changes in future flood scenarios will affect the number and distribution of people at risk and 
their associated physical and socioeconomic impacts, and how these impacts will vary among 
neighborhoods. 
 
Sea-level rise throughout the 21st century will result in increased flood exposure as current flood 
levels are achieved more frequently and new flood levels result in more widespread inundation. 
To increase the resiliency of coastal communities and allow populations to respond and recover 
to these hazards, it is important to develop a place-based understanding of how storm surge 
exposure, impacts, and community vulnerability will change over time.  Both the physical and 
socioeconomic impacts of flooding events are often unevenly distributed, with socially 
vulnerable groups most likely to experience a disproportionate share of the detrimental effects. 
When both physical and socioeconomic vulnerability are present in combination, the risk to 
populations is exacerbated. Physical exposure, social vulnerability, and critical infrastructure are 
 v 
combined to form an overall storm surge flood risk index that characterizes site-specific 
neighborhood levels of risk to flood hazard. Results show that future sea-level rise will increase 
the population at risk to the 100- and 500-year coastal floods, particularly under scenarios of 
potential population growth and distribution in the coastal and near-coastal zones. New York 
City must consider sea-level rise in their long term planning efforts to make coastal communities 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Coastal regions around the world are experiencing the effects of sea-level rise on local and 
regional flood events and these effects are expected to increase into the future (IPCC 2014a, 
2014b, 2013, 2012; FitzGerald et al. 2008; Williams et al. 2009). Flood events pose great threat 
to the safety of coastal residents, their infrastructure, networks, and economy, and sea-level rise 
may exacerbate these threats by increasing the volume and extent of floodwaters. Sea-level rise 
alters the coastline physically, changing coastal landscapes through erosion and permanent land 
loss; barrier island breaching, segmentation and migration; and wetland ecosystem drowning. 
These physical changes to the coast can affect the movement of storm surge on land and result in 
increased impacts to infrastructure and coastal communities (FitzGerald et al. 2008; Gesch 2009; 
Williams et al. 2009). It is important to understand the distribution and extent of sea-level rise 
enhanced flood events in order to develop plans and policies that mitigate potential hazards and 
make the coastal region more resilient to storm surge. 
 
While global sea levels are rising, global population is increasing and will continue to do so into 
the future. The world’s population is currently estimated to be 7.1 billion and is predicted to 
reach 9.38 billion by the year 2050 (US Census Bureau n.d.). One of the effects of this 
population increase is an overall migration from inland to high-risk coastal areas, increasing the 
density of people and infrastructure in places already vulnerable to flood hazards. McGranahan 
et al. (2007) assert that 10% of the global population is living less than 10m above sea level and 
that the urbanization rate in these low elevation coastal zones is 60%, compared to the global 
urbanization rate of less than 50%. In fact eight of the 10 largest cities in the world are coastal, 
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and in the Unites States 14 of the 20 largest cities are situated within 100km of the coast and less 
than 10m above sea level (Williams et al. 2009). Nicholls and Small (2002) estimate that by 
1990, 1.2 billion people or approximately 23% of the world’s population was living within 100m 
of sea level and 100km from a coast. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) this number could increase to 1.8 
or 5.2 billion by the 2080s, depending on assumptions about coastward migration (Angel et al. 
2011). 
 
Continued growth of the low-lying coasts increases the vulnerability of these areas and exposes 
larger populations to coastal hazards such as inundation and storm surge (FitzGerald et al. 2008). 
With sea-level rise coastal regions will become more vulnerable as storm surge, founded upon 
higher sea levels, increases in elevation and inundation extent. Coastal flood events of a given 
magnitude – i.e., the 100-year flood - will have greater recurrence intervals in the future while 
new elevation benchmarks for those events are established. This means that new communities 
will become at-risk to flooding and communities currently at-risk will experience more frequent 
and intense flooding. An important component in the assessment of the vulnerability of a region 
to current and future flood impacts is the recognition that flood impacts will be disproportionate, 
influenced not only by differences in physical exposure to floodwaters but also by spatial 
variations in social and economic vulnerabilities (Wisner et al. 2003).  
 
Over the past two decades emergency managers, prompted by an increase in the losses 
experienced through flood-related natural disasters (Pielke and Downton 2000; National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration 2014), have shifted their attention from disaster response to 
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pre-event planning and preparedness. This shift is reflected in policies that emphasize 
preparation, mitigation, and adaptation strategies in addition to recovery measures. Assessments 
of who and what are exposed to flood hazards, how populations are differently vulnerable, and 
the impacts of exposure are necessary to develop structural and non-structural mitigation plans 
that are effective in increasing a system’s or society’s resilience. In New York and many other 
coastal cities, sea-level rise will increase the frequency and intensity of flood events, 
compressing the time scale over which floods will evolve (Horton et al. 2015). Coastal cities 
need to consider the intersection of flood inundation, the exacerbating effects of future sea-level 
rise, and residential development in coastal areas to identify existing and emerging areas of 
hazard and conduct vulnerability assessments to inform hazard mitigation plans as well as long-
term risk reduction plans (Cutter and Finch 2008).   
 
1.1. Objective and Hypothesis 
The objective of this research is to determine how sea-level rise projections may alter the 
potential socioeconomic impacts of contemporary 100- and 500-year coastal flood events and of 
future flood events enhanced by sea-level rise scenarios, how changing flood exposure may 
affect the number and distribution of people at risk, and how flood impacts will vary among 
neighborhoods. This paper is founded on the (Cutter 1996; Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003) 
hazards-of-place model of vulnerability that incorporates both biophysical and social indicators 
to evaluate overall vulnerability at the local level. Hazard exposure and community vulnerability 




Two key questions form the foundation of this work: 
 
1. How will sea-level rise in the 2020s and 2050s: 
• Affect the area and population exposed to the 100- and 500-year coastal floods in all 
neighborhoods of New York City? 
• Create new areas of physical vulnerability and increase existing physical vulnerability 
in neighborhoods currently at-risk? 
• Interact with existing areas of social vulnerability and contribute to the landscape of 
overall storm surge flood risk? 
2. Which elements of vulnerability exert the most influence on overall storm surge flood 
risk and how this does this influence vary with location? 
 
The impacts of flood events are not evenly distributed among coastal communities. Both social 
and physical geographies interact to expose vulnerable populations to an elevated risk. In this 
work, a combined evaluation of floodwater exposure, social vulnerability, at-risk critical 
facilities, and potential floodwater contaminants provides a metric to rank neighborhood risk to 
flood hazards through an overall storm surge risk index that characterizes site-specific levels of 
risk to flood hazard. Using recent publically available sociodemographic data will allow 
community planners to identify pockets of socially and physically vulnerable populations and 
develop targeted resiliency strategies. The overlap of socially vulnerable populations with 
physical hazard will highlight the needs of communities that may require special attention, 
planning efforts, and mobilization to respond to and recover from disasters and hazards. 
 
 5 
Other studies have aimed to measure and quantify community exposure and vulnerability to 
current and future hurricane storm surge scenarios. Shepard et al. (2012) apply a GIS based 
approach to assess future risk to sea-level rise and storm surge along the southern shores of Long 
Island, New York. Using publically available data sets such as US Census and SLOSH (Sea, 
Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) model output, they develop three indices that 
capture exposure, social vulnerability, and critical infrastructure and facilities at risk to category 
3 hurricane inundation scenarios both with and without sea-level rise.  The fourth and final index 
captures ‘overall risk’ and is a product of the three indices above. The overall risk index 
represents the combined vulnerability of the people, property, and resources within a community. 
They conclude that with sea-level rise 1) existing risk will likely increase and new areas of risk 
will emerge; and 2) increases in inundation area can in some areas result in amplified impacts. 
Frazier et al. (2010) also use US Census and SLOSH datasets to assess variations in 
socioeconomic exposure (i.e., populations, economic activity, and critical facilities) to category 1 
- 5 hurricane storm surge scenarios both with and without sea-level rise in Sarasota County, 
Florida. They determine that, due to sea-level rise, socioeconomic exposure in hazard zones will 
increase and smaller hurricanes will resemble the surge of larger ones. Furthermore, an analysis 
of Sarasota County’s 2050 comprehensive plans shows concentrated population growth in the 
current and future storm surge risk zones. 
 
This work is similar to previous efforts in purpose and scope but also unique in its choice of 
flood events, study area, and methodologies. For example, instead of evaluating sea-level rise 
inundation or hurricane storm surge scenarios as is commonly done, this work focuses on the 
100- and 500-year flood events because they are used as benchmarks for insurance requirements 
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and/or planning scenarios and refer to a flood volume instead of a specific storm event. In this 
regard, the 100- or 500-year flood is broadly applicable and could be a product of wintertime 
nor’easters or of hurricanes of varying category strengths and path directions. It is also an 
appropriate selection for New York City as an East Coast locale with a relatively low frequency 
of direct and indirect hurricane hits (Smith 1999). Also unique is the use of a disaggregation 
technique to generate a more refined estimate of the population situated within flood zones. By 
scaling U.S. Census population data to a smaller unit of analysis (i.e., the tax lot) the selection of 
flooded areas located adjacent to flood boundaries is made at a finer resolution. The result is a 
more accurate representation of the count and distribution of the flood exposed population. Other 
studies (Rygel, O’sullivan, and Yarnal 2006; Kleinosky, Yarnal, and Fisher 2006; Wu, Yarnal, 
and Fisher 2002) use coarser methods such as centroid containment or areal weighting to select 
flooded populations at larger spatial units of analysis, resulting in greater margins of error (see 
section 6.2.2 for a discussion of floodplain population estimation techniques).  
 
The assessment of overall storm surge flood risk in New York City is a unique challenge due to 
its population diversity and density. NYC is one of the densest and most ethnically and culturally 
diverse cities in the United States with great variation in the national origin, race, religion, 
income, and education attainment of its residents. The most ethnically diverse county is Queens. 
Queens also realizes incredible linguistic diversity with nearly 800 languages spoken by 
residents, 47.8% of which are identified as foreign born.  What makes this diversity unique in the 
cityscape of NYC is that it is realized at incredible population densities. The heterogeneity of 
population characteristics is reflected in a spatial context when the socioeconomic and 
demographic data are used to assess vulnerability at the tax lot scale.  
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This research moves beyond the classic hazards-of-place vulnerability approach of overlapping 
biophysical and social vulnerabilities and incorporates two additional place-based factors that 
may also contribute to vulnerability: the potential contamination of floodwaters by spills or leaks 
of hazardous wastes and the compromise of facilities that serve the population in critically 
important ways. Hazardous wastes may have immediate and long-term impacts when they come 
into contact with the environment and population and could leak, spill, or overflow into 
floodwaters during flood events. They are included as a separate floodwater contaminants index 
that attenuates or enhances the biophysical (exposure) vulnerability. The contaminants index 
uses residential proximity to potential contaminant sources as an indicator of the degree of risk. 
Also considered as a separate index are critical facilities such as correctional facilities, group 
homes, and psychiatric care centers, that provide temporary or long-term residence in a group 
setting to large populations that may be sick or disabled. These facilities house a “special needs” 
population and warrant particular attention because of their complex and resource intensive 
evacuation needs. If they are situated in a flood zone, these facilities would need additional time 
for evacuation as well as arrangements for the relocation of residents, therefore these facilities 
are particularly important to identify in the context of citywide emergency planning and 
response.  
 
The purpose of combining physical and social vulnerabilities and critical facilities in a spatial 
context is to identify the factors that contribute to local differences in vulnerability and target 




1.2. Research Overview 
This work uses a GIS-based methodology to develop and map a composite exposure and 
infrastructure vulnerability index for New York City populations within existing and predicted 
flood zones to assess overall flood risk at the intersection of exposure and vulnerability. Four 
individual indices were constructed using sociodemographic, cadastral, flood extent, and 
infrastructure-based datasets, each capturing an aspect of the risk populations face during flood 
events. These indices were then combined to form an overall storm surge flood risk index at the 
tax lot level.  The index was mapped to illustrate the distribution of flood risk throughout the 
flood zones of the city and to highlight the most vulnerable areas.   
 
The four individual indices are listed from left to right in Figure 1.1, and combined to form the 
overall storm surge flood risk index at the top of the figure. The first index, the storm surge 
exposure index, is founded upon the premise that higher floodwater elevations and high velocity 
breaking waves pose a greater threat to communities than smaller floodwater heights without 
wave action. This index ranks the degree to which people may be exposed to floodwaters and is 
intended to convey the potential for harm at different locations. Areas that rank higher on this 
index will likely experience greater damage to buildings and infrastructure, and have populations 
that are at greater risk to injury or mortality than areas that rank lower on the index. The second 
index is the social vulnerability index, which uses socioeconomic indicators derived from the US 
Census and American Community Survey to identify groups that have greater difficulty coping, 
adapting, or responding to flood events. These indicators describe characteristics of the 
population that are present even when a flood hazard is not present, yet these characteristics can 
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render residents particularly vulnerable when these events do occur.  The indicators used in this 
social vulnerability index are listed in Figure 1.1.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. The four individual indices - storm surge exposure index, social vulnerability index, 
critical facilities index, and storm surge floodwater contaminants index - that comprise the 
overall storm surge flood risk index. The components of the individual indices are listed below 
them. 
 
The third index, the critical facilities index, considers facilities that provide essential services to 
residents and may become vulnerable to damage or failure during a flood event. Facility types 
were grouped into two categories: Group 1 comprised of facilities serving or temporarily housing 
a population needing direct assistance for mobility (e.g., disabled persons and/or the elderly) and 
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Group 2 consisting of facilities with complex evacuation and/or recovery needs (e.g., 
correctional facilities, single and family shelters, schools and day care centers). The grouping of 
the facilities is intended to convey a potentially greater vulnerability for Group 1 facilities than 
house people with mobility issues. Emergency managers should target areas with high 
concentrations of critical facilities to allow for coordinated evacuation and other preparatory 
measures (Morrow 2008). Finally, the fourth index - floodwater contaminants - uses residential 
proximity to facilities that handle or store toxic wastes as the criteria by which to evaluate the 
potential for exposure to chemicals and other hazards that may be released in floodwaters during 
a flood event. The nine types of facilities included in this index are listed in Figure 1.1. Finally, 
the four individual indices are aggregated without weights to form the overall storm surge flood 
risk index. By creating an overall flood risk index multiple aspects of potential vulnerability to 
flood events can be represented with one value and compared citywide. Also the incorporation of 
both physical social vulnerabilities into the overall storm surge flood risk index offers a place-
based understanding of the local landscape of risk. 
 
1.3. Document Structure 
This work is divided into eight chapters in the following order: an introduction chapter, four 
background chapters, a methodology chapter, results and discussion, and a conclusions chapter 
with references and appendices at the end. This introduction chapter describes the goals and 
hypotheses of the dissertation itself and offers context for the questions being examined at the 
study location. The second chapter reviews the concept of vulnerability in the context of natural 
hazards and disasters as well as the evolution of models of social vulnerability. Social 
vulnerability assessments and indices developed in previous research are reviewed. Chapter three 
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describes global and regional trends of sea-level rise, sea-level rise projections for the New York 
City region, and the impact of sea-level rise on future flood events.  Chapter four discusses the 
potential for sites of industrial wastes and other toxics sited along the waterfront to release 
hazardous materials into floodwaters during coastal flood events. Chapter five describes critical 
facilities in New York City that are situated in areas that are at-risk to current and future flood 
events. The sixth chapter describes the GIS methodologies of spatial analysis that were used to 
develop each of the four component indices, the overall storm surge flood risk index, and the 
spatial autocorrelation analysis. Chapter seven presents the results of the analysis and discusses 
the implications. Chapter eight states the conclusions of this work and discusses the limitations 




Chapter 2: Hazard and Vulnerability Assessments 
 
 
Assessments of hazards and vulnerability have been widely used by planners, decision makers, 
and emergency managers to identify the areas most in need of assistance before, during, and after 
a disaster event. The following section discusses the emergence of hazard vulnerability research, 
the role of social vulnerability assessments in hazard planning, mitigation, and disaster response 
and recovery, and the utility of maps as visualization tools for improved planning and response. 
 
2.1. Key Terms and Definitions 
Throughout the research literature relating to hazards and vulnerability, the definition of key 
terms such as ‘risk’ and ‘vulnerability’ have varied when derived from different epistemologies, 
conceptual models, and frameworks. Other terms are used interchangeably as exemplified by the 
use of ‘vulnerability assessment’, ‘hazard assessment’, and ‘risk assessment’ to broadly describe 
the assessment of physical exposure and/or social vulnerability to a hazard. Still other terms have 
different meanings depending on field of research in which they are used. For example, the term 
‘resilience’ is an outcome (i.e., ability to cope) in the hazards community but a process (i.e., 
learning and improving their capacity to handle hazards) in the global environmental change 
literature (Cutter et al. 2008). This work uses key terms that have accrued multiple definitions in 
the literature. To avoid confusion, table 2.1 lists these terms and defines them within the context 





Key	  Terms	  and	  Definitions	  
Adaptation	  
The	  process	  of	  adjustment	  to	  actual	  or	  expected	  climate	  and	  its	  effects.	  In	  
human	  systems,	  adaptation	  seeks	  to	  moderate	  or	  avoid	  harm	  or	  exploit	  
beneficial	  opportunities.	  (Agard	  et	  al.	  2014)	  
Adaptive	  
Capacity	  	  
The	  ability	  of	  systems,	  institutions,	  humans,	  and	  other	  organisms	  to	  adjust	  to	  
potential	  damage,	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  opportunities,	  or	  to	  respond	  to	  
consequences.	  (Agard	  et	  al.	  2014)	  
Biophysical	  
Vulnerability	  
Potential	  exposure	  to	  a	  physical	  hazard;	  broadly	  equivalent	  to	  the	  definition	  
of	  risk.	  Factors	  of	  biophysical	  vulnerability	  are	  related	  to	  system	  properties	  
investigated	  by	  the	  physical	  sciences.	  (Fussel	  2005)	  
Coping	  
Capacity	  
The	  ability	  of	  people,	  organizations	  and	  systems,	  using	  available	  skills	  and	  
resources,	  to	  face	  and	  manage	  adverse	  conditions,	  emergencies	  or	  disasters.	  
(UN/ISDR	  2009)	  
Exposure	  	   People,	  property,	  systems,	  or	  other	  elements	  present	  in	  hazard	  zones	  that	  are	  
thereby	  subject	  to	  potential	  losses.	  (UN/ISDR	  2009)	  
Hazard	   Extreme	  natural	  events	  that	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  harm	  people	  and	  places	  
singly	  or	  in	  combination.	  (Blaikie	  et	  al.	  1996,	  UN/ISDR	  2009)	  
Mitigation	   Actions	  taken	  to	  reduce	  or	  avoid	  risk	  or	  damage	  from	  a	  hazard	  event.	  (Cutter	  
et	  al.	  2008)	  
Natural	  
Disasters	  
Major	  events	  that	  stem	  from	  earth	  system	  processes	  and	  intersect	  with	  
society	  at	  scales	  that	  overwhelms	  society's	  capacity	  to	  respond	  to	  and	  
recover.	  	  
Risk	  
The	  likelihood	  of	  incurring	  harm,	  or	  the	  probability	  that	  some	  type	  of	  negative	  
outcome	  (such	  as	  injury	  or	  loss)	  would	  result	  from	  a	  hazard.	  The	  term	  can	  be	  
used	  to	  convey	  the	  concept	  of	  chance	  or	  probability	  but	  in	  this	  work	  is	  used	  
to	  describe	  the	  potential	  losses	  from	  a	  hazard	  at	  a	  given	  place	  and	  time.	  
(Cutter	  et	  al.	  2000,	  2003)	  
Resilience	  
The	  ability	  of	  a	  social	  system	  to	  respond	  and	  recover	  from	  disasters.	  It	  
includes	  those	  inherent	  conditions	  that	  allow	  the	  system	  to	  absorb	  impacts	  
and	  cope	  with	  an	  event,	  as	  well	  as	  post-­‐event,	  adaptive	  processes	  that	  
facilitate	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  social	  system	  to	  re-­‐organize,	  change,	  and	  learn	  in	  
response	  to	  a	  threat.	  (Cutter	  et	  al.	  2008)	  
Social	  
Vulnerability	  
A	  pre-­‐existing	  condition,	  irrespective	  of	  any	  natural	  hazard,	  that	  describes	  the	  
socioeconomic	  and	  demographic	  factors	  that	  create	  the	  potential	  for	  harm.	  It	  
is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  exposure	  (who	  or	  what	  is	  at	  risk)	  and	  sensitivity	  of	  system	  
(the	  degree	  to	  which	  people	  and	  places	  can	  be	  harmed).	  (Blaikie	  et	  al.	  1996,	  
Turner	  et	  al	  2003,	  Cutter	  et	  al.	  2008)	  
Table 2.1. The key terms used in this work and their definitions.  
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2.2. Hazard Vulnerability Research 
Historically hazards research has been a pragmatic endeavor, solving practical problems 
stemming from extreme natural events. The first risk/hazards paradigm developed in the 1940s 
was an exposure-based approach that focused on the identification and distribution of human-
occupied hazard zones, the range of adjustments available to individuals and society for reducing 
impact, and social acceptance or tolerance of the risks inherent with living in hazard zones 
(Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Cutter et al. 2009). This approach was prominent until the 
1970s when critiques emerged citing this hazard-centric approach as narrow in theory and 
lacking perspective on the role of human agency. Researchers began to argue for a broader view 
that considered the social construction of natural hazards and the socioeconomic drivers that 
make populations vulnerable to physical hazards.  
 
The theoretical foundations of hazard vulnerability research continued to evolve as new 
conceptual models were developed. The three most commonly cited of these include the pressure 
and release model of disaster (Blaikie et al. 1994; Wisner et al. 2003), the hazards-of-place 
model (Cutter 1996), and the vulnerability/sustainability framework (Turner et al. 2003). The 
pressure and release model views disasters as existing at the intersection of physical exposure to 
a hazard on one end and a series of ‘pressures’ that create progressively greater vulnerability on 
the other. This human-centric approach tracks the impacts of hazards on a population from root 
causes to dynamic pressures to the unsafe conditions that create vulnerability. However the 
pressure and release model fails to cite the interaction of human and natural environments in the 
production of disasters and neglects the role of proximity to hazards (Cutter et al. 2008, 2009). 
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The hazards-of-place model (Figure 2.1) uses elements of the original risk/hazards paradigm and 
the pressure and release model, framing vulnerability as both a biophysical risk and social 
response but within the context of a specific geographic or social spatial domain (Cutter 1996; 
Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Wu, Yarnal, and Fisher 2002).  It is a placed-based perspective 
that emphasizes the interaction of physical and social vulnerability in a spatial and temporal 
context. In Figure 2.1, risk and mitigation interact to produce the hazard potential (see Table 2.1 
for definition of key terms). Risk is the likelihood of incurring harm or experiencing a negative 
outcome from a hazard and mitigation refers to action taken to reduce or avoid risk or damage 
from a hazard. The hazard potential is moderated by geographic filters such as the site and 
situation of the place and proximity to the hazard to produce the biophysical vulnerability. The 
social fabric of the place also moderates the hazard potential through the pre-existing 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics that influence a community’s ability to respond 
to, cope with, recover from, and adapt to hazards. This interaction produces the social 
vulnerability of the place. Finally the biophysical and social vulnerabilities combine to form the 
overall place vulnerability (Cutter 1996). This model is well suited for geospatial applications 
and as such is useful for identifying areas of risk and vulnerable populations. However it does 
not consider the root causes of social vulnerability, such as limited access to power and 




Figure 2.1. The hazards-of-place model of vulnerability. From Cutter et al. (2003). 
 
Like the hazards-of-place model, the vulnerability/sustainability framework developed by Turner 
et al (2003) is also place-based, but this approach is focused on situating local vulnerabilities 
within the context of regional and global influences and processes. The context it provides is 
useful for qualitative analyses but it does not distinguish social and physical vulnerabilities nor 
does it provide parameters that define the beginning and end of vulnerability relative to hazards 
(Cutter et al. 2008, 2009). 
 
The reconceptualization of natural hazards as both a physical event and a socially constructed 
situation has changed the way the researchers understand hazard vulnerability. The shift from 
understanding disaster as a function of physical events that act upon people and places, to a 
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broader definition that includes situations constructed through social, political, and economic 
processes is a more contextual approach that considers the combination of physical and 
geographic factors as essential to producing a disaster.  
 
Assessments of hazard vulnerability are frequently used as tools to identify and describe the 
hazards in a given place or region that have the greatest potential for impact and to describe the 
consequences of that impact. They consist of three main components: an assessment of the 
source of the hazard and who and what is exposed to it, an assessment of impacts on the 
population (loss, injury, harm), and an assessment of damage to infrastructure, facilities, and the 
economy (Cutter et al. 2009). Vulnerability assessments can also have a human-environment 
focus with emphasis on the conditions that expose people and places to extreme natural events, 
the characteristics that create vulnerability as a social condition, and the intersection of exposure 
and social vulnerability at a particular place or region.  
 
 
2.3. Social Vulnerability  
The term ‘vulnerability’ has been conceived in two prominent ways: 1) vulnerability as the 
potential exposure to a physical hazard and 2) vulnerability as patterns of differential losses 
among people affected by exposure to hazard (Wu, Yarnal, and Fisher 2002; Rygel, O’sullivan, 
and Yarnal 2006). The first perspective describes biophysical vulnerability while the second 
perspective addresses the social construction of vulnerability. These two perspectives evolved 
sequentially. Early definitions of vulnerability include simply the potential for loss (Cutter 1996) 
and “…being prone to or susceptible to damage or injury” (Blaikie et al. 1994), perspectives that 
place the emphasis on the impact of the hazard. Wisner et al. (2003) reframed this view from a 
social perspective, defining vulnerability as “…the characteristics of a person or group in terms 
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of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural hazard”. 
In the context of this work, vulnerability is the susceptibility of both biophysical and social 
systems to a hazard (the event or occurrence that has the potential to cause harm to people or 
property).  
 
The impacts of hazardous events are often unevenly distributed among and within communities. 
Even though neighborhoods may experience the same level of flood inundation or storm surge, 
the hazard is experienced differently at the community level with vulnerable groups more likely 
to suffer a disproportionate share of the effects. This is because the degree to which populations 
are vulnerable to hazards is more than just a function of exposure to the threat; it also is 
contingent upon social characteristics such as income, gender and age, that affect a population’s 
ability to respond to hazards. 
 
Social vulnerability is a pre-existing condition, irrespective of any natural hazard, that describes 
the socioeconomic and demographic factors that influence the ability of a community to prepare 
for, respond to, and recover from a natural hazard. It is a function of the degree of exposure to a 
hazard (who or what is at risk) and the susceptibility of people and places to harm, as well as an 
indicator of community resistance and resilience. The factors that have the most influence on 
social vulnerability include access to political power and representation; access to resources, 
information, knowledge; availability of social networks; physical mobility and health; financial 
resources; residential building stock; and beliefs and customs (Wisner et al. 2003; Cutter 2001). 
These factors can be represented by a variety of indicators derived from socioeconomic and 
demographic datasets. 
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Some of the most commonly cited indicators include age, disabilities, socioeconomic status, 
gender, and race. Age is a factor in the context of evacuation, with the very young and elderly 
facing physical difficulties in mobility. The elderly in particular are subject to health problems 
and are also less likely to have the economic resources to respond and recover from a disaster 
(Morrow 2008). People with disabilities, both physical and mental, may have limited mobility 
and need assistance in disaster preparation, evacuation, and response. Poverty status is an 
indicator of people’s ability to afford preparedness actions, emergency supplies, and recovery 
measures (Fothergill and Peek 2004). Though wealthy populations may experience greater 
impacts to property and possessions, they have a greater safety net for recovery including 
insurance and other financial resources. The poor are less likely to be able to absorb even small 
degrees of loss, have less access to critical resources including financial assistance, and are more 
likely to live in substandard housing (Cutter et al. 2009). Gender can be an indicator of a 
vulnerable population as well, with women more vulnerable to disasters then men. They are 
more likely to face poverty and to serve as primary care givers to children, often in single status. 
Racial and ethnic minorities are more vulnerable to hazards because they are more likely to live 
in poverty, experience discrimination in housing, and be relegated to hazard-prone areas. Alone 
these indicators present social challenges, but in combination they pose great social burden to 
people and families facing natural disasters. 
 
Assessments of socially vulnerable populations in flood prone areas have appeared in the 
literature for nearly 20 years. Socioeconomic and demographic data is collected - often through 
the US Census - and combined to develop a relative ranking of social vulnerability at the chosen 
spatial unit of analysis for a given geographic area. Some of these studies used factor analysis or 
principal component analysis to reduce the number of census variables (indicators of 
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vulnerability) to a smaller subset that explains the greatest percent of the variance among the 
variables within the study area dataset (Clark et al. 1998; Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003; 
Cutter and Finch 2008; Fekete 2009; Kleinosky, Yarnal, and Fisher 2006; Rygel, O’sullivan, and 
Yarnal 2006; Schmidtlein et al. 2008). Factor analysis applies a statistical technique to the 
selection of social vulnerability index values, relying less of the judgment of the practitioner to 
determine which indicators should be included. Other studies use best judgment to select a small 
number of census variables for inclusion and then use standardizing techniques or percentile 
ranking to create an index of social vulnerability values (Chakraborty, Tobin, and Montz 2005; 
Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Flanagan et al. 2011; Maantay, Maroko, and Culp 2009). 
 
This research selects social vulnerability indicators that are commonly understood to be prime 
factors in creating social vulnerability. It largely refers to the work of Maantay et al. (2009), who 
estimated vulnerable urban populations for flood hazard in New York City through the creation 
of a vulnerability index. Socioeconomic and demographic data were selected at the census block 
group and census tract levels. The scale of analysis is sufficient to compare values at the 




2.4. Coastal Hazard Vulnerability Mapping 
Many studies have produced maps of coastlines physically vulnerable to future sea-level rise 
scenarios. Their purpose is to illustrate the impacts of accelerated sea-level rise on coastal lands 
and to estimate the spatial extent of areas at risk to inundation. In these efforts, projections of 
sea-level rise are added to topographic contours, orthometric datum, or tidal datum to map land 
that could be inundated or eroded by rising seas, and to delineate potential future coastlines 
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within the continental United States. However many of these studies are limited in that they only 
evaluate sea-level rise inundation and do not account for specific flood events, they do not 
connect their analyses with designated flood hazard metrics, or evaluate populations or 
infrastructure at-risk (Titus and Richman 2001; Mazria and Kershner 2007; Poulter and Halpin 
2007; Gesch 2009; Li et al. 2009; Cooper, Beevers, and Oppenheimer 2005; Gornitz, Couch, and 
Hartig 2002). And though high-resolution LiDAR (light detection and ranging) elevation data is 
used exclusively or partially in a few studies (Larsen et al. 2004; Poulter and Halpin 2007; Titus 
and Wang 2008; Gesch 2009) the majority of elevation datasets used in these studies are of 
coarse resolution which provides limited accuracy.  
 
Other studies do connect their analyses to flood events and evaluate the vulnerability of 
populations at risk. Projections of sea-level rise have been added to specific flood events such as 
the SLOSH (Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) model, a model which estimates 
storm surge heights from hurricanes, to assess vulnerability within future sea-level rise enhanced 
storm surge zones (Wu, Yarnal, and Fisher 2002; Kleinosky, Yarnal, and Fisher 2006; Rygel, 
O’Sullivan, and Yarnal 2006). These studies are particularly useful in places like New York City 
where coastline topography dictates that sea-level rise inundation will not be experienced as a 
daily event but rather as the increased height and extent of storm surge events. In addition to 
mapping future sea-level rise scenarios, a few studies evaluate sea-level rise enhanced storm 
surge zones under future scenarios of population growth to assess potential emerging areas of 
community vulnerability (Wu, Yarnal, and Fisher 2002; Kleinosky, Yarnal, and Fisher 2006).  
Other studies that examine current and enhanced storm surge conditions broaden their evaluation 
of biophysical and social community vulnerability by incorporating economic elements such as 
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parcel value and land use, as well as critical infrastructure and facilities in their assessments 
(Frazier et al. 2010; Shepard et al. 2012).  
 
Studies of coastal flooding and inundation are enhanced by the use of maps that illustrate the 
location of vulnerable lands, features, and populations. This visual imagery of storm surge is 
essential in conveying to decision makers, stakeholders, and the public the increased risk of flood 
exposure due to higher seas. Geographic information systems have become a popular tool for 
developing these maps and depicting social vulnerability. Maps offer a visual comparison of 
values within and between study areas and are used to identify the most sensitive populations. 
Choropleth maps in particular use degrees of shading at the spatial unit of analysis (e.g., census 
unit) to indicate the value of the vulnerability, with darker colors indicating greater vulnerability 
(Clark et al. 1998; Wu, Yarnal, and Fisher 2002; Rygel, O’sullivan, and Yarnal 2006; 
Chakraborty, Tobin, and Montz 2005; Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000). Vulnerability maps 
illustrate the local or regional landscape of risks, hazards, and vulnerability (also referred to as 
‘riskscapes’ or ‘hazardscapes’ (Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000)) and allow for more targeted 
emergency planning and response. 
 
Maps of vulnerability to current and future flood zones in New York City allow for planners, 
decision makers, and emergency managers to identify the areas most in need of assistance. An 
index of social vulnerability combined with a spatial analysis of current and future flood events 
identifies both the geographic areas most likely to be impacted by flood hazards and areas most 
likely to suffer from hazard events. These areas do not always overlap but when they do these 
populations experience heightened vulnerability to floods. Mapping the distribution of the most 
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vulnerable populations allows planners and responders to evaluate the influence of social 
characteristics on overall vulnerability and to respond to that range of differential vulnerabilities 
across the city.   
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Chapter 3: Sea-Level Rise and Flooding in New York City  
 
With its hyper-dense built environment of concrete and asphalt it can be easy to forget that New 
York City is a city of islands. Its five boroughs are situated in the New York harbor and estuary 
where the Atlantic Ocean, Hudson River, and East River meet. The boroughs of Manhattan and 
Staten Island are individual islands while Brooklyn and Queens are both situated on the western 
end of Long Island, an island formed from glacial debris left behind by the recession of the 
Laurentide ice sheet during the last glaciation. Multiple rivers, streams, and tidal straits thread 
throughout and between the boroughs creating nearly 600 miles of coastline (Figure 3.1). The 
borough of the Bronx is separated from the rest of the city by the Harlem and East Rivers. 
Through its northern border, it is the only borough directly connected to the mainland. The 
Hudson River separates Manhattan and the Bronx from New Jersey, and the East River divides 
Manhattan and the Bronx from Long Island. Staten Island is bounded by the Arthur Kill to the 
west, the Kill van Kull to the North, and the New York Bay and Atlantic Ocean to the east and 
south. These coastlines range in character from sandy beaches and marshlands to bulkheads and 




Figure 3.1. The five boroughs of New York City and the major waterways that surround them. 
 
New York City is over 300 mi2 in area (468 mi2 including water) and home to a population of 8.4 
million, making it the most populous city in the United States (US Census Bureau 2013). With 
27,532 people per square mile, it is also one of the most densely populated metropolitan areas in 
the country with Manhattan ranking as the densest county. The city’s population is projected to 
grow throughout the 21st century with historical rates of population growth suggesting an 
additional one million residents by the year 2040. A major concern in the context of population 
growth is the development of additional housing units to accommodate new residents. As of 
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2011 the number of housing units in NYC was 3.3 million1. Currently NYC does not have the 
capacity to house one million additional residents because of limitations in the development of 
existing neighborhoods (Keenan and Chakrabarti 2013). Although ample additional residential 
zoned floor area is available throughout the city for (vertical) redevelopment, the majority of it is 
“landlocked” meaning that the available air rights cannot be or are not incentivized to be 
developed. Therefore the pressure to house incoming residents has forced development in 
expanding floodplains with high-density commercial and residential properties springing up 
along many waterfront areas, replacing abandoned factories and manufacturing sites (Jacob, 
Gornitz, and Rosenzweig 2007). The East River corridor offers many sites on or near the water 
that would accommodate the development of large residential housing complexes, particularly in 
western Brooklyn and Queens and southern areas of the Bronx. Keenan and Chakrabarti (2013) 
estimate that of the one million incoming residents approximately 70% could potentially be 
housed through infill of existing neighborhoods while the remaining 30% would have to be 
housed in large, new, mixed-income residential developments along the waterfront. Though new 
construction in the 100-year floodplain is regulated by building codes and standards, potential 
future changes in flood scenarios may not be accounted for. 
 
3.1. Recent Coastal Flood Events  
Many studies have cited the increased vulnerability of New York’s shorelines to climate induced 
sea-level rise due to its unique geography and climatology (Rosenzweig and Solecki 2000; 
Gornitz, Couch, and Hartig 2002; Colle et al. 2008). Though New York City is impacted by 
coastal, street and fluvial flooding, coastal flooding can have the most serious effects (Federal 
                                                
1 This housing stock estimate refers to 2011 data collected by the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey: 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/HPD-2011-HVS-Selected-Findings-Tables.pdf  
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Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 2007). Coastal flooding occurs during weather events 
such as tropical storms, hurricanes, and nor’easters when the high winds and low barometric 
pressure of these intense storm systems act to push ocean water inland. The water that is pushed 
ashore, referred to as the storm surge, is often several meters above mean water level and can be 
amplified by astronomic tides. New York City is especially vulnerable to storm surge because of 
its extensive coastlines, dense population and its unique position at the right angle hinge of New 
York and New Jersey. This hinge, referred to as the New York Bight, acts to hold in place storm 
surge that is pushed into the Lower New York Bay by the cyclonic (counterclockwise) winds of 
hurricane and nor’easters. The northern edge of a storm can drive surge westward along the 
southern coastline of Long Island and into the coasts of Staten Island and Manhattan. With New 
Jersey at a right angle to the south, the surge has little outlet for retreat and could potentially 
build to heights in excess of 32 feet according to the highest theoretical storm surge produced by 
SLOSH (Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) hurricane surge models. 
 
Researchers know that New York State has been frequently impacted by storm surge from 
tropical and extratropical storms. Though the observational record of storm events spans only the 
last 150 years, contemporary newspapers, personal diaries, ship logs, and town histories have 
been used to extend this record back to the 1620s (Boose, Chamberlin, and Foster 2001). In 
addition, large prehistoric storms have left telltale signs of their passing in the geological proxy 
record and these signals have been used to extend the storm record over a few millennia (Liu and 
Fearn 2000b, 2000a; Donnelly, Bryant, et al. 2001; Donnelly, Roll, et al. 2001; Donnelly et al. 
2004). Using this paleotempestological technique, Scileppi and Donnelly (2007) have concluded 
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that numerous strong hurricanes have impacted the NYC and Long Island region over the past 
~3500 years. 
 
Though the New York coastal area has been hit by 6 major (Category 3) hurricanes since 1851 
(Ludlum 1963; Blake, Landsea, and Gibney 2011; Orton et al. 2015), nor’easters and winter 
storms are also responsible for major coastal flooding impacts due to their broad geographic 
extent and surge that persists through multiple cycles of high tide, often for several days. For 
example, the 1962 Ash Wednesday winter storm occurred during the spring equinox and lasted 
over 5 tidal cycles, resulting in 6.9-foot (2.1 meter) flood elevations at the Battery, New York. 
The December 1992 nor’easter, which arrived on a full moon and lasted three tidal cycles, 
flooded the Battery with 7.9 feet (2.4 meters) of water and led to the near complete shut down of 
the metropolitan New York transit system with the Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) trains 
out of operation for 10 days (Gornitz, Couch, and Hartig 2002). In comparison to nor’easters, the 
impact of hurricane storm surge is typically of shorter duration. For example the Great Hurricane 
of 1938 was moving forward at speeds of 50 - 60 mph when it made landfall on Long Island. 
Though it blew the East River three blocks into Manhattan the surge didn’t last a full tidal cycle. 
The same was true when Hurricane Sandy struck the New York/New Jersey coastal region on the 
evening of October 29, 2012. Its period of maximum surge at the Battery was also brief, peaking 
once just after high tide around 9:30pm. The surge of hurricanes may be of shorter duration than 
that of nor’easters but the damage inflicted may be severe. Sandy’s peak surge of over 14 feet 
caused unprecedented damage to the city’s infrastructure including transportation, electric and 
natural gas utilities, wastewater treatment facilities, buildings, and services such as fuel, 
healthcare and food supplies.   
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There has been considerable discussion as to the potential for more frequent and intense 
hurricanes both globally and in the North Atlantic in the future. Both the 4th and 5th Assessment 
Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) state that there have been no 
clear global trends in hurricane activity over the past century, in part due to the absence of 
satellite technology data before 1970 (Bindoff et al. 2007; Hartmann et al. 2013). However it is 
likely2 that the global frequency of hurricanes will either decrease or remain the same under 21st 
century greenhouse warming conditions. The frequency of intense storms (Saffir-Simpson 
category 3 or higher) will more likely than not3 increase substantially in many regions, including 
the North Atlantic (Christensen et al. 2013). In fact, Emanuel (2013) downscaled the CMIP5 
global climate model4 to simulate 21st century hurricane activity and found a 40% increase in 
storms ranked category 3 and higher in most regions throughout the world. Though the total 
number of tropical storms in the North Atlantic may decrease slightly, the number of intense 
hurricanes, extreme hurricane winds, and the amount of intense hurricane precipitation are all 
more likely than not projected to increase by the 2080s (Horton et al. 2014), in part due to 
expected warming of the upper ocean in the tropical cyclone genesis regions of the North 
Atlantic. The trend for nor’easters in the future is unknown.  
 
Individual storm tracks are variable and poorly understood making it unclear how an increase in 
intense hurricanes in the North Atlantic may impact the New York City region. However, as sea-
level rise will provide a higher baseline upon which storm surges and wave action are founded, 
an increase in storm intensity could pose great risks to coastal communities. 
                                                
2 The IPCC defines likely as a greater than 66% probability. 
3 The IPCC defines more likely than not as a greater than 50% probability. 




3.2. Long Term Trends in Global Sea Level Change 
Evidence of fluctuations in global sea levels have been observed in the geologic record and 
reconstructed for the past half billion years. Since the last glacial maximum approximately 
20,000 years ago, we have been in an era of global sea-level rise with ocean levels first rapidly 
rising nearly 400 feet and then decelerating 9,000 years ago before finally leveling out to 0.04 to 
0.08 inches per decade between 3,000 and 2,000 years ago (IPCC 2007; FitzGerald et al. 2008).  
Rates of sea-level rise accelerated during the late 19th century with estimates for the 20th 
century showing a global average sea-level rise of about 0.67 inches (+/-0.08) per decade 
(Church and White 2011). Satellite altimeter observations indicate that the rate of global sea-
level rise increased to 0.13 inches (+/-0.02) per year between 1993 and 2009 (Church and White 
2011). Though multiple processes contribute to sea-level rise, thermal expansion of the oceans 
and melting of land-based ice have been the dominant contributors to global average rise in the 
20th century. Model-based sea-level rise projections in the fifth assessment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Church et al. 2013) predict that sea level will rise 
between 10.2 and 32.3 inches for the period 2081 - 2100 (relative to 1986 - 2005), a range that 
considers four Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) scenarios of atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations. RCP8.5, the pathway with the highest greenhouse gas emissions 
(Riahi et al. 2011), gives a rise of 20.5 to 38.6 inches by 2100. The improved semiempirical 
method presented by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) suggests that global sea levels could reach 
one or even two meters by 2100. 
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3.3. Regional Sea Level Change as an Emerging Issue in New York City 
Climate change adaptation and resilience has only become a major policy issue in New York 
City in the past decade. Before that time regional changes in sea level were not of significant 
concern to city stakeholders, agencies, and decision-makers. Two factors that influenced this 
shift in policy focus were 1) an increasing trend of global awareness, conversation, and decision-
making about climate chance science and impacts, and 2) an increase in climate events that had 
significant impact on New York City infrastructure and operations. As the impacts of climate 
change became more tangible, there emerged a growing need to develop a rigorous base of 
climate science information to inform future fiscal decisions and public policy. Projections of 
temperatures, precipitation, and sea-level rise throughout the 21st century were first developed 
for NYC in 2010 as a product of climate adaptation and resilience initiatives instituted by former 
Mayor Michael Bloomberg. These initiatives were the very forefront of climate change policy 
and action in New York City.  
 
The first major report on global climate change science, impacts, and potential response 
strategies was published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990. By 
the second IPCC report in 1995 the content had expanded to include adaptations and mitigation, 
as well as economic and social dimensions of climate change. Through the IPCC, the 
international scientific community identified climate change as a critical science-policy issue and 
developed an assessment framework that has been replicated at multiple scales. Much of the 
climate change literature that has emerged in New York City from the 1990’s to present is 
derivative of the work of the IPCC.  
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In 1994 the conference Metropolitan New York in the Greenhouse: Infrastructure Planning for 
an Uncertain Future was convened in New York City to prepare the region’s infrastructure for 
climate change impacts and to encourage direct action toward mitigation or adaptation (Hill 
1996). Though scenario planning was a significant topic in the conference, the first major 
scenario-based scientific assessment of climate impacts across the New York Metropolitan 
Region wasn’t developed until 2000 as part of the first comprehensive national climate 
assessment. The Metropolitan East Coast (MEC) Assessment of Impacts of Potential Climate 
Variability and Change report (Rosenzweig and Solecki 2000) recommended adaptations at both 
conceptual and operational levels, the creation of an Inter-Agency Climate Task Force, and the 
creation of a Climate Awareness Program to inform decision-makers and the general public 
about climate change and response. Overall, the report while widely cited was not immediately 
translated into significant policy changes or immediate management actions. 
 
In 2006 the Mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, formally announced the creation of a 
new Mayoral office - the Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability (OLTPS). The goal 
of this office was to “improve New York City’s quality of life, environmental sustainability, and 
resilience to climate change…” by developing cohesive sustainability plans. The detailed action 
plan developed by OLTPS titled PlaNYC 2030: A Greener Greater New York, called for the 
development of a strategic process to adapt to climate change impacts, the creation of a New 
York City Climate Change Advisory Board, updates to the 100-year floodplain maps, and the 
need to consider site-specific strategies for highly vulnerable communities in the city.  
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On August 8, 2007 a severe and largely unpredicted thunderstorm caused major and in some 
areas prolonged service disruptions of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s (MTA) 
transit system. This and other severe weather events emphasized the immediacy of climate 
change impacts and elevated the importance of adaptation measures that would fortify the city. 
The following August 2008, the Mayor announced the creation of the New York City Climate 
Change Adaptation Task Force, a group made up of City and State agencies, authorities and 
private companies that operate, maintain, or control critical infrastructure in New York City. The 
taskforce was charged with developing adaptation strategies to secure the city’s infrastructure 
from the effects of climate change. At the same time, the Mayor brought together the New York 
City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC). The Panel was composed of experts from the academic, 
legal, insurance, and engineering sectors and was convened to serve as technical advisor the 
Climate Change Adaptation Task Force.  Central to the panel’s charge was the development of 
climate change projections for New York City, including future trends in temperature, 
precipitation, and sea-level rise. The NPCC developed a rigorous science base that included past, 
current, and expected future trends and scenarios developed from downscaled global climate 
models, as well as future flood maps illustrating the potential extent of the 100-year floodplain 
with projected sea-level rise. Their work was summarized in the 2010 report, Climate Change 
Adaptation in New York City: Building a Risk Management Response (Rosenzweig and Solecki 
2010), which established the scientific foundation for climate change adaptation in NYC and 
guided the New York City Climate Change Adaptation Task Force members in their climate 
change adaptation planning process.  
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Then Hurricane Sandy struck at the end of October 2012 bringing record storm surge of 14 feet 
above MLLW5 to the Battery and exceeding the acting 100-year floodplain (as defined by 
FEMA’s 1983 Flood Insurance Rate Maps study) by 53% (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013). 
Storm impacts included 43 deaths, 2 million without power, tens of thousands of buildings 
impacted, and $19 billion in damage. Sandy highlighted the very real vulnerability of New York 
City’s infrastructure, natural environments, communities, and economies to the effects of storm 
surge and rising sea levels. 
 
Two months later, Mayor Bloomberg created the Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency 
(SIRR) to address how to create a more resilient New York City in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. 
This initiative convened the Second New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC2), 
established them as a permanent body, and charged them with developing updated climate 
projections and future 100- and 500-year flood maps for New York City. The 400-page report of 
the SIRR, PlaNYC: A Stronger, More Resilient New York, was released on June 11, 2013 and 
focused on preparing for and protecting against the impacts of climate change (NYC Office of 
the Mayor 2013). Critical to informing this report of the relevant emerging climate science was 
the new release from the NPCC2 titled Climate Risk Information 2013: Observations, Climate 
Change Projections, and Maps (New York City Panel on Climate Change 2013a).  This report 
contained updated future climate projections for New York City, including data on mean annual 
temperatures, total annual precipitation, sea-level rise, and extreme events. The NPCC2 has since 
updated and extended their 2013 climate projections for a 2015 publication in the Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences. 
                                                
5 Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW) refers to the average height of the lowest tide recorded at a tide station each day 
during the recording period. See NOAA’s Tides and Currents website 
(http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/datum_options.html) for more information on tidal datums. 
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3.3.1. Regional Rates of Sea Level Change: NPCC and NPCC2 Sea-Level Rise Projections 
Currently, rates of relative sea-level rise in New York City as measured by tide gauges range 
between 0.86 and 1.5 inches per decade (2.9 and 3.8 cm) with the long term rate since 1900 
averaging 1.2 inches per decade (3.1 cm).  Approximately 40% of this rise is regional land 
subsidence, a process by which the land “sinks” in response to the retreat of the ice sheets after 
the last glacial maximum. Sea levels are rising twice as fast locally (1.2 inches per decade) as 
they are globally (0.67 inches per decade) (Horton et al. 2015).  
 
In 2010, 2013, and 2015 the New York City Panel on Climate Change released 21st century 
projections for climate change and sea level rise in the New York City region. In their 2010 
report, the NPCC presented two sets of sea level rise projections: one based on IPCC methods 
and a second “rapid ice melt” (RIM) scenario based on paleoclimate data. The IPCC-based 
methods approach considers multiple components such as global thermal expansion of water, 
local land subsidence, meltwater from glacier, ice caps, and ice sheets, and local water surface 
elevation, in the development of regional sea level rise scenarios.  It uses seven global circulation 
models (GCMs) and the B1, A1B, and B2 emissions scenarios to develop sea-level rise 
projections for three time slices - 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s - each centered on a given decade 
(e.g., 2050 - 2059). These results indicate that sea level could rise 2 to 5 inches by the 2020s, 7 to 
12 inches by the 2050s, and 12 to 23 inches by the 2080s relative to the baseline period of 2000-
2004 (Table 3.1).  
 
However, discussion in the scientific community suggested that the GCMs used in the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) might have underestimated the range of possible sea level rise 
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(IPCC 2007). The probability of sea-level rise lower than the GCM projections of the IPCC-
based methods is very low, but the probability of the sea-level rise exceeding the IPCC-based 
projections is higher. To address this possibility an alternative “rapid ice-melt” scenario was 
devised based on paleoclimate studies and extrapolated rates of ice melt from the West Antarctic 
and Greenland ice sheets. These polar ice sheets have the potential to contribute significantly to 
SLR if the current melt patterns continue to accelerate. Rapid Ice Melt projections suggest 5 to 
10 inches by the 2020s, 19 to 29 inches by the 2050s, and 41 to 55 inches by the 2080s (Table 
3.1). 
 
New	  York	  City	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  2010	  
	   Central	  range1	  sea-­‐level	  rise	  projections	  
	   Baseline	  
2000-­‐2004	   2020s	   2050s	   2080s	  
IPCC-­‐based	  
methods2	   NA	   +	  2	  to	  5	  inches	   +	  7	  to	  12	  inches	   +	  12	  to	  23	  inches	  
Rapid	  ice-­‐melt	  
scenario3	   NA	   ~	  5	  to	  10	  inches	   ~	  19	  to	  29	  inches	   ~	  41	  to	  55	  inches	  
1	  Central	  range	  =	  middle	  67%	  of	  values	  from	  model-­‐based	  probabilities	  rounded	  to	  the	  nearest	  inch.	  	  
2	  The	  model-­‐based	  sea-­‐level	  rise	  projections.	  
3	  "Rapid	  ice-­‐melt”	  scenario	  is	  based	  on	  acceleration	  of	  recent	  rates	  of	  ice	  melt	  in	  the	  Greenland	  and	  West	  Antarctic	  ice	  
sheets	  and	  paleoclimate	  studies.	  
Table 3.1. NPCC 2010 baseline sea-level rise and mean annual changes. Table modified 
from Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2010. 
 
When reconvened in the wake of Hurricane Sandy in 2013, the Second New York City Panel on 
Climate Change (NPCC2) developed new climate change projections for the 2020s and 2050s. 
These projections were generally consistent with those produced in 2010 however the 
temperature and precipitation outcomes were founded upon a new and larger set of GCMs and 
updated emissions scenarios known as representative concentration pathways (RCPs). Sea-level 
rise projections were no longer founded on the GCM and rapid-ice melt methods, but instead 
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were developed using an expanded component-by-component approach. This component-based 
approach aggregates the following primary elements of sea-level change: meltwater from ice 
caps, glaciers, and ice sheets; the “fingerprint” of ice mass changes on land; vertical land 
movements (glacioisostatic adjustments); global thermal expansion of ocean water; and land 
water storage (New York City Panel on Climate Change 2013b). The 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th 
percentile values were estimated for each component, and all components at each percentile 
summed to give the aggregate sea level rise projection. For the 2020s these projections suggest a 
low-estimate (10th percentile) of 2 inches, a middle range (25th - 75th percentile) of 4 to 8 inches, 
and a high-estimate (90th percentile) of 11 inches, and for the 2050s a low-estimate of 7 inches, a 
middle range of 11 to 24 inches, and a high-estimate of 31 inches by the 2050s (Table 3.2). The 
2013 NPCC2 sea-level rise projections for the 2020s and 2050s are the primary dataset used in 
this work to evaluate the population and infrastructure vulnerable to future flood events. Though 
the 2013 projections were superseded by the NPCC2 in 2015, these more recent projections were 
not available at the time of this analysis.  
New	  York	  City	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  2013	  
Sea-­‐level	  rise	  	  







2020s	   2	  inches	   4	  to	  8	  inches	   11	  inches	  
2050s	   7	  inches	   11	  to	  24	  inches	   31	  inches	  
Table 3.2. NPCC 2013 baseline sea-level rise and mean annual changes. Values are rounded to 
the nearest inch. Source: New York City Panel on Climate Change, 2013a. 
 
In 2015 the NPCC2 released their most recent sea-level rise projections to date using the same 
expanded component-by-component based approach used in 2013. Estimates for the 2020s and 
2050s were slightly refined and new projections for the 2080s and 2100 were included (Table 
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3.3). For the 2020s and 2050s, the high 90th percentile estimates were lowered by an inch relative 
to 2013 values bringing the projections to 10 and 30 inches respectively. Also the low 10th 
percentile estimate for the 2050s was raised from 7 to 8 inches. For the 2080s, projections 
indicate a low 10th percentile estimate of 13 inches, a middle range of 18 to 39 inches, and a high 
90th percentile estimate of 58 inches, and for 2100 a low 10th percentile estimate of 15 inches, a 
middle range of 22 to 50 inches, and a high 90th percentile estimate of 75 inches.  
New	  York	  City	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change,	  2015	  
Sea-­‐level	  rise	  	  







2020s	   2	  inches	   4	  to	  8	  inches	   10	  inches	  
2050s	   8	  inches	   11	  to	  21	  inches	   30	  inches	  
2080s	   13	  inches	   18	  to	  39	  inches	   58	  inches	  
2100	   15	  inches	   22	  to	  50	  inches	   75	  inches	  
Table 3.3. NPCC 2015 sea-level rise projections. Values are rounded to the nearest inch. Source: 
(Horton et al. 2015). 
 
The NPCC2 also determined that as sea levels rise coastal flood heights will increase and floods 
of a given magnitude will occur with greater frequency.  
 
3.4. Mapping Current and Sea-Level Rise Enhanced Flood Extents 
When considering the impacts of sea-level rise on New York City’s coasts, the NPCC chose to 
focus on the 100-year floodplain instead of coastal inundation or hurricane surge scenarios. 
There were two prominent reasons for this decision: 1) the 100-year flood is used as the current 
critical benchmark for major land use, flood insurance, and policy decisions and therefore 
politically meaningful, and 2) as a theoretical value the 100-year flood can be used to 
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approximate potential flooding events, irrespective of the storm event with which they are 
associated. The 100-year flood, also referred to as the 1-in-100 year flood or the 1 percent annual 
chance flood, is defined as a statistical construct used to represent the probability that a flood of a 
certain discharge (and elevation) will occur with a 1% chance in any given year (Galloway et al. 
2006).  
 
However the record surge brought by Hurricane Sandy emphasized the need to look beyond the 
100-year flood to assess future flood possibilities. Though flood insurance is not required for 
structures located in the 500-year floodplain, knowledge of the potential extent of this floodplain 
in the future can serve to guide long-term efforts for planning and resiliency and allow for 
protection our critical infrastructure and essential facilities. For this reason, in their second and 
third reports the NPCC2 chose to focus on both the 100- and 500-year floodplains. 
 
To give visual dimension to the numeric projections of sea-level rise, the NPCC2 used future 
sea-level rise estimates to create maps illustrating the potential extent of future 100- and 500-
year flood scenarios in New York City. These maps are founded upon the work of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that both modeled and mapped the current 100-and 
500-year floods in NYC. FEMA is responsible for creating and maintaining Flood Insurance 
Rate Maps (FIRMs) that delineate the 100- and 500-year floodplains for all communities that 
participate in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). These maps are used to determine if 
flood insurance is required when banks provide federally insured loans for new construction or 
building renovation. In New York State, compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program 
is mandatory for all jurisdictions and the existence of flood insurance plans at the community 
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level is a condition for any given property to obtain flood insurance. Construction within the 
100-year floodplain is subject to special building codes, and insurance and environmental 
regulations. As a result, many of the flood-resistant construction codes of New York City are 
required to meet the state and federal requirements, which have been standardized through the 
International Building Code (IBC).  
 
The 100- and 500-year flood zones of New York City were first delineated over 25 years ago by 
FEMA as part of their Flood Insurance Study (FIS) for New York City. An FIS is a document 
that contains information about flooding in a community and is produced in conjunction with the 
Flood Rate Insurance Map (FIRM). The FIS describes the flooding history of a community, 
explains the engineering methods and data sources used to develop the FIRMs, and provides 
flood heights and profiles for various recurrence probabilities. FIRMs display flood boundaries 
for the 100- and 500-year floods and base flood elevation (BFE) information for the 100-year 
flood. Base flood elevations refer to the elevations to which floodwaters are expected to rise 
during the 100-year flood event. They are measured relative to a given datum - either the 
National Geodetic Vertical Datum of 1929 (NGVD29) or the North American Vertical Datum of 
1988 (NAVD88; FEMAs 2013 maps use NAVD88). FIRMs are essential to determining flood 
insurance premiums; setting the regulatory standard for structural elevations, building design 
standards, and flood proofing; and for the implementation of floodplain management and 
regulation practices. They are used by multiple parties including federal agencies, state and local 




FIRMs broadly distinguish between two types of flood hazard areas: areas exposed to the 100-
year flood also known as Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA), and non-SHFA which includes 
areas in the 500-year floodplain as well as areas not exposed to flooding (Figure 3.2). Within the 
SHFA, areas subject to wave heights of three feet or greater are termed coastal high hazard areas 
and designated VE Zones where the V stands for “velocity wave action.” Areas within the SFHA 
not subject to velocity wave action are designated Coastal AE Zones. The Limit of Moderate 
Wave Action (LiMWA) is a line within the AE Zone that delineates the landward location of the 
1.5-foot wave height. Base flood elevations are displayed as whole numbers rounded to the 
nearest foot in the VE and AE Zones. Beyond the SHFA, moderate flood hazard areas are subject 
to the 500-year flood and areas of minimal flood hazard are subject to less than the 500-year 
event. Though the flood zone designations discussed above are valuable for determining the 
areas of greatest flood hazard, they are difficult to estimate in future flood scenarios.  For this 
reason the NPCC and NPCC2 flood maps do not include estimates of future base flood 
elevations, nor do they distinguish future zones of high velocity wave action. 
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Figure 3.2. A coastal profile showing the transition of FEMA designated flood zones from the 
ocean (left) moving onshore to the limit of the 100-year flood and beyond. The Special Flood 
Hazard Area contains Zones VE and AE. Zone X indicates areas beyond the 100-year flood zone 
that may be subject to the 500-year flood. Image source: https://www.fema.gov/coastal-flood-
risk-study-process. 
 
 In addition to illustrating the potential extent of future 100- and 500-year flood scenarios, the 
NPCC also estimates the impact of sea-level rise on flood reoccurrence intervals. Sea-level rise 
increases the frequency with which floods of a given magnitude will be experienced so that 
future storm events and astronomical tides need be of much smaller magnitude to achieve the 
levels of flooding that we experience today from higher magnitude events. And future storm and 
tide events of large magnitude will achieve new flood heights and extents. For example, the 
current 100-year flood has a 1% chance of occurring in any given year, and associated flood 
heights reach 11.2 feet. By the 2080s, the current 100-year flood (1% chance annual flood) could 
occur with a 2% - 5.4% annual chance with flood elevations reaching 12.8 to 14.6 feet, 1.5 to 2.3 
feet higher than currently experienced (Horton et al. 2014).  
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3.4.1. New York City Panel on Climate Change (NPCC) Flood Maps 
The NPCC first published future flood maps in their 2010 report Climate Change Adaptation in 
New York City: Building a Risk Management Approach. This report features maps of the 100-
year floodplain for the 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s, using the 90th percentile values of the 2010 
IPCC-based and rapid ice-melt sea-level rise projection scenarios (Figure 3.3).  The 90th 
percentile values equate to 5 inches for the 2020s, 13 inches for the 2050s, and 23 inches for the 
2080s for the IPCC-based approach and 9 inches for the 2020s, 27 inches for the 2050s, and 53 
inches for the 2080s for the rapid ice melt approach. FEMA’s 100-year floodplain, as defined by 
the 1983 FIS, is shown in purple with projections for the 2020s in red, the 2050s in orange, and 
the 2080s in yellow.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Maps of the potential future 100-year floodplains in New York City using the IPCC 
model-based approach (left) and the rapid ice melt approach (right) to sea-level rise projections. 
Source: Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2010. 
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The second round of NPCC2 future flood maps was featured in both the Climate Risk 
Information 2013: Observations, Climate Change Projections, and Maps and the PlaNYC: A 
Stronger, More Resilient New York reports using the 90th percentile values of the 2013 sea-level 
rise projections. Instead of using IPCC-based and rapid ice-melt scenarios, sea-level rise 
projections were developed using an expanded component-by-component approach (see section 
3.1.1 for details on this approach). The 90th percentile values equate to 11 inches for the 2020s 
and 31 inches for the 2050s. The first of these maps illustrates the potential 100-year flood zone 
in the 2020s and 2050s and the second illustrates the potential 500-year flood zone for the 2020s 
and 2050s (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). The FEMA 100- and 500-year floodplains have been revised 
from the 1983 versions based on updates to the Flood Insurance Study for NYC. Revised 
floodplains are shown in purple with projections for the 2020s in yellow and the 2050s in red. 
The 2013 maps also differ from the maps created for the NPCC 2010 report in that they feature 




Figure 3.4. Maps of the potential future 100-year floodplains in New York City using a 
component-by-component approach to sea-level rise projections. Source: New York 





Figure 3.5. Maps of the potential future 500-year floodplains in New York City using a 
component-by-component approach to sea-level rise projections. Source: New York 
City Panel on Climate Change, 2013. 
 
Though the NPCC2 developed revised maps for their 2015 publication the future flood 
geographic information system (GIS) shapefiles were not available at the time of this analysis. 
Therefore the 500-year floodplain for the 2050s shown in Figure 2.5 was selected as the focus of 
this work because it was the best available data that also encompassed the greatest potential 
flood area and affected population.   
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3.4.2. NPCC Flood Maps - Methodology and Limitations 
Despite their value in illustrating potential future flood scenarios the NPCC flood maps contain 
numerous sources of uncertainty as a result of the datasets and methodologies used in their 
development and as such are limited in their accuracy.  This section reviews the flood mapping 
methodology and limitations, and describes the intended use of the maps. 
 
Future flood scenarios were created using ESRI’s ArcGIS software as follows: FEMA’s base 
flood elevation values are used as baseline, projected sea-level rise values are added to the BFEs 
to give potential future BFE values, and then the future BFE values are extended landward until 
they reach an equivalent topographic elevation at which point the flood extent terminates. For the 
2013 effort the NPCC began with FEMA’s best available flood maps for New York City, added 
high-estimate (90th percentile) projections of sea-level rise to the given BFEs, and then directed 
the GIS to select as ‘flooded’ the land between the coastal flood zone and nearest inland 
equivalent topographic elevation. Best available flood maps at the time of analysis were FEMA’s 
Advisory Base Flood Maps (released in February 2013) that provided the BFE values for the 
500-year flood, and FEMA’s Preliminary Work Maps (released in June 2013) that provided the 
BFE values for the 100-year flood. The digital elevation model (DEM) used in the flood map 
process was also best available, developed from LiDAR (light detection and ranging) data 
collected in the spring of 2010. Vertical accuracy of the DEM was reported as a root mean 
square error (RMSE) of 9.5cm, which equates to a linear error at 95% confidence value of 7.3 
inches (18.6cm). The 90th percentile sea-level rise projections of 11 inches (27.9cm) for the 
2020s and 31 inches (78.7cm) for the 2050s both exceed the 95% error bounds of the elevation 
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data. Thus the vertical accuracy of the underlying elevation data is sufficient to support the 
mapped sea-level rise increments.  
 
One unique aspect of the NPCC flood scenario maps relative to other storm surge and sea-level 
rise (inundation) mapping efforts is the integration of base flood elevation data into their future 
flood projections. Many sea-level rise and storm surge mapping methodologies use one constant 
elevation contour, such as mean sea level, as their baseline and simply add elevation to represent 
inundation. For example, Cooper et al. (2005) considered the 100-year flood in their analysis of 
the impacts of sea-level rise on New Jersey. They used FEMA’s 100-year flood elevation for 
Atlantic City (2.9m), added projections of sea-level rise elevation, and applied that new value to 
the entire New Jersey coastline by mapping the corresponding topographic contour. However, 
the configuration of the islands of New York City and their connecting water bodies allows 
storm surge to bottleneck in constricted areas, resulting in large changes in BFE values over 
small horizontal distances both parallel and perpendicular to the shoreline. This change in flood 
elevation values along the coasts should be reflected in the landward movement of floodwaters, 
such that the inland shape and extent of the flood zone reflects the changing base flood elevation 
values nearer to shore. The NPCC approach incorporates these lateral variations in flood 
elevation values by assuming that landward values of floodwater elevation are likely to be more 
similar to neighboring flood-elevation values and less similar to more distant values. This unique 
approach to flood modeling is creative but also simplistic in that it makes broad assumptions 
about the movement of storm surge. In reality the movement of storm surge over land is a 
complex process generally understood via wave transformation modeling.  Wave transformation 
modeling accounts for the effects of soils, vegetation, surface permeability, bathymetry, existing 
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structural and non-structural flood protections, friction, and other factors that affect the 
movement of floodwaters and result in local variations in flooding extent.  
 
Without the use of hydrodynamic (including wave transformation) modeling to develop future 
flood projections, many assumptions had to be made in the GIS-based NPCC methodology about 
storm surge movement and wave action, and connectivity to the open ocean. In addition 
numerous sources of error or uncertainty are present in datasets that are foundational to the 
future flood maps. For example the NPCC sea-level rise projections, the modeled BFE and 
SWEL values developed by FEMA, and the underlying topographic dataset each have their own 
margin of error that is difficult to quantify and relay visually on the NPCC flood maps. 
 
Due to the limitations and uncertainties discussed above, the flood areas delineated in the NPCC 
maps were not intended to represent precise flood boundaries or to be used to assess actual 
coastal hazards, insurance requirements, or to be used in lieu of the FEMA FIRMs. The maps 
were meant to illustrate three distinct areas of interest worthy of further study: (1) areas currently 
subject to the 100- and 500-year floods that will continue to be subject to flooding in the future; 
(2) areas that do not currently flood but are expected to potentially experience the 100- and 500-
year floods in the future; and (3) areas that do not currently flood and are unlikely to do so in the 
timeline of the climate projection scenarios (end of the current century). In this way the NPCC 
established a framework by which to evaluate future flood scenarios.  
 
The future flood maps developed by the NPCC are the best available of such data and the 
boundaries of the 100- and 500-year floodplains are used in this work to define the extent of the 
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residential population considered to be at-risk to future flooding. A great advantage of these 
maps is that they are not specific to a given storm and instead present surge scenarios that could 
be achieved in tropical storm, hurricane, or nor’easter conditions, thereby broadening their 
applicability. Maps that approximate future flood zone extents are critical to decision and policy 
makers as well as the public to prepare for floods of increased elevation, extent, and duration. 
Also as a product of the NPCC, local and regional stakeholders and policy makers consider these 
maps in the development of their climate change adaptation plans and strategies. By using the 
best available data of the NPCC, this work can complement and add value to the ongoing 






Chapter 4: Potential Floodwater Contaminants 
 
In the United States, working waterfronts shape the economy, development, and culture of local 
communities. They support a multitude of industries such as manufacturing; oil and gas; marine 
transportation, construction, ship and boat building; coastal tourism and recreation; and fishing 
and aquaculture, that rely on access to the waterfront for their success. Throughout history 
prominent waterfront activities have changed in response to technological innovations, the global 
economy, and environmental regulations with many coastal communities now being re-
developed for residential, commercial, and recreational uses. 
 
The New York City harbor was the economic engine for the city and the region throughout the 
19th century. The waterfront was lined with piers and warehouses, rail lines connecting the coast 
to the interior, military facilities, and noxious industries, and was characterized as dangerous, 
foul-smelling, and polluted (Platt 2009). Though the industrial sector that once occupied much of 
the shoreline is now in decline, the working waterfront is still a vital part of New York City’s 
economy. The port of New York and New Jersey is the busiest on the East Coast and port 
activities are essential to the movement of goods and materials into the metropolitan region. 
Maritime, municipal, and industrial uses such as energy infrastructure, chemical and petroleum 
facilities, and wastewater treatment plants, as well as legacies of past industry such as abandoned 
highly contaminated sites continue to populate the New York City coastline. These sites often 
use, transport and/or store large volumes of toxic chemicals, hydrocarbons, heavy metals and 
hazardous wastes. Of particular concern in the context of storm surge events is the potential for 
on-site storage vessels to rupture or otherwise accidentally release hazardous materials into 
surrounding floodwaters. Two recent storm surge events, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
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Hurricane Sandy in 2012, illustrate this potential. The following sections describe these events, 
their impact on coastal facilities and infrastructure, and the concern for environmental 
contamination in both the floodwaters and the residual sediments.  
 
 
4.1. Hurricane Katrina  
Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the state of Louisiana as a Category 3 storm on August 29, 
2005 bringing heavy rains and extreme flooding to a large portion of the Gulf Coast. Storm surge 
elevations ranged from 10 to 19 feet in New Orleans, Louisiana, inducing breeches in the city’s 
levee system and inundating nearly 80% of the city with floodwaters 6 to over 16 feet deep. 
These floodwaters, supplemented by the storm surge and rain from Hurricane Rita just three 
weeks later, persisted for nearly six weeks and left behind sediments that were in some areas 
several feet thick (US EPA n.d.). Because New Orleans is situated within a dense infrastructure 
of oil terminals and wells, pipelines and refineries, there was widespread concern as to the 
potential for environmental contamination in both the floodwaters and the residual sediments. 
Facilities associated with chemical and petroleum production, storage, and distribution handle 
vast quantities of hazardous substances, the release of which could cause widespread 
contamination of near coastal waters.  
 
Hurricane Katrina did in fact demonstrate the potential for storm surge to facilitate the release of 
large volumes of hazardous materials. Over 200 onshore releases of hazardous chemicals, 
petroleum, or natural gas were reported as a result of Katrina.  Ten onshore storage tank releases 
of petroleum products were greater than 10,000 gallons each, amounting to more than 8 million 
gallons released in total. Damage to storage tanks, including valves and piping, was cited as the 
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cause of nine of these releases and most of the releases were in facilities where the storm surge 
was only two meters in elevation (Santella, Steinberg, and Sengul 2010). Tanks were lifted by 
the storm surge and their hulls or valves ruptured when they shifted or impacted other objects in 
the water. Of the non-petroleum onshore hazardous material release events, 26% were due to 
equipment damage (valves, pipes, etc.) and 22% were due to chemical storage tank damage. 
Approximately 10% of toxic release inventory (TRI) facilities and 28% of SIC 13116 facilities 
located in surge areas experienced accidental releases (Santella, Steinberg, and Sengul 2010). By 
contrast in areas impacted only by hurricane strength winds (no surge), these numbers dropped to 
1% and 10% respectively. Overall half of all releases of petroleum, chemicals and other 
industrial substances in the storm surge zone were greater than 1,000 gallons (liquid) each or 
greater than 1,000 pounds (solid compounds) each suggesting a considerable threat posed by 
hazardous material releases in areas of storm surge.  
 
There was concern about other potential sources of floodwater pollutants as well, such as the 
toxic chemicals used by dry cleaners and service centers, the herbicides and pesticides stored in 
homes, the oil and gasoline in flooded vehicles, as well as bacterial contamination from 
uncontrolled biological wastes. To address these concerns samples from the floodwaters and 
residual sediment were collected and tested to assess the extent of chemical and biological 
contamination and determine the likelihood of human and wildlife health hazards. A comparison 
of studies conducted immediately after the storm, three weeks later, and then six weeks later 
show that elevated levels of metals and bacteria were present in the floodwaters, sediments, and 
soils and persisted after the waters had receded. 
                                                
6 SIC 1311 facilities are facilities classified by the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) as pertaining to crude 




Pardue et al. (2005) sampled floodwaters between 5 and 9 days after the storm in areas where 
many first responders and residents were exposed. They found levels of lead, arsenic, and 
chromium that exceeded drinking water standards but were generally at levels ‘typical’ of 
stormwater. Fecal coliforms - bacteria that serve as an indicator of fecal contamination - were 
elevated compared to primary contact water standards but concentrations of volatile and semi-
volatile organic pollutants7 were low.  
 
A study of floodwaters and soils sampled three weeks after the storm found concentrations of the 
aldrin (a pesticide), arsenic, lead, and seven semi-volatile organic compounds in sediments/soil 
that exceeded the human health specific screening levels (HHSSL) established by the USEPA 
(Presley et al. 2006). Though floodwaters did not exceed the Safe Drinking Water Act Maximum 
Contaminant Levels (SDWA MCL), high concentrations of Aeromonas spp, a human pathogen 
associated with diarrhea and fresh wound infections, and other coliform bacteria were found in 
these samples. The authors concluded that environmental contaminants were present in New 
Orleans and encouraged further testing to evaluate the threat to human health. 
 
Adams et al. (2007) collected samples from sediments and soils six weeks after the storm. Lead 
was found in 30% of samples at concentrations equal to or greater than drinking water action 
levels. In samples that underwent a batch leaching method, a process that simulated acid rain 
conditions to mobilize leachable metals, 50% of the leachate samples had arsenic concentrations 
equal to or greater than drinking water maximum contaminant level. Pesticides were detected in 
                                                
7 Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) include cleaning supplies, paint and paint remover, glues and adhesives, and 
pesticides, among many other substances. For a more exhaustive list see the EPA’s Introduction to Indoor Air 
Quality (IAQ) website: http://www.epa.gov/iaq/voc.html.  
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at least one location but most concentrations were non-detectable or at trace levels suggesting 
that localized contamination may have been present but general contamination had not occurred. 
Benzene or other gasoline constituents were not detected.  
 
The studies cited above measure some pollutant concentrations with respect to drinking water 
standards. This comparison has been criticized as inappropriate for floodwater evaluation 
because exposure will occur by contact and not ingestion (Reible 2007). The US EPA offers 
nationally recommended recreational water quality criteria (RWQC) that are designed to protect 
human health in situations of primary contact recreation, such as swimming, surfing, and diving. 
The RWQC may offer a more realistic baseline against which to evaluate floodwater 
contamination by contact, however the drinking water standards do provide a conservative 
baseline. 
 
4.2. Hurricane Sandy  
When Hurricane Sandy made landfall in New Jersey on October 29, 2012 it became the largest 
storm in the recorded history of New York City eventually claiming 43 lives and causing over 
$19 billion in damage. From a meteorological perspective Sandy was also an enormous storm 
with a tropical-storm-force wind field that extended for nearly 1,000 miles at landfall. Prior to 
landfall as Sandy was tracking to the northeast along the east coast, multiple weather systems 
converged to shift its track abruptly west and cause it to reenergize and intensify. This shift 
brought the northeast quadrant of Sandy’s counterclockwise winds perpendicular to the city’s 
coastline, driving storm surge directly into the NYC Harbor. The storm arrived in NYC about 
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thirty minutes after high tide and on the evening of a spring tide bringing a record-breaking 
storm surge of greater than 14-feet8 to the Battery in Lower Manhattan.  
 
Hurricane Sandy’s impacts to the infrastructure and residents of NYC were extensive, affecting 
sectors such as transportation, telecommunications, public health, and energy, both within and 
outside of the flood zones (Table 4.1). Power outages had the greatest overall effect on the 
sectors rendering critical facilities inoperable and causing loss of or reduced service. 
 
Summary	  of	  Hurricane	  Sandy’s	  Impacts	  on	  New	  York	  City	  Sectors	  




Damage	   to	   boardwalks,	   landings,	   and	   terminals;	   damage	   to	   fuel	   supply	  
infrastructure	  along	  the	  waterfront	  leading	  to	  a	  citywide	  gas	  shortage;	  nearly	  3	  
million	  cubic	  yards	  of	  sand	  were	  lost	  due	  to	  coastal	  erosion.	  
Utilities	   Almost	   2	  million	   people	   lost	   power,	   natural	   gas	   services	   were	   disrupted	   for	  
84,000	   customers,	   Con	   Edison’s	   steam	   system	   lost	   service	   to	   1/3rd	   of	   its	  
customers.	  
Telecommunications	   Phone,	  wireless,	  cable,	  and	  internet	  outages,	  some	  outages	  due	  to	  power	  loss	  
others	  due	  to	  flood	  damage	  to	  equipment	  and	  cables.	  	  	  
Health	  Care	   Six	   hospitals	   closed,	   nearly	   2,000	   patients	   evacuated.	   Twenty-­‐six	   nursing	  
homes	  and	  adult-­‐care	  facilities	  closed,	  nearly	  4,500	  patients	  evacuated.	  
Transportation	   Subway	   system	  was	   completely	   suspended	   for	  3	  days;	   all	   East	  River	   subway,	  
LIRR,	   and	   Amtrak	   tunnels	   and	   the	   Hudson	   River	   PATH	   and	   Amtrak	   tunnels	  
were	   flooded	  along	  with	  vehicle	   tunnels	   into/out	  of	  Manhattan.	  500	  miles	  of	  
road	   were	   significantly	   damaged.	   Ferry	   service	   was	   disrupted	   on	   the	   Staten	  
Island	  and	  East	  River	  Ferries,	  and	  private	  ferries.	  
Water	   Drinking	   water	   was	   unaffected,	   though	   the	   pumping	   systems	   in	   high-­‐rise	  
buildings	   with	   power	   outages	   could	   no	   longer	   deliver	   water	   to	   the	   upper	  
floors.	  	  	  
Wastewater	   10	  of	  14	  wastewater	  treatment	  plants	  were	  damaged	  or	  lost	  power	  and	  42	  of	  
96	   pumping	   stations	   were	   knocked	   out	   of	   service.	   800	   million	   gallons	   of	  
partially	  treated	  sewage	  and	  560	  million	  gallons	  of	  raw	  untreated	  sewage	  were	  
released	  into	  the	  local	  waterways.	  
Table 4.1. Summary of the impacts of Hurricane Sandy on several sectors of New York City. 
Source: New York City Office of the Mayor (2013). 
                                                
8 Storm surge was measured relative to Mean Lower Low Water. See NOAA’s Tides and Currents website for more 
information on tidal datums: http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/datum_options.html.  
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Prior to Hurricane Sandy’s arrival the presence of heavy chemicals and industrial wastes on the 
shores of New York City’s waterways had been noted with alarm by community-based 
organizations and environmental justice groups. In fact in the wake of Tropical Storm Irene in 
August 2011 and prior to Sandy’s landfall in October 2012, the New York City Environmental 
Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA) issued press releases calling for the New York City Mayor and 
State Governor to protect low-income waterfront neighborhoods from “…[potential] toxic 
exposures during hurricane storm surges” (New York City Environmental Justice Alliance 2012, 
2011). NYC-EJA had previously documented the contamination hazards presented by 
Significant Maritime and Industrial Areas (SMIA) in six New York City neighborhoods. SMIAs 
are a product of the NYC Waterfront Revitalization Program, which clusters the city’s heaviest 
industrial, and infrastructure uses into storm surge zones. These press releases voiced concern 
that storm surge could spread unsecured heavy chemicals throughout these predominantly low-
income neighborhoods and result in immediate and cumulative risk exposures. 
 
In addition to the presences of SMIAs along the waterfront, two of New York City’s water 
bodies are on the National Priorities List as Federal Superfund Sites: the Gowanus Canal in 
Brooklyn and the Newtown Creek along the Brooklyn-Queens border. Both of these water 
bodies exceeded their banks during Hurricane Sandy bringing several feet of floodwaters to the 
surrounding neighborhoods. Many residents of these neighborhoods were concerned that the 
floodwaters that infiltrated their basements and seeped up the walls were laden with carcinogens 
and toxic wastes (Navarro 2012; Peeples, Shapiro, and Knafo 2012). The waters were described 
as murky and brown, with the pungent smells of dead fish and gasoline (Peeples, Shapiro, and 
Knafo 2012; Valhouli 2012). 
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Despite these observations the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) 
assessed these Superfund sites and reported that, in part due to actions that were taken in advance 
of the storm to secure the sites, they “…do not believe that any sites were impacted in ways that 
would pose a threat to nearby communities” (US EPA 2013). Regardless, on October 31st two 
days after Hurricane Sandy made landfall, the EPA took four floodwater samples from Gowanus 
Canal and then two samples from the Newtown Creek area on November 9th. The samples were 
analyzed for bacteria and 139 different chemicals9. Bacteria levels for both locations were high, 
suggesting that people should protect themselves when cleaning up floodwaters (EPA n.d.). 
Levels of volatile and semi-volatile organic compounds were low or not detected, and levels of 
petroleum related compounds were consistent with road runoff. Levels of heavy metals slightly 
exceeded drinking water standards in the Gowanus Canal but were at low levels or not detected 
at Newtown Creek (US EPA n.d., n.d.).  
 
Perhaps the most conclusive evidence of post-Sandy floodwater contamination was the month 
long recreational waterbody advisory on the New York City waterways. On October 31, 2012 the 
New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene also issued an advisory stating that 
“…direct contact with the Hudson River, East River, New York Harbor, Jamaica Bay and the 
Kill Van Kull for recreational activities such as swimming, canoeing, kayaking, windsurfing or 
any other water activity that would entail possible direct contact with the water should be 
avoided until further notice” (NYC Department of Health & Mental Hygene 2012). The city 
                                                
9 Though not specified in these reports, it is assumed all samples were evaluated with respect to the New York State 
Water Quality Standards (and guidance values) designed to protect waters for drinking and recreation uses. See the 
New York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s Water Quality Standards and Classifications website 
for details: http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/23853.html. 
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waterways were repeatedly tested for levels of coliform and dissolved oxygen until the waters 
were deemed acceptable for recreational use on November 30, 2012. 
 
The NYS Department of Environmental Conservation fecal coliform standard for bathing and 
other recreation use is 200 colony forming units (CFU)/100mL. By contrast, the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection and the US Environmental Protection Agency used the 
federal standard of 14 CF/ 100mL - the standard for harvesting shellfish - as their baseline for 
recreational use. On November 29, 2012 samples were drawn from Newark Bay and the New 
York Harbor for analysis. None of the 10 samples sites tested was within acceptable limits. 
These results support the NJDEP’s advisory issued on October 29, 2012 to stay out of the water. 
The full reopening of all New Jersey state waters to full recreational use, including shellfish 
harvesting, wasn’t issued until April 11, 2013.  
 
The water analyses cited above suggest that floodwater contamination, particularly in the form of 
elevated bacteria levels, was in fact a concern particularly in the first 30 days after Sandy. The 
EPA testing of the Gowanus and Newtown waterways provides a foundation for environmental 
contamination analysis, but would have been more robust had they analyzed a larger number of 
floodwater samples, included sediment samples, and resampled during a range of dates after the 
storm.  
 
4.3. Hazard sources in NYC 
Multiple sources of toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes are situated in various forms and 
facilities throughout New York City. This work creates an index of potential exposure to these 
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hazards in floodwaters by evaluating residential proximity to the following nine types of 
facilities: Chemical Bulk Storage, Petroleum Bulk Storage, and Major Oil Storage Facilities 
(MOSF), the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI) facilities, the State Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (SPDES) facilities, State Superfund Sites, Brownfields, Water Pollution Control Plants 
and Combined Sewage Overflow (CSO) Outfalls. Each of these potential sources of hazard are 
detailed in the following sections. 
 
4.3.1. Chemical Bulk Storage, Petroleum Bulk Storage, and Major Oil Storage Facilities 
New York State’s Hazardous Substances Bulk Storage Program regulates the above ground and 
underground storage of petroleum and chemicals according to standards set by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (DEC). These regulations were established to prevent leaks and spills of hazardous 
materials resulting from improper handling and maintenance of storage facilities. Improper 
storage and handling of hazardous substances can lead to spills that contaminate water supplies 
or pose a fire or hazardous fumes risk with potentially serious consequences to public health and 
the environment.  
 
The most recent database of bulk storage in New York City lists 34,755 bulk storage facilities 
classified as Petroleum Bulk Storage, Chemical Bulk Storage, or Major Oil Storage Facility 
(Table 4.1). The dominant facility type are Petroleum Bulk Storage facilities, which account for 
both Underground Storage Tanks (USTs) and Aboveground Storage Tanks (ASTs) that have a 
singular or combined storage capacity greater than 1,100 and less than 400,000 gallons. 
Chemical Bulk Storage facilities store any volume of chemical substances that are subject to 
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Federal or State mandated regulation. Oil terminals and vessels that have a storage capacity of 
400,000 gallons or more are termed Major Oil Storage Facilities. 
 
These facilities are further classified according to their operating status: active, inactive, 
unregulated, unregistered, administratively closed, and no longer a MOSF. The exposure index 
developed in this work assigns greater weight to the active and unregulated faculties because 
they are actively storing or utilizing hazardous substances. The DEC defines ‘unregulated’ 
facilities as those that do not meet the thresholds for quantity or product type for regulation under 
one of the Bulk Storage Programs, but they do contain hazardous substances and can leak. 
Facilities that are administratively closed, inactive, or no longer a MOSF are considered to be 
devoid of hazardous substances and as such are not considered in this work. Unregistered tanks 
are unlawful to operate and delivery of any product to such tanks is prohibited, therefore they are 
also not considered in this work.  
 
DEC Program Type Facility Status Count 
Chemical Bulk Storage Active  109 
 Unregulated 352 
 Administratively Closed, Inactive, or Unregistered 37 
Petroleum Bulk Storage Active  25,871 
 Unregulated 6,491 
 Administratively Closed, Inactive, or Unregistered 1,523 
Major Oil Storage Facility Active  168 
 Unregulated 0 
 Administratively Closed, Inactive, or No Longer a 
Major Oil Storage Facility 
198 
 TOTAL 34,755 
Table 4.2. The number (count) of New York City Bulk Storage Program Facilities and their 




4.3.2. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI)  
The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) is a mandatory self-reporting program administered by the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that was developed to track the 
management of toxic chemicals handled by facilities across the United States. Established as part 
of the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), the goal of TRI 
is to empower citizens and stakeholders with information about how toxic chemicals are 
managed. The list of over 650 chemicals covered by the TRI program covers those that cause 
“cancer or other chronic human health effects, significant adverse acute human health effects, or 
significant adverse environmental effects” (US EPA 2013). Facilities that meet certain industry, 
employee, and chemical thresholds are required to submit annual reports of these chemicals to 
the TRI program. These reports detail the quantities of chemicals they disposed of or released, 
recycled, purposed for energy recovery, or subjected to other forms of treatment.  
 
Disposal and all other means of releases and treatments are performed either on-site or off-site. 
Releases include emissions to the air through fugitive (unconfined) or stack air releases, to local 
waterbodies as surface water discharges or transfers to wastewater treatment plants, and to the 
ground via (usually) off-site landfills and injection wells.  Methods for recycling include solvent 
recovery and metals recovery, depending on the chemical being recycled, and the process of 
energy recovery involves combustion of toxic chemicals in furnaces or boilers that generate heat 
or energy for use. 
 
Of the forty-one TRI facilities situated in New York City, twenty-five of them report on-site 
disposal or releases to air, land, water, and injected underground (Table 4.2). The other sixteen 
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facilities either treat their wastes off-site or use less than 500 pounds annually of each toxic 
chemical they handle. Regardless of the fate of these chemicals the potential hazard of TRI 
facilities lies in the onsite storage of hazardous chemicals prior to processing. In the case of 
Hurricane Katrina, the failure of storage tanks subject to storm surge was the most common 
mechanism of petroleum releases (Santella, Steinberg, and Sengul 2010).  
 
The TRI database used in the exposure index was queried from the online TRI Explorer 
database. The Release Facility Report lists the TRI site locations, the chemicals being reported, 
and the pounds of releases, waste transfers, and overall waste quantity. However there are 
multiple other factors not captured in the database that are necessary to understand the potential 
impacts to public health. First, release estimates alone are not sufficient to determine to what 
degree, if any, the public could be exposed to these chemicals. The exact mechanism and 
pathway of release (air, land, water) is also an important to consideration to understand the 
means by which a population can be exposed. Second, the toxicity of TRI chemicals vary widely 
so the volume of a chemical present cannot alone be an indicator of health risk. Third, once 
released some chemicals will degrade over short time spans when exposed to sunlight, heat, and 
microorganisms, rendering them less harmful while other chemicals persist without degradation.  
And finally, chemicals can be incorporated into the food chain where they can accumulate and 
magnify in concentration. This bioaccumulation is best exemplified in the fish populations of the 
New York City Waterways that absorb and accumulate toxins such as polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) and mercury. Other factors involving the efficiency of waste management affect the 






Borough Count On-Site Disposal/Releases 
Bronx 4 3 
Kings 18 12 
Manhattan 2 1 
Queens 16 8 
Richmond 1 1 
Total: New York City 41 25 
Table 4.3. The number (count) of facilities that report to the 
Toxic Release Inventory in New York City. Source: EPA 2011. 
 
4.3.3. The State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) 
The State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) is a New York State permit program 
developed in accordance with the Clean Water Act that regulates point source discharges to 
surface and ground waters. The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation 
(DEC) administers the SPDES program through the issuance of general and individual 
wastewater discharge permits. General permits are issued for discharges that, when adhering to 
program guidelines, typically have a smaller and less significant impact on the environment. This 
includes private, commercial, or institutional sanitary discharges to groundwater only (not 
surface water) of 1,000 to 10,000 gallons per day; storm water discharges associated with 
industrial activity, construction, and municipal separate sewer systems; and concentrated animal 
feeding operations.  
 
Individual permits are issued on a per facility basis and cover unique discharge characteristics.  
These permits cover industrial discharges of up to 10,000,000 or more gallons per day (gpd), 
municipal discharges of up to and over 40,000,000 gpd, private/commercial/institutional 
discharges of up to 100,000 gpd or more, power plant discharges of any size, and ballast 
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(marine) discharges of up to 1,000,000 gpd or more in any 24-hour period (New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation 2003). All individual permits are classified into 
Major, Significant Major, Non-Significant Minor, and Petroleum remediation categories 
according to size, type, and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classification.  
 
Of the over 8,000 active individual permits in New York State, 72% are sewage-type Non-
Significant Minor private/commercial/institutional (Class 02) and 8% are Non-Significant Minor 
Industrial (Class 04). Though these two categories make up almost 80% of the wastewater 
discharges they are only responsible for 10% of the water pollution generated. However of the 90 
SPDES permits in New York City, none are categorized as Class 02 or 04 (Table 4.3). The 
dominant permit type is Class 01, Significant Minor Industrial wastewater discharge. The 
category Significant Minor describes discharges to surface and ground waters that have the 
potential to contain toxics. Over one quarter of the permits are categorized as Major discharges 
by both the DEC and EPA. A Major permit is issued for wastewater that scores high on the 
following criteria: toxic pollutant potential, flow/stream flow volume, conventional pollutant 
content, public health impact, water quality factors, and proximity to near coastal waters (United 
States Environmental Protection Agency 1990).  Facilities categorized as Major in New York 
City include fourteen water pollution control plants, multiple electricity generating stations, the 
ExxonMobile Greenpoint remediation project, and the Staten Island landfill. 
 
Though NYC has only 25 Major SPDES permits compared to 55 Significant Minor permits, 
wastewater discharges qualifying as Major have the potential to affect significant environmental 
impact. Both Major and Minor permit facilities are included in this work. 
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DEC Classification SPDES Permit 
Category 
EPA Classification Count 
01 – Industrial Significant Minor Non-Major 55 
02 - Private, Commercial, Institutional Non-Significant Minor Non-Major 0 
03 – Industrial Major Major 11 
04 - Industrial Non-Significant Minor Non-Major 0 
05 - Municipal Major Major 14 
07 - Municipal Significant Minor Non-Major 0 
09 - Private, Commercial, Institutional Significant Minor Non-Major 10 
10 - Industrial Petroleum Remediation Non-Major 0 
  TOTAL 90 
Table 4.4. The number (count) of SPDES permits in New York City listed by DEC 
Classifications and their associated SPDES permit category. Source: NYS DEC 2011. 
 
 
4.3.4. State Superfund Sites  
The Registry of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites is a program administered by the New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation’s Division of Environmental 
Remediation (DER) that identifies, classifies, and remediates abandoned hazardous waste sites. 
This multi-stage process uses input from the Department of Health, local government agencies, 
and the public to prioritize hazardous sites, and develop remedial plans, and facilitate action to 
bring the sites into compliance. 
 
The investigation and cleanup process begins with notification to the DER of potentially 
problematic sites. Once identified, these sites are subject to a Site Characterization (SC) 
investigation to determine if hazardous wastes are present and, if affirmed, whether they pose a 
significant threat to public health. An SC study evaluates the soils, surface waters, and 
groundwater, and records history of a site and concludes with a ranking of Class 1 indicating 
imminent danger to the public health or environment, Class 2 indicating a significant threat, or 
Class 3 showing no significant threat. All Class 1 and 2 sites undergo a Remedial 
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Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) that details the length, depth, and width of contamination, 
defines the pathways of migration, and develops remedial action choices that will permanently 
reduce or eliminate the contamination. The proposed remediation plan is open for public 
comment before the plan is finalized and remedial design and construction can begin. At sites 
where responsible parties cannot be found or held accountable for the contamination, the State 
pays for the site investigation and cleanup using the “State Superfund” that was created in the 
1986 Environmental Quality Bond Act. 
 
Hazardous waste sites can also be classified as Class 4, Active or Completed. Class 4 sites have 
been properly closed but require continued management, Active sites are not on the Registry but 
are being remediated through another environmental remediation program, and Completed sites 
have been satisfactorily remediated. There are no Class 1 “imminent danger” State Superfund 
Sites in New York City, but there are sites classified as Class 2, 3, 4, as well as A (Active) and C 
(Completed). This exposure index focuses on Class 2 sites because of their level of threat to 
public health and the environment. There are currently forty-three Class 2 State Superfund Sites 
in New York City; the numbers by county are Bronx=1, Kings=16, New York=1, Queens=19, 
and Richmond=6. Two of these sites, Gowanus Canal in Kings, and Newtown Creek in 
Kings/Queens, are also listed as Federal Superfund Sites on the National Priorities List. The 
database used for this analysis describes the site class and location but does not offer information 




The Brownfield Cleanup Program (BCP) is an environmental remediation program administered 
by the DEC’s Division of Environmental Remediation intended to provide incentive for persons 
to voluntarily remediate brownfield sites to a level that is protective of public health and the 
environment, rendering those sites available for reuse and redevelopment. Incentive for 
remediation is provided through tax credits available to taxpayers who enter into a Brownfield 
Site Cleanup Agreement (BCA) with the DEC. The brownfield redevelopment tax credit offers 
separate credits based on site cleanup, groundwater cleanup, and on site (re)development. 
Taxpayers may also be eligible to earn credit for real property taxes and for environmental 
remediation insurance (New York State Department of Taxation and Finance 2010). 
 
Brownfields are defined by the DEC as “…real property, the redevelopment or reuse of which 
may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous waste, petroleum, 
pollutant, or contaminant” (New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 
Division of Environmental Remediation 2004). Eligible sites do not include State Superfund 
Class 1 or 2 sites or sites on the National Priorities List. There are 129 BCP sites in New York 
City, 85 of which are classified as ‘A (Active)’ and 44 of which are considered ‘C (Completed)’. 
Sites undergoing evaluation for potential contamination are not included in the DEC’s 
Environmental Remediation Dataset. The classification code ‘A’ refers to sites where work is 
underway and not yet complete while ‘C’ refers to sites where remediation has been 
satisfactorily completed. The BCP does not offer information about which hazardous wastes or 
toxics are present at Active sites. Only ‘A - Active’ sites are included in the index of floodwater 
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contaminants and they are distributed as follows: Bronx=15, Kings=27, New York=16, 
Queens=26, Richmond=1. 
 
4.3.6. Water Pollution Control Plants and Combined Sewage Overflow Outfalls 
The City of New York treats 1.3 gallons of wastewater every day and returns the disinfected 
water to the city’s waterways. To accomplish this feat, a combined sewer and sanitary sewer 
system transports wastewater from over 1 million buildings and thousands of sewer inlets to 
fourteen wastewater treatment plants located along the waterfront. These plants are sited at low 
elevations along the coast to allow for gravity assisted wastewater flow and efficient sludge 
removal by barge, however as such they are also particularly vulnerable to storm surge. During 
normal weather conditions the system can handle full treatment of wastewater, however the 
system capacity is exceeded when wastewater flow is two times greater than normal. In order to 
prevent sewage from backing up into the system during extreme weather events, combined 
stormwater and wastewater are discharged untreated into nearby waterways. These combined 
sewer overflows (CSOs) carry untreated human waste and pathogenic bacteria, ammonia, 
pesticides, petroleum products, litter, toxic metals and other hazardous substances to the 
waterways. CSOs can also carry large volumes of organic material and nutrients, which enter the 
waterways and consume much of the dissolved oxygen essential to sustaining marine life (New 
York City Department of Environmental Protection n.d.).  
 
There are 427 CSO outfall locations along NYC’s shoreline managed by the New York City 
Department of Environmental Protection (Table 4.4). The outfalls are categorized into three 
Tiers: Tier 1 outfalls carry 50% of the total CSO volume, Tier 2 outfalls carry 20% of total CSO 
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volume and Tier 3 outfalls carry 10%. However the volume of discharge at a given CSO outfall 
can change through time, depending on the amount and location of rainfall, as well as the 
condition of the sewers and proximity of green (water retaining) infrastructure. The dataset used 
for this work does not distinguish tiers among the outfall locations therefore this exposure index 
must weight all CSO locations equally, instead of distinguishing them based on effluent volume 
and toxicity.  
 
Borough Combined Sewage Overflow Outfalls (count) 
Water Pollution Control 
Plants (count) 
Bronx 61 1 
Brooklyn 82 5 
Manhattan 159 2 
Queens 86 4 
Staten Island 39 5 
Total: New York City 427 14 
Table 4.5. The number (count) of Combined Sewage Overflow Outfalls and Water Pollution 
Control Plants in New York City. Source: NYC DEP 2013, NYC DCP 2012. 
 
Hurricane Sandy provided a recent example of the impact of storm surge on NYC’s combined 
sewer system, including water treatment plants and pumping stations. The 14-foot storm surge 
caused damage to and/or power loss at 10 of the city’s treatment plants and 42 of the city’s 96 
pumping stations, which are responsible for pumping sewage from low-lying areas to high 
elevations. Most of the damage involved electrical systems and equipment located on the lower 
levels that became inundated during the storm. Three of the wastewater treatment plants were 
completely non-operational for some period of time while the other plants were able to maintain 
partial treatment. These failures resulted in the discharge of 560 million gallons of untreated 
combined sewage, stormwater, and seawater, and another 800 million gallons of partially treated 
and disinfected wastewater into waterways (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013). Though DEP 
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testing showed little effect on post-storm harbor water quality the City issued a recreational 
water body advisory for the Hudson and East Rivers, New York Harbor, Jamaica Bay, and the 
Kill van Kull that remained in place for 30 days.  
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Chapter 5: At Risk Critical Facilities 
 
Facilities and infrastructure are considered both critical and at-risk when they provide essential 
services to residents and are situated in flood areas. Examples include utility providers of 
electricity, natural gas, drinking water, wastewater treatment, and telecommunications; medical 
and health services; transportation infrastructure; and emergency response services. If these 
services are compromised or disabled during a flood event, potentially serious impacts can befall 
the surrounding community and health hazards can result. However the utility, transportation, 
and emergency response facilities listed above were not included in this analysis for two reasons: 
1) lack of publically available data and 2) lack of spatial coincidence between facility locations 
and population impacts. The omitted facilities are addressed in more detail in section 5.2. This 
work instead focuses on facilities that provide services to or temporarily house a portion of the 
population and therefore may have special or resource intensive on-site evacuation needs.  
 
Previous assessments of storm surge risk and vulnerability under present and future sea-level rise 
conditions have been incorporated critical facilities into their analysis. These studies define 
critical infrastructure as roads, bridges, utilities, airports, railways, and emergency services and 
other important lifelines upon which the population depends for information, services, and 
safety. For example, in an assessment of socioeconomic vulnerability and exposure to hurricane 
storm surge hazards in Sarasota County, Florida, Frazier et al. (2010) incorporate the amount and 
percentage of public safety facilities such as police, fire, and radio/television stations; medical 
services; facilities that service infrastructures such as electric, water and wastewater, and natural 
gas; facilities that serve basic community needs such as gas stations, grocery stores, and banks; 
and offices of government into their analysis. They compare the amount and percentage of these 
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facilities, as well as other socioeconomic variables, within current and future Category 1-5 
hurricane storm surge zones and conclude that socioeconomic exposure in contemporary hazard 
zones is high and will increase with sea-level rise. 
 
Shepard et al. (2012) consider critical facilities and infrastructure in their overall risk index of the 
southern shores of Long Island, New York. They combine hazard exposure and community 
vulnerability to quantify potential changes in risk under present and future sea-level rise 
conditions. Block groups were ranked to create an index based on the density of critical 
infrastructure and facilities located within, and this density was positively correlated with 
vulnerability. Transportation terminals, utility cables (using road length as proxy) and facilities, 
road density, critical facilities (police, fire, EMS), and community facilities were included. The 
most and least vulnerable communities were identified and the authors conclude that sea-level 
rise will increase existing risk and create new areas of risk.  
 
The critical facilities index developed for this work is similar to the studies mentioned above but 
uses different criteria to select facilities for inclusion. The goal of this index is to identify the 
population potentially affected by critical facility failure due to floodwaters by assuming a 
spatial correlation between the facility location and residents at-risk. While this correlation may 
be proven for some variables it is not proven for other variables. For example, the service areas 
for utilities and emergency services are not always a matter of public record and cannot be 
approximated by administrative boundary or circular buffers, however the service area extents 
are critical to making accurate associations between compromised utility facilities and 
populations affected. Without this information utilities were not included in this critical facilities 
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index. Also transportation impacts are not always locally confined. For example, Hurricane 
Sandy’s impacts on the New York City transportation system illustrate that flooding effects were 
widespread throughout the city and not just relegated to the neighborhood surrounding flooded 
subway stations. Much of this system wide impact had to do with floodwaters that entered the 
system through point sources and then spread underground through the subway tunnels. This was 
the case in Lower Manhattan where flooding began at the South Ferry subway station and then 
extended uptown along the tracks. Subway service was completely suspended citywide for three 
days after Sandy, affecting far more than just the residents in the coastal zones. Therefore 
constraining transportation impacts to the neighborhoods surrounding damaged infrastructure 
would not reflect the true scope of the population affected by lost services. 
 
5.1. Resources at Risk 
The following datasets were collected from the Department of City Planning’s Selected Facilities 
and Program Sites in New York City database, Release 2012. This database was compiled from 
city, state and non-profit agency sources and is intended to assist in site and land use planning 
efforts. Facility types selected from the database were grouped into two categories: Group 1 is 
comprised of facilities with a population needing direct assistance for mobility (i.e., disabled 
persons and/or the elderly) and Group 2 consists of facilities with complex evacuation and/or 
recovery needs. 
 
5.1.1. Group 1 - Facilities with Residents Needing Physical Assistance 
Table 5.1 lists the Group 1 facility types that provide housing to disabled or minimally abled 
persons that would need physical assistance in the event of an evacuation. 
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GROUP	  1:	  
FACILITIES	  WITH	  RESIDENTS	  REQUIRING	  PHYSICAL	  ASSISTANCE	  
Hospitals	  and	  Residential	  Health	  Centers	  
-­‐	  Nursing	  homes,	  Hospitals,	  Hospices	  
Residential	  Disability	  Centers	  
-­‐	  Community	  and	  Supervised	  Individual	  Residences	  
High	  Rise	  Buildings	  
-­‐	  Multi-­‐family	  elevator	  buildings	  >	  7	  stories	  high	  
Table 5.1. Critical facilities in Group 1 serve populations with 
physical disabilities who would require direct assistance for 
evacuation. 
 
• Residential Health Services: This category includes hospitals, nursing homes, and 
hospices. 
• Residential Developmental Disability Services: These facilities include hospital-based 
inpatient care, community and individual residences, intermediate care facilities, and 
developmental centers. 
• High Rise Residences: Multi-family residential elevator buildings greater than seven 
floors in height.  
 
 
Group 1 facilities provide temporary or long-term residence to a sick, disabled, and/or elderly 
population. These facilities warrant particular attention because evacuating hospitals, nursing 
homes, hospice centers, and disability centers in advance of or during a coastal storm requires a 
resource-intensive coordinated effort to mobilize the patients. For example in the case of 
Hurricane Sandy three hospitals closed in advance of the storm and three others - New York 
University’s Langone Medical Center, Bellevue Hospital, and Coney Island Hospital - shut down 
during or immediately after the storm due to the failure of mechanical or electrical systems 
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(Manuel 2013; Redlener and Reilly 2012). The Office of Emergency management had to 
coordinate the evacuation of 2,000 patients. In addition twenty-six nursing home and adult care 
facilities were also closed and five partially closed, with 4,500 patients requiring evacuation 
(NYC Office of the Mayor 2013). These closings put tremendous strain on both the city’s 
emergency resources and healthcare system as a whole. 
 
Residential high-rise buildings, defined as being greater than or equal to seven floors in height, 
were added to Group 1 also because of the lessons learned during Hurricane Sandy. Though 
high-rise buildings as a whole did not sustain much structural damage, they suffered significant 
non-structural damage to their systems and equipment that were housed in the basement or 
otherwise insufficiently elevated (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013). In addition to power loss 
borne by flooded equipment, power loss to substantial portions of the electrical service grid led 
to the disruption of water and elevator services in high-rise buildings. Residential high-rises are 
not required to have back-up power generators despite the need for electricity to run the elevators 
and pump water to the rooftop water tanks to restore water pressure. Elderly and disabled 
residents became shut-ins, trapped on the upper floors without functioning plumbing, lights, and 
heat. In some cases, residents went for days and weeks without essential medications (Manuel 
2013). Many had to rely on family, neighbors, and volunteers to bring them the resources they 
needed (Green 2012). Other more physically able residents were forced to navigate dozens of 
stairs in darkened stairwells to bring needed supplies to their apartments. 
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5.1.2. Group 2 - Complex or Coordinated Evacuation Requirements 
Group 2 facilities (Table 5.2) house moderate to large populations in group settings for short 
(daily) or, in the case of correctional facilities, group homes, chemical dependency treatment 
centers, psychiatric care centers, and homeless shelters, extended stays. These facilities are 
flagged for inclusion in the index because they would require additional planning and resources 
to mobilize and provide shelter for their population in the event of a flood. Unlike the Group 1 
population, people in Group 2 are likely mobile but may not be able to make their own choices 




FACILITIES	  WITH	  COMPLEX	  OR	  COORDINATED	  EVACUATION	  
Correctional	  Facilities	  
-­‐	  Federal,	  State,	  and	  City	  Correctional	  Facilities	  
Residential	  Chemical	  Dependency	  Centers	  
-­‐	  Detoxification	  and	  Withdrawal	  Centers	  
Group	  Homes	  
-­‐	  Residential	  Group	  Homes	  for	  Children	  and	  Adults	  
Residential	  Mental	  Health	  Facilities	  
-­‐	  Hospital	  and	  Psychiatric	  Center	  Care	  
Day	  Care	  Centers	  and	  Schools	  
-­‐	  Head	  Start,	  Public,	  Private,	  Charter,	  Pre-­‐K,	  K-­‐12	  
Temporary/Transitional	  Housing	  Residents	  
-­‐	  Shelter	  for	  Singles	  and	  Family	  Homeless	  Facilities	  




• Correctional Facilities: These facilities include Federal, State, and City correctional 
facilities; State and City secure and non-secure juvenile justice facilities; and State 
Reception Centers (14-day stay). 
• Residential Chemical Dependency Services: The facilities include inpatient detoxification 
and withdrawal services, inpatient rehabilitation and residential services, residential 
supportive living and rehab for youth, method one to abstinence residential services, and 
community residential service. 
• Residential Group Homes: These facilities include services for children such as group 
foster homes and residences, foster institution, boarding homes, and supervised 
independent living. It also includes services for adults such as adult care facilities, and 
supportive single room occupancy housing. 
• Residential Mental Health Facilities: These facilities include prison-based mental health 
units, State operated psychiatric centers, supported single room occupancies, youth 
community residences, and hospital-based inpatient care. 
• Day Care and Schools: Day care includes public, private, and corporate group day care as 
well and public and private Head Start centers. Schools include public and charter 
schools as well as and private/parochial schools from pre-k though senior high school. 
• Temporary/Transitional Housing: This includes shelters for singles as well as family 
homeless facilities contracted or operated by the Department of Homeless Services, non-
contracted, and those with and unknown contract status. 
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5.2. Resources Omitted 
Utilities such as the electric, steam, and natural gas systems supply essential services to residents 
yet were not included in the critical facilities index due to limited information such about the 
distribution of their services. The critical facilities index assumes that a flooded facility impacts 
the residents of the tax lot in which it is located, however for utilities the location of a facility 
does not always correspond to the location of services and it is the loss of service that is most 
relevant to the index. For example, during Hurricane Sandy floodwaters infiltrated the protective 
barriers at Con Edison’s East 13th Street substation in Manhattan rendering the station inoperable 
and knocking out power to most of Manhattan below 34th street. However, power remained in 
the Battery Park neighborhood of Manhattan that receives its electricity from Brooklyn. This 
example illustrates how electric networks can extend in any direction from their source, making 
it difficult to make connections between substation location and residents at-risk to lost services. 
An understanding of the location of utilities in the flood zones and the extent of their service 
network would have been necessary to make a meaningful contribution to the critical facilities 
index.  
 
This work also omits public safety facilities such as police, fire, and emergency medical services 
(EMS) from the critical facilities index. These facilities were considered for inclusion based on 
the assumption that residents in areas whose emergency service facilities have been impacted by 
flooding are at greater risk to potential harm should they need to call on these services and find 
them unavailable. However the New York City police and fire departments have multiple levels 
of redundancy built into their response areas making it unlikely an area would be denied service 
due to a compromised police or fire station, so the assumption above isn’t supported. 
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For example, every fire station in the Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) covers 
primary, secondary, and tertiary response areas, each one bigger than the previous, such that if a 
primary station is unable to respond to a call a secondary and even tertiary station is available. 
Primary response areas do not overlap between fire stations but primary and secondary as well as 
secondary and tertiary areas do overlap among stations, and they do so in case the primary 
response area's engine or ladder truck is on another call at the time of an emergency. In this way 
every area of the city has at least three levels of back up and these back up stations are not 
necessarily further from a given response location than the primary station, in part due to the fact 
that response areas are not circular in shape but instead follow major thoroughfares and other 
neighborhood boundaries. In this regard the city is well covered by the FDNY even when an 
area’s primary station is unavailable. For reasons of security the response areas assigned to a 
given station are not made available to the public. 
 
The issue of emergency response is really one of overall access during flood events, meaning 
that it is difficult for any and all emergency responders to move within flooded areas regardless 
of whether their actual facility has been compromised. This is best illustrated by the FDNY’s 
response to the fire that destroyed much of the Breezy Point neighborhood during Hurricane 
Sandy. Breezy Point, Queens is situated on the western end of the Rockaway Peninsula between 
the Atlantic Ocean to the south and Jamaica Bay to the north. When Sandy struck on October 29, 
2012, storm surge came in contact with live electrical wires and sparked a house fire that spread 
to over 130 homes and burned unchecked for hours, growing to a six-alarm status. Two main 
issues impacted FDNY’s ability to respond effectively to the fire: 1) once they arrived in Breezy 
Point they were blocked from reaching the scene of the fire by floodwaters, and 2) when they 
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were able to get close enough to fight the fire they were unable to access the fire hydrants that 
were submerged underwater. The fact that the Rockaway firehouses were flooded was irrelevant 
because the department had moved their rolling stock out of the firehouses and across Jamaica 
Bay to the mainland prior to the arrival of the storm. This precautionary strategy was part of the 
emergency flood plan the Rockaway fire stations had developed in coordination with the Office 
of Emergency Management. It meant that although firefighters had to drive back over the Marine 
Parkway Bridge during the storm to reach Breezy Point, their engines and ladders were in 
service.  
 
This scenario, in addition to the response area information above, illustrates that compromised 
emergency facilities are not the primary concern in flooding situations because 1) other non-
compromised facilities can cover a given response area, and 2) the rolling stock equipment of 
stations in flood zones can be kept in operating condition by moving them out of flood zones. 
The primary concern is about emergency service access to areas experiencing flooding and then 
access to hydrants or other resources in these areas. In this case the best indicator of vulnerability 
in the context of access of emergency responders is the degree and height of floodwaters in a 
given neighborhood, not proximity to a compromised police/fire station, and degree of 
flooding/height of floodwaters is captured in the index of exposure to storm surge. Stations 
beyond the flood areas are positioned to move into flooded areas when the roads become 
passable, so the concern is really about mobility within flooded neighborhoods. 
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Chapter 6: Methodology 
 
This research seeks to determine how sea-level rise projections may alter the potential 
socioeconomic impacts of contemporary 100- and 500-year flood events and of future flood 
events enhanced by sea-level rise scenarios, how changing flood exposure may affect the number 
and distribution of people at risk, and how flood impacts will vary among neighborhoods. In 
order to assess overall storm surge flood risk at the intersection of exposure and vulnerability, a 
GIS-based methodology was developed to map a composite exposure and infrastructure 
vulnerability index for New York City populations within existing and predicted flood zones. 
ESRI’s ArcGIS 10 and SPSS Statistics 20.0 software were used to quantify and characterize the 
population and infrastructure estimated to be at-risk. Four separate indices were constructed to 
capture exposure to floodwater heights and wave action, exposure to floodwater contaminants, 
social vulnerability, and critical facilities at-risk to flooding. The following sections detail the 
datasets used in the analyses and describe the processes for developing and aggregating the 
respective indices to form a composite overall flood risk index. 
 
6.1. Datasets 
Multiple spatially referenced datasets were obtained through publically available sources and 
through agency requests. The following datasets were used to evaluate present and potential 
future floodplain extent and to develop the index of exposure to flood water heights and wave 
action: 
• FEMA’s Flood Insurance Rate Maps for New York City released in 1983 
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• FEMA’s Preliminary Work Maps for New York City released in June 201310. 
Access: http://www.region2coastal.com/bestdata 
• The future 100- and 500-year flood zones for the 2020s and 2050s published in June 2013 
were obtained with permission from the New York City Panel on Climate Change. These 
vector shapefiles contain polygons delineating the floodplain extent in four potential future 
flood scenarios.  
 
The following datasets were used in the creation of the social vulnerability index: 
• MapPLUTO (short for Property Land Use Tax lot Output) 2011 tax lot data files were 
retrieved from the NYC Department of City Planning’s Bytes of the Big Apple product. 
MapPLUTO merges tax lot data with tax lot features from the Department of Finance Digital 
Tax Map. Tax lot data was used as an ancillary dataset in population disaggregation. 
Access: http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bytes/applbyte.shtml#pluto 
• Block group cartographic boundary shapefiles were downloaded from the 2010 US Census 
Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) product. They 
were used to aggregate tax lot information to the block group level. 
Access: http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf_blkgrp.html 
• Sociodemographic data was collected from the 2010 U.S. Census survey and the American 
Community Survey 5-Year Summary Files, 2006 – 2010 and used in the creation of the 
social vulnerability index. 
 
                                                
10 The Preliminary FIRMs for New York City were released on December 5, 2013 and supersede the Preliminary 
Work Maps. However the Preliminary FIRMs were not available at the time of this analysis. 
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The following datasets were used in the creation of the storm surge floodwater contaminants 
index: 
• The October 2011 State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPEDES) dataset created 
by the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation was retrieved through the 
through the NYSGIS Clearinghouse. 
Access: http://gis.ny.gov/gisdata/inventories/member.cfm?organizationID=529 
• Information about Brownfield and Superfund sites in New York City was gathered from the 
dataset Environmental Remediation Sites – New York State (NYSDEC) developed by the New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Date of publication is April 2008 
with the last metadata last update on November 2010. 
Access: http://www.dec.ny.gov/geodata/ptk 
• Information about chemical bulk storage, the petroleum bulk storage program, and major oil 
storage facilities was gathered from the Bulk Storage Facilities Database Search – NYS 
(NYSDEC) dataset created by the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation. Date of publication is April 2008, which is also listed as the currentness 
reference. 
Access: http://www.dec.ny.gov/geodata/ptk 
• The 2013 Combined Sewer Overflow Outfalls dataset created by the NYC Department of 
Environmental Protection was accessed by request. 
• An inventory of New York City Water Pollution Control Plants was obtained from the 2012 
Selected Facilities and Program Sites dataset (2012, rev.1) developed by the NYC 
Department of City Planning’s Bytes of the Big Apple product. 
Access: http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bytes/applbyte.shtml#other 
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• The Toxic Release Inventory dataset for New York City was downloaded by querying 
Facility Release Reports for the 2011 reporting year using the Toxic Release Inventory 
Explorer Tool developed by the Environmental Protection Agency. Facilities reporting to 
TRI were required to submit RY 2011 data to EPA by July 1, 2012. 
Access: http://iaspub.epa.gov/triexplorer/tri_release.facility 
 
The following datasets were used in the creation of the critical facilities at-risk index: 
• The 2012 Selected Facilities and Program Sites dataset (2012, rev.1) was retrieved from the 
NYC Department of City Planning’s Bytes of the Big Apple product. This dataset includes 
information about New York City schools, parks, libraries, public safety, day care, foster 
care, special needs housing, and health and mental health facilities and programs. 
Access: http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bytes/applbyte.shtml#other 
• An inventory of multi-family elevator buildings was selected from the MapPLUTO (short for 
Property Land Use Tax lot Output) 2011 tax lot data files retrieved from the NYC 
Department of City Planning’s Bytes of the Big Apple product.  
Access: http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/bytes/applbyte.shtml#pluto 
 
6.2. Estimating the Population At-Risk to Flooding 
To assess the individual and community impacts of current and potential future flooding it is 
important to understand the residential population at-risk. Maps of areal flood extent coupled 
with demographic data offer an opportunity to estimate the population at-risk by analyzing the 
aggregate residential population that intersects the flood zone. Various methods are used to 
achieve this estimation, each with limitations in accuracy and precision. This section describes 
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the method employed in this work to determine how many New York City residents are and will 
be at-risk to100- and 500-year flood events.  
 
6.2.1. Selecting the Flood Zones 
This work considers the following six different flood scenarios for New York City: 1) present-
day 100- and 2) 500-year floods;11 3) 100- and 4) 500-year floods for the 2020s timeslice; and 5) 
100- and 6) 500-year floods for the 2050s timeslice. These flood scenarios were selected because 
they were developed by or are founded upon the FEMA flood insurance study for New York 
City, the products of which set the standard for flood insurance rates and land use planning 
decisions. FEMA FIRMs are created through hydrologic and hydraulic modeling and consider 
the effects of surge, wave action, and astronomical tides and are considered to be the best 
available data for the region. The future flood scenarios of the 2020s and 2050s are founded 
upon FEMA’s FIRMs and illustrate the potential impacts of sea-level rise on flood heights and 
extents.  
 
6.2.2. Population Disaggregation 
Disaggregation of data is the process of dividing a data set into its component parts to yield a 
finer unit of analysis. With respect to census derived population estimates, disaggregation is used 
to better represent populations within areas, such as floodplains, that do not coincide with census 
unit boundaries. By disaggregating and redistributing population from large census units into 
smaller units based on the location of residential housing, the residential population along the 
boundary of a floodplain can be more accurately approximated relative to other floodplain 
                                                
11 Present day references FEMA’s Preliminary Work Maps for New York City released in June 2013. 
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population estimate techniques. This section describes the process of dasymetric disaggregation 
used in this work to determine population at-risk to current and future flood scenarios. First, the 
common techniques for estimating floodplain populations - centroid containment, areal 
weighting, and filtered areal weighting - are described below.  
 
Centroid containment is a coarse method of estimation that selects for inclusion only the census 
units whose geometric centroid12 falls within the floodplain. As can be seen in Figure 6.1 (from 
Maantay and Maroko, 2009), centroid containment (left) has the potential to dramatically under 
or overestimate population when the polygon centroid and the floodplain do not coincide – i.e., a 
polygon can be widely flooded without including the centroid and vice versa.  Areal weighting 
(center) is a technique that addresses the lack of spatial coincidence between census and 
floodplain boundaries and it has been used in multiple vulnerability studies (Clark et al. 1998; 
Wu, Yarnal, and Fisher 2002; Kleinosky, Yarnal, and Fisher 2006; Rygel, O’sullivan, and Yarnal 
2006). This technique assumes a homogenous distribution of the population and a proportional 
relationship between the percentage of the census unit flooded and the percentage of at-risk 
population in the census unit. However a major source of error in the areal weighting technique 
is that populations are rarely homogeneously distributed throughout a geographic area due to the 
presence of non- or low-populated spaces such as manufacturing and industrial facilities, public 
and private parks and lots, water bodies, and extensive infrastructure. Even in residential areas 
population density can vary based on housing type and unit size, resulting in a heterogeneous 
population distribution. This is particularly the case for New York City. 
 
                                                
12 A geometric centroid refers to the center of mass of a two dimensional object, or the arithmetic mean position of 
all the points in the shape. In this work the two-dimensional objects are the census unit polygons in ArcGIS.   
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Figure 6.1. Estimates of population in a section of Staten Island situated in FEMA’s 1983 100-
year flood zone. The three methods featured - centroid containment (left), areal weighting 
(center), and CEDS (right) – predict different numbers of people as well as different people. 
Reprinted from Maantay and Maroko (2009). 
 
The filtered areal weighting method was developed to address these unpopulated areas. Filtering 
is accomplished through the use of an ancillary dataset, often land-use or land-cover, that serves 
to exclude uninhabited areas from the analysis and redistribute the population in the remaining 
areas (Maantay, Maroko, and Herrmann 2007). Despite the improvement over the traditional 
areal weighting technique, filtered areal weighting still cannot account for variations in 
population density and can omit populations living in non-residentially zoned areas during the 
filtering process.  
 
The Cadastral-based Expert Dasymetric System (CEDS) of population disaggregation has been 
used less extensively but offers greater precision than other methods such as centroid 
containment or areal weighting (Maantay, Maroko, and Herrmann 2007). In fact the areal 
weighting method, though useful as a simple first order approximation, has been shown to 
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potentially underestimate the affected population by 37% compared to CEDS (Maantay and 
Maroko 2009). CEDS improves on areal weighting and other methods by using cadastral data as 
an ancillary dataset to filter out uninhabited areas and account for variations in population 
density. Cadastral data refers to the value, extent, and ownership of land for taxation purposes. It 
is more detailed and refined than land-use or land-cover data and, when applied using an ‘expert 
system’ that determines which variable in the cadastral dataset should be applied to each 
individual record, yields a customized disaggregation that best fits the data.  It is a great 
advantage to be able to apply this method to the densely populated New York City area and 
achieve results at a high spatial resolution. 
 
Maantay et al. (2007) evaluate census estimated vs. CEDS estimated populations in New York 
City using both ‘residential units’ and ‘residential area’ as cadastral datasets. They compared 
three methods of disaggregation derived population estimates to census derived population 
estimates: 1) CEDS with the expert system that selects the cadastral dataset (residential units or 
residential area) to be applied to each individual record, 2) dasymetrically derived population 
using ‘residential units’ alone (no expert system), and 3) dasymetrically derived population using 
‘residential area’ alone (no expert system) and found that each of those methods differ from 
actual census population counts by 1) 6.37%, 2) 8.69% and 3) 9.44% respectively. The CEDS 
method outperforms the others, but offers only a small advantage over the dasymetrically derived 
approach. Rather than apply the full expert system as Maantay et al. (2007) have done, this work 
uses the second method - dasymetrically derived population using ‘residential units’ - to 
disaggregate population from the census block group level to the tax lot level, as this has shown 
to effectively estimate the hyper-heterogeneous population of New York City.  
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Dasymetric disaggregation was achieved as follows: 
 
POPl = POPc * Ul / Uc               (1) 
 
where: 
POPl = dasymetrically derived tax lot-level population; 
POPc = census population at the block group level; 
     Ul = the number residential units at the tax lot level; and  
    Uc = the number of residential units at the block group level. 
 
After the population has been disaggregated to the tax lot level, the centroid containment method 
is ultimately used to select which tax lots are located within the floodplain. As described above 
centroid containment has the potential to greatly over or underestimate the population in a 
floodplain when the unit of analysis is large, such as at the census block or block group level. 
However the two advantages of dasymetric disaggregation are that the tax lot footprints are on 
average over 300 times smaller in area than those of block groups and they better reflect actual 
population distribution (Figure 6.2), so when the centroid containment method is applied to these 










Figure 6.2. Comparison of block 
group and tax lot sizes in the 
neighborhood of Bushwick 
Brooklyn. The block group 
outlined in red in the center of 
this aerial photo contains 172 tax 
lots highlighted in green. The 
area of the block group is 
523,425 square feet, a value 253 
times greater than the average 
tax lot area of 2,066 square feet. 
For this reason it is much more 
accurate to evaluate the 
boundary of a floodplain at the 
tax lot level, rather than the 







Figure 6.3 describes the outcomes of floodplain population estimation using three techniques: 
centroid containment, areal weighting and dasymetric disaggregation. In this illustration a block 
group (red box) contains the four tax lots A, B, C, and D (black boxes) some of which are 
exposed to a hypothetical floodplain in blue. According to the U.S. Census the population of the 
block group is 500 and, according to MapPLUTO, it contains 180 residential units. The number 




Figure 6.3. An example of floodplain population estimation using three techniques: centroid 
containment, areal weighting and dasymetric disaggregation. The red line indicates the block 
group extent and the tax lots within are drawn as black rectangles. The census-derived 
population for the block group is 500 and the Map PLUTO derived number of residential units 
for the block group is 180. A hypothetical floodplain is illustrated in blue enveloping the centroid 
of tax lot D but touching none of the other tax lot centroids. The floodplain population estimate 
is 0 by centroid containment, 170 by areal weighting, and 278 by dasymetric disaggregation.  
 
Using centroid containment at the block group level to estimate the population in the floodplain 
would yield an estimate of zero because the block group centroid (red dot) does not fall within 
the floodplain. Therefore this entire block group would be omitted from a floodplain population 
count. Areal weighing at the block group level would calculate 35% of the total block group 
population as flooded, corresponding to the percentage of block group area flooded, and yield a 
population estimate of 170. In contrast, dasymetric disaggregation using the residential units 
ancillary data set yields a floodplain population estimate of 278. First, the block group 
population of 500 is disaggregated down to tax lot populations and the distribution of this 
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disaggregation is guided by the residential units dataset (see Figure 6.3, tax lot population 
calculations on the right). Then the tax lots whose centroids intersect the floodplain are selected 
for inclusion in the population count. In this case only the centroid of tax lot D is intersects the 
floodwaters for a total floodplain population of 278. Though floodwaters move through a portion 
of tax lot C the centroid is not included in the flood area, and the tax lot is omitted from the 
population estimate.  
 
 
6.3. Index I: Exposure to Storm Surge Index 
An index of storm surge exposure was developed in ArcGIS to rank tax lots based on their 
potential to experience high storm surge elevations and high velocity wave action. Depending on 
their topography and proximity to the coastline, tax lots are exposed to different surge heights for 
a given flood which makes some tax lots more physically vulnerable than others. In addition to 
surge height, zones of high velocity wave action - defined by FEMA as zones of breaking waves 
greater than 3 feet - have the potential to inflict significant structural damage13. As such, 
populations living in tax lots with greater exposure to storm surge and wave action are more 
physically vulnerable to flood events than populations in tax lots that experience low elevation 
flooding. This storm surge elevation index captures both the degree of exposure to floodwaters 
and the physical vulnerability of the residential population at the tax lot level.   
 
The storm surge exposure index was created using FEMA’s Preliminary Work Maps for New 
York City (June 2013) and the New York City Panel on Climate Change future 100- and 500-
                                                
13 Damage assessments and wave tank research has shown that wave heights of 1.5 feet can cause significant 
structural damage. As such, beginning in 2009 FEMA coastal studies are also required to map the Limit of Moderate 
Wave Action (LiMWA), a line that delineates the landward location of the 1.5-foot wave height. 
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year flood zone maps for the 2020s and 2050s (June 2013). Tax lots are ranked 1 through 9 with 
higher numbers corresponding to greater exposure and subsequent vulnerability to harm (Figure 
6.5). Tax lots subject to the current 100- and 500-year floods are ranked as more vulnerable than 
those subject to projected future flooding only, since current flood zones will continue to be 
flooded in the future at greater surge heights. FEMA designated zones of high-velocity wave 
action are ranked highest of all.  
 
Figure 6.4. Ranking of NYC tax lots based on their potential to experience high storm surge 
elevations and high velocity wave action. The higher the rank the greater the exposure to flood 
waters and the greater the physical vulnerability of the residential population. The 10ft BFE was 
chosen as the break value in the AE zones (zones subject to shallow flooding of 1 - 3 feet) based 
on the distribution of the base flood elevation data.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 describes the ranks of exposure relative to population vulnerability. Rank 1 tax lots 
are situated well inland or at high elevation such that they are only projected to experience 
flooding during a 500-year flood event in the 2050s. They were selected in ArcGIS as tax lots in 
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the 500-year 2050s flood zone that are not also included in any other flood scenario. Rank 2 tax 
lots are only projected to experience flooding during a 500-year flood event in the 2050s or 
2020s. They were selected in ArcGIS as tax lots within the 500-year 2020s and 2050s flood 
extents that are not also included in any other flood scenario. Rank 3 tax lots are projected to 
flood during a 500-year flood event in the 2050s or 2020s or a 100-year flood event in the 2050s. 
This succession is repeated such that the higher ranked tax lots are subject to a new degree of 
flooding in addition to the flooding experienced in lower ranks. 
 
Tax lots ranked 1 through 4 are subject to future flooding in the 2020s or 2050s only. Lots also 
subject to the current 500-year flood are ranked 5, and lots ranked 6 through 9 are subject to the 
current FEMA designated 100-year flood event but vary in ranking based on base flood elevation 
and the presence or absence of high velocity wave action. The base flood elevations (BFEs) in 
rank 6 tax lots are less than 10 feet, the BFEs in rank 7 lots are equal to 10 feet, and the BFEs in 
rank 8 or 9 lots are greater than 10 feet. Lots that ranked 9 on the exposure to floodwaters index 
are also subject to high velocity wave action. 
 
6.4. Index II: Exposure to Storm Surge Floodwater Contaminants Index 
An index of exposure to potential storm surge floodwater contaminants was created from the 
facility types that utilize, store, and discharge toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes discussed in 
Chapter 4. The heterogeneous distribution of these facilities throughout New York City means 
that there is an uneven potential for residents to be exposed to floodwater contaminants from 
these sites, with many residential tax lots containing or proximal to multiple facilities. The tax 
lots determined to be at risk were selected using a buffer analysis, such that those lots with 
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centroids located within a designated facility buffer zone are considered at-risk to contamination 
during a flood event. The index of potential floodwater contaminants is largely an evaluation of 
the concentration of sites containing toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes at the tax lot level. 
 
6.4.1. Buffer Technique: Description and Critique 
Proximity analysis has been used in the environmental justice literature to examine the 
characteristics of the population near sites of environmental hazard (Chakraborty and Maantay 
2011). It is based on the assumption that anyone living within a fixed distance of a given hazard 
is at risk to that hazard. In early environmental justice analysis, political and administrative 
boundaries were used to represent the size and shape of an at-risk area because population data 
was available for use at that spatial scale. However, it was recognized that the dispersion of 
hazardous emissions - whether through air or water - does not follow administrative boundaries 
and the use of a circular buffer around the emission site to approximate the affected area became 
a common practice (Glickman 1994; Glickman and Hersh 1995; Sheppard et al. 1999). 
Aggregation of pre-defined census units within the buffer is then used to estimate the 
composition of the population affected. The challenge with aggregation is that the buffer and 
underlying geographic unit boundaries do not coincide such that the buffer includes both whole 
and partial census polygons. Three common options for measuring the demographics within a 




Figure 6.5. Three methods of measuring the demographics in buffer analysis: A) polygon 
containment, B) centroid containment, and C) buffer containment. 
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the polygon, centroid, and buffer containment methods for measuring the 
demographics in a buffer analysis (note that these and similar methods for estimating floodplain 
populations are discussed in section 6.2.2). The first method, polygon containment (Figure 6.5a) 
considers all the data in the polygons that are contained by or intersect the buffer. Centroid 
containment (Figure 6.5b) includes only those polygons whose centroids fall within the buffer 
zone. In both of these methods the shape of the buffer zone is determined by the outline of the 
included polygons and the data in these polygons is aggregated to form the buffer estimate. This 
is not the case for buffer containment (Figure 6.5c), a method that selects only the polygons and 
portions of polygons contained within the buffer. Because the circular shape of the buffer is 
maintained in this method, areal weighting must be applied to the data in the polygons only 
partially within the buffer.  
 
Buffer analysis, particularly the use of circular buffers, has many limitations in use and may not 
effectively represent areas at-risk to hazard. However it can capture the intended dimensions of 
areas at-risk to hazards when the following three assumptions are met:  
1. The hazard site is small enough to be treated as a point; 
2. The impacts are confined in the specified circular area; 
 98 
3. The impacts are equal and uniform in all directions (Liu 2001).  
These assumptions are difficult to fulfill in the context of point source floodwater contamination 
analysis. With respect to the first assumption that the hazard site is small enough to be treated as 
a point, some sites of potential floodwater contaminants such as water pollution control plants 
occupy an entire tax lot and cannot be treated as a simple point. Though the centroid of the 
facility may be used as the buffer origin point, the buffered area surrounding the site may be 
smaller than intended if the site itself is large.  
 
The second assumption that the impacts are confined in a specified circular area is untenable in 
the context of coastal storm surge flooding. Storm surge movement is very complex; floodwater 
moves both perpendicular and parallel to the coastline at multiple heights and is affected by land 
use/land cover, coastline structures, and other inland infrastructure. The movement of floodwater 
inundation and retreat can only be approximated by local or regional hydrodynamic models. The 
movement of contaminants within those floodwaters adds another layer of complexity. For these 
reasons it is impossible to assert that contaminants will affect the entire buffered area, only affect 
a portion of the buffered area, or that impacts will extend beyond the boundaries of the buffer. 
 
The third assumption that impacts are equal and uniform in all directions implies that all people 
within the buffer zone are exposed to similar risks - i.e., that they are exposed to hazards of equal 
toxicity in the same dosage (Armstrong and Chakraborty 1997). However the dynamic nature of 
floodwater movement suggests that both exposure and dosage would vary within the buffer area. 
Also, because this work includes nine separate sources of hazards often within overlapping 
buffers, contaminants of different volumes and toxicity may be present in any given area. Or 
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multiple point sources of a single contaminant could be sited in a small area, potentially 
increasing the local volume of contaminant relative to point sources that are distributed evenly. 
 
The use of circular buffers in the index of potential floodwater contaminants clearly does not 
meet assumptions discussed above; therefore buffers are not used to represent the spread, extent 
or direction of contaminant impacts. Instead buffers are used to evaluate of the concentration of 
toxic sites at the tax lot level, with the assumption that areas with dense concentrations of 
hazardous waste and chemical facilities are at-risk to greater toxic exposure and harm. Circular 
buffers are also used as a weighting tool to incorporate some measure of a site’s potential threat 
by assigning larger buffer distances to facilities that 1) store a greater volume of hazardous 
materials and 2) store, utilize, and discharge toxics that are easily mobilized (i.e., have a high 
potential to enter the floodwaters). In this regard, buffer distance (measured as radius from the 
site) is used as a proxy for pollutant volume and also a proxy for mobility (the potential to reach 
floodwaters).  Using buffers as proxy for these factors gives greater weight to sites with a higher 
level of potential threat and these sites are counted in more tax lots in the floodwater 
contaminants index. Sites with a lower level of potential threat have smaller buffers and are less 
represented in the index. 
 
For example, in this analysis SPDES permits categorized as Major were assigned a buffer 
distance of three-quarters of a mile while those categorized as Significant Minor were assigned a 
buffer distance of one-quarter mile. Major permits were given greater buffer distance because 
they score higher on the following criteria relative to Minor permits: toxic pollutant potential, 
flow/stream flow volume, conventional pollutant content, public health impact, water quality 
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factors, and proximity to near coastal waters (see section 4.1.3). They have the potential to 
discharge a greater volume of toxic pollutants as well as pollutants with greater toxicity. All 
SPDES permitted facilities discharge pollutants directly into ground or surface waters making 
their contaminants more mobile than those at sites where toxics are stored in closed containers 
such as storage tanks. 
 
The range of buffer distances used in this work  - one-quarter, one-half, three-quarters, and one-
mile in radius - are similar to those used in previous studies of hazard sites (Zimmerman 1993; 
Glickman 1994; Armstrong and Chakraborty 1997; Sheppard et al. 1999; Harner et al. 2002), 
however it has been argued that the choice of buffer radius is often arbitrary and can affect study 
results (Liu 2001). Armstrong and Chakraborty (1997) analysis of TRI facilities in Des Moines, 
Iowa found that the proportion of minority and impoverished residents is higher in the half-mile 
buffer distances relative to the one-mile buffer distances, suggesting that as the unit of analysis 
becomes larger the population within becomes more similar to the city as a whole. This result is 
in contrast to the analysis of Glickman and Hersh (1995) who studied industrial sites in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania and found that a larger circular buffer distance of one-mile 
contained a greater proportion of disadvantaged population than those within the one-half mile 
buffer. In this work buffers are not used to evaluate social vulnerability or equity but only as 
proxy for pollutant volume and mobility, so the sociodemographics within the buffered areas are 
not considered and the concerns above do not apply. 
 
Using buffers as a proxy for risk has been criticized as a simplistic approach that is often applied 
with uncertainty (Bowen 1999). Harner et al. (2002) use one-half and one-mile buffer distances 
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to approximate different levels of perceived risk to different hazard sources. Superfund National 
Priority List (NPL) and Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability 
Information System (CERCLIS) sites were buffered to one-mile and all other types of sites (e.g., 
TRI) to one-half mile on the premise that NPL and CERCLIS sites likely have a greater level of 
potential threat and therefore pose greater risk to the surrounding communities. However, 
because the exact volume and composition of pollutants at many hazardous sites is unknown or 
unreported and the exact level of toxins present can vary on a daily basis, it can be difficult to get 
a true measure of the level of potential threat.  
 
The nine facility types selected for inclusion in the floodwater contaminant index include 
Chemical and Petroleum Bulk Storage facilities, and Major Oil Storage Facilities (MOSF), Toxic 
Releases Inventory (TRI) facilities, State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) 
Major and Minor facilities, State Superfund Sites, Brownfields, Water Pollution Control Plants 
and Combined Sewage Overflow (CSO) Outfalls. Buffers were created around each potential 
contaminant source using the buffer tool in ArcGIS. Distances were assigned based on the 
volume of contaminants at a given site and the potential for the toxic material to be spilled, 
discharged, or otherwise incorporated into floodwaters. 
 
1-mile (5,280 ft) buffer 
• Water Pollution Control Plants 
Because of their potential to release large volumes of untreated sewage directly into or proximal 
to storm surge, NYC’s wastewater treatment plants were buffered to 1 mile.  
 
 102 
¾ mile (3,960 ft) buffer 
• Active or unregulated Major Oil Storage Facilities 
Active or unregulated Major Oil Storage Facilities were assigned a buffer distance of ¾ mile due 
to their high storage capacity of 400,000 gallons or more. 
• Facilities with State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System “Major” permits 
Major permits are issued for discharges that score high in toxic pollutant potential, flow/stream 
flow volume, conventional pollutant content, public health impact, water quality factors, and 
proximity to near coastal waters. For these reasons they are buffered to ¾ mile. 
 
½ mile (2,640 ft) buffer 
• Class 2 State Superfund Sites 
Though Class 2 Sites contain hazards that pose a significant threat to the public health or 
environment, the type of hazardous substance and potential pathway into floodwaters was not 
detailed in the superfund database. Therefore the buffer distance applied is ½ mile. 
• Combined Sewage Overflow Outfalls 
Combined Sewage Overflow Outfalls release untreated sewage directly into or proximal to storm 
surge. The volume of these releases cannot be ascertained from the given database so the buffer 
distance assigned is ½ mile, a smaller buffer than that of the water pollution control plants. 
 
¼ mile (1,320 ft) buffer 
• Toxics Release Inventory facilities with on-site disposal or releases 
The TRI facilities used in this work self-report annual quantities of hazardous wastes released or 
disposed of on-site. However to understand the public health risk of these facilities situated in 
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flood zones, more information about the toxicity of each chemical and the mechanism of release 
(i.e., air vs. water or land release) or disposal is necessary. Since that information is not available 
in the TRI database the ¼ mile buffer is based on the threat of leaks or spills of stored chemicals 
into floodwaters, not based on the type of treatment the chemicals receive. 
• Active Brownfield Sites 
Active brownfield sites are currently in the process of remediation but the type and volume of 
hazardous waste or contaminant present is not listed in the brownfields database. Without this 
information it is impossible to make assumptions about the magnitude of potential public health 
impacts. For this reason brownfields are assigned the smallest buffer distance of ¼ mile.  
• Facilities with State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System “Significant Minor” permits 
Significant Minor permits are issued for discharges to surface and ground waters that have the 
potential to contain toxics, however they are not classified as having significant environmental 
impact. They are buffered to ¼ mile. 
• Active and Unregulated Chemical and Petroleum Bulk Storage facilities 
Active and unregulated faculties are actively storing or utilizing hazardous substances but doing 
so in smaller volumes than Major Oil Storage Facilities, warranting a smaller buffer area of ¼ 
mile. 
 
6.4.2. Exposure to Storm Surge Floodwater Contaminants Index Methodology 
The exposure to floodwater contaminants index was created using ArcGIS and SPSS. The index 
considers all facilities within the extent of the 500-year flood boundary for the 2050s, the largest 
flood extent used in this work. Each of the nine selected facility types were added to ArcGIS as 
point shapefiles and then buffered with a circular buffer to their assigned distances. The NYC 
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MapPLUTO tax lot shapefile and 500-year 2050s flood shapefile were also added to ArcGIS, 
and the MapPLUTO shapefile was then clipped to the future flood extent. Using a one-to-many 
spatial join, tax lots from MapPLUTO that intersect the contaminant buffers were flagged and 
added to an output table. This one-to-many join was repeated for once for each of the nine 
potential contaminants, resulting in nine output tables for the 500-year 2050s flood extent. The 
output tables were opened in SPSS where repetitive instances of flagged lots (i.e., lots intersected 
by multiple instances of the same type of hazard) were aggregated to get the total number of tax 
lot intersects per hazard. The nine data tables were merged into one file, and each tax lot 
summed across the nine contaminants to get the total number of buffer intersections from all 
contaminants per tax lot. This final count of buffer intersections per tax lot is used to create the 
floodwater contaminants index. Values ranged from 0 for tax lots that were not intersected by 
any buffers to tax lots intersected by as many as 227 buffers. 
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Figure 6.6. Sources of potential storm surge floodwater contaminants in south Brooklyn, their 
buffer zones, and the tax lots at risk. Chemical and petroleum bulk storage facilities were omitted 
to maintain figure clarity. The 500-year floodplain for the 2050s is in blue. 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates how the tax lots in the southern Brooklyn 500-year 2050s floodplain can be 
intersected by zero, one, or multiple facility buffers. This affects their rank on the floodwater 
contaminants index because their index score is a count of how many buffer intersections each 
tax lot experiences. Buffer sizes range from ¼ to 1 mile in radius and the number of each facility 
type ranges from tens to thousands. For example, the sheer number of chemical and petroleum 
bulk storage facilities would have overwhelmed the other facility buffers so they were omitted 
from Figure 6.6 (though not omitted from the index). The water pollution control plant is 
buffered to a mile (red), the Superfund site is buffered to ½ mile (orange), the toxic release 
inventory sites are buffered to ¼ mile (yellow), the major state pollutant discharge elimination 
system (SPDES) site are buffered to ¾ mile (green) and the SPDES minor sites are buffered to ¼ 
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mile (blue), major oil storage facilities (MOSF) are buffered to ¾ mile (purple), and the 
brownfields are buffered to ¼ mile (pink).  
 
6.5. Index III: Social Vulnerability Index 
The social vulnerability of the population estimated to be affected by current and future 100- and 
500-year flood events was measured by creating an index derived from a suite of selected 
socioeconomic indicators at the block group and census tract levels. The data collected and 
methods of aggregating the index are described in this section. 
 
6.5.1. U.S. Census and American Community Survey Data 
Social vulnerability assessment research to date has been conducted at multiple geographic units 
such as the county (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003; Cutter and Finch 2008; Fekete 2009), 
census tract (Flanagan et al. 2011; Maantay, Maroko, and Culp 2009), census block group 
(Kleinosky, Yarnal, and Fisher 2006; Peacock et al. 2011; Rygel, O’sullivan, and Yarnal 2006), 
and census block (Cutter, Mitchell, and Scott 2000; Wu, Yarnal, and Fisher 2002). The choice of 
the unit of analysis is influenced by the study area size (i.e., national, regional, or local analysis) 
and the availability of data (the smaller the geographic unit, the fewer detailed datasets that are 
available). Though results for a given study area can vary with different units of geographic 
analysis, Cutter et al. (1996) found that census tracts and block groups are the most appropriate 
for equity analysis because of intra-county and intra-zip code variations in indicators. This work 
used census block group data wherever available and census tract data otherwise, with these 
choices largely dictated by the availability of the socioeconomic indicators. 
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The population data used in the social vulnerability index was collected from the 2010 U.S. 
Census survey and the American Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Summary Files, 2006 – 
2010.  The 2010 U.S. Census was the primary data source wherever possible, supplemented by 
the American Community Survey data when Census data was not available. Some Census data 
was not available was due to a change in the structure of the 2010 Census survey. Prior to the 
2010 Census, the Census survey consisted of both long form and short form questionnaires. The 
short form gathered population count and basic demographic data while the long form also 
collected housing, demographic, and economic data. Data collected from both forms is typically 
necessary to construct a robust index of social vulnerability. However, in an effort to streamline 
decennial operations and provide more timely data the 2010 Census did not use the long form 
and instead sent out only the short form. The decennial long form was replaced by the ACS, 
which provides data not once every ten years but once every year of the decade. Therefore many 
of the common variables selected for inclusion in previous indices were not available through the 
2010 U.S. Census and were sought from the ACS. 
 
This work could have used the older 2000 Census long form data instead of using the ACS, 
however the value and relevance of the 2000 Census data is greatly diminished by the time that 
has passed since its collection. For this reason, the recent data collected by the American 
Community Survey over a 5-year range from 2006 - 2010 was used. The ACS is a survey of 
demographic, economic, and housing data collected every year and averaged over a given time 
period of 5, 3, or 1 years. ACS surveys only 3 million households per year and is less accurate 
with a higher margin of error than the U.S. Census, however because data is collected every year 
it is more current and in many ways more relevant. The 5-year survey is the most reliable of 
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ACS estimates, composed of the largest sample size and date range for areas of all population 
sizes, and it was the survey used for many indicators in this work.  
 
The selection of variables was guided by the work of Cutter et al. (2003), Maantay et al. (2009), 
and Flanagan et al. (2011) grouped into domains as follows: socioeconomic status, household 
structure and disability, minority status and language, and group housing and transportation 
(Table 6.1). 
 
Variable	   Description	   Source	   Unit	  
Domain	  A:	  
Socioeconomic	  Status	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
1.	  Percent	  persons	  below	  
poverty	  
Individuals	  below	  poverty	  =	  
"Under	  0.50"	  +	  "0.50	  to	  0.74"	  +	  
"0.75	  to	  0.99";	  denominator	  is	  
total	  population	  for	  whom	  
poverty	  status	  is	  determined.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  
C17002	   -­‐	   Ratio	   of	   income	   to	  




2.	  Percent	  civilian	  
unemployed	  
Civilian	  persons	  unemployed	  
divided	  by	  total	  civilian	  
population.	  Civilian	  population	  =	  
total	  population	  16	  years	  or	  
older	  -­‐	  persons	  in	  the	  armed	  
forces.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  
B23001	   -­‐	   Sex	   by	   employment	  
status	  for	  the	  pop	  16	  yrs	  and	  over.	  
Census	  
Tract	  
3.	  Per	  Capita	  Income	  in	  
2011	  
The	  mean	  income	  computed	  for	  
every	  person.	  
American	  Community	  Survey	  5-­‐
Year	  Summary:	  2006	  -­‐	  2010.	  Table	  
B19301	  -­‐	  Per	  capita	  income	  in	  the	  




4.	  Percent	  adults	  with	  no	  
high	  school	  diploma	  
Persons	  25	  yrs	  and	  older	  with	  
less	  than	  a	  12th	  grade	  education	  
(including	  individuals	  with	  12	  
grades	  but	  no	  diploma);	  
denominator	  is	  the	  pop	  25	  yrs	  
and	  over.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  
B15002	   -­‐	   Sex	   by	   educational	  






Variable	   Description	   Source	   Unit	  
Domain	  B:	  Household	  
structure	  and	  disability	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
5.	  Percent	  persons	  65	  
years	  of	  age	  or	  older	  
Persons	  65	  years	  of	  age	  or	  older;	  
denominator	  is	  total	  population.	  
2010	   Census	   Summary	   File	   1,	  
100%	  Data.	  Table	  P12	  -­‐	  Sex	  by	  age.	  
Block	  
Group	  
6.	  Percent	  persons	  10	  
years	  of	  age	  or	  younger	  
Persons	  10	  years	  of	  age	  or	  
younger;	  denominator	  is	  total	  
population.	  
2010	   Census	   Summary	   File	   1,	  
100%	  Data.	  Table	  P12	  -­‐	  Sex	  by	  age.	  
Block	  
Group	  
8.	  Percent	  male	  or	  female	  
single	  householder	  with	  
children	  under	  18	  years	  
Male/Female	  Householder,	  no	  
spouse	  present,	  with	  own	  
children	  under	  18	  years;	  
denominator	  is	  total	  households.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  
DP02	   -­‐	   Selected	   social	  





Variable	   Description	   Source	   Unit	  
Domain	  C:	  Minority	  
Status	  and	  Language	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
9.	  Percent	  Minority	   Black	  or	  African	  American	  alone	  
(not	  Hispanic	  or	  Latino)	  +	  All	  
Hispanic	  or	  Latino;	  denominator	  
is	  total	  pop.	  
2010	   Census	   Summary	   File	   1,	  
100%	   Data.	   Table	   QT-­‐P4	   -­‐	   Race,	  
combinations	   of	   two	   races,	   and	  
not	  Hispanic	  or	  Latino.	  
Block	  
Group	  
10.	  Percent	  persons	  5	  
years	  of	  age	  or	  older	  who	  
speak	  English	  less	  than	  
well	  	  
For	  all	  age	  groups	  and	  all	  
languages	  -­‐	  the	  total	  of	  persons	  
who	  speak	  English	  "not	  well"	  or	  
"not	  at	  all";	  denominator	  is	  total	  
pop	  5	  yrs	  or	  older.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  
B16004	   -­‐	  Age	  by	   language	  spoken	  
at	  home	  by	  ability	  to	  speak	  English	  



















Variable	   Description	   Source	   Unit	  
Domain	  D:	  Group	  
Housing	  and	  
Transportation	  
	  	   	  	   	  	  
11.	  Percent	  multi-­‐unit	  
structure	  
Housing	  units	  with	  10	  or	  more	  
units	  in	  structure;	  denominator	  
is	  total	  occupied	  housing	  units.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  
B25024	  -­‐	  Units	  in	  structure.	  
Block	  
Group	  
12.	  Percent	  Crowded	  
Households	  
Total	  occupied	  housing	  units	  
with	  more	  people	  than	  rooms	  (>	  
1	  person	  per	  room);	  
denominator	  is	  total	  occupied	  
housing	  units.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  




13.	  Percent	  households	  
without	  a	  vehicle	  
available	  
Households	  with	  no	  vehicle	  
available;	  denominator	  is	  total	  
occupied	  housing	  units.	  
American	   Community	   Survey	   5-­‐
Year	   Summary:	   2006-­‐2010.	   Table	  




14.	  Percent	  persons	  in	  
group	  quarters	  
Total	  population	  in	  group	  
quarters;	  denominator	  is	  total	  
population.	  
2010	   Census	   Summary	   File	   1,	  
100%	  Data.	  Table	  P29	  -­‐	  Household	  
type	  by	  relationship.	  
Block	  
Group	  
Table 6.1. Variables used in the social vulnerability index, their geographic unit, and data 
source. Adapted from Flanagan et al. (2011), Maantay et al. (2009), and Cutter et al. (2003). 
Sources: 2010 U.S. Census, American Community Survey 5-Year Summary: 2006-2010. 
 
 
6.5.2. Constructing the Social Vulnerability Index 
Social vulnerability indices can be configured in a variety of ways to best measure the intended 
dimension of social vulnerability. Users can vary the structural design, indicator selection, and 
scale of analysis, and choose the best methods for data transformation, scaling, weighting and 
aggregation (Tate 2012). The index constructed in this work uses a deductive structure of 
fourteen indicators, each transformed from counts to percentages, normalized via rank order, and 
then aggregated without weights to form the final index value. Though Tate (2012) found the 
deductive design to be neither the most accurate nor the most precise, it was a practical option 
given the small number of indicators and the decision not to use a weighting scheme (Figure 
6.7). Assigning weights to various indicators can have great influence on the index outcome and 
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must be assigned thoughtfully when used at all. In fact when creating the social vulnerability 
index for the United States, Cutter et al. (2003) report that in the absence of a defensible method 
for assigning weights they opted to treat each factor as having an equal contribution to the 
vulnerability index. This work also weights each indicator equally simply for lack of a rationale 





Figure 6.7. A model of deductive design for the construction of vulnerability indices. Each 
indicator (I.1. – I.6.) is transformed, normalized, and aggregated without weights to form the 
index. Reprinted from Tate (2012). 
 
The social vulnerability index was created twice: once at the citywide level and once for the 500-
year flood zone for the 2050s using ArcGIS and SPSS software. Indices were not constructed for 
each of the six flood extents considered in this work in order to conserve processing time and 
power. Instead the 500-year flood zone, which encompasses all other flood zones, was selected 
for social vulnerability analysis. The citywide and 500-year flood zone methodologies vary 
slightly in their respective datasets and processes so they are detailed separately below. 
 
I. Social Vulnerability Index Methodology: Citywide 
In this citywide methodology, a social vulnerability index value was calculated for every 
populated block group in NYC. Sociodemographic data from the 2010 U.S. Census and ACS 
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was gathered at the block group level wherever possible and the census tract level where block 
group resolution was unavailable. The block group and census tract level datasets were opened in 
SPSS and merged based on their GeoID variables. Cases where total population is equal to zero 
were eliminated from the merged dataset. The sociodemographic variables were transformed 
from count values to rate values (values per block group or census tract population) by dividing 
the raw counts by the appropriate denominator (see Table 6.1 for descriptions of the variables 
and their respective denominators). This brought the number of indicators in the social 
vulnerability index to fourteen and eliminated their respective measurement scales. Each 
indicator rate value was assigned a percentile rank to determine the top tenth percentile values in 
the indictor dataset for each block group. The top tenth percentile values were recoded to the 
number one and all other values were recoded to the number zero. The recoded percentile values 
were summed across all fourteen indicator values for each block group, yielding a maximum 
potential social vulnerability index value of fourteen and a minimum value of zero.  
 
II. Social Vulnerability Index Methodology: 500-Year Flood Zone 
In this methodology, a social vulnerability index value was calculated for every populated tax lot 
in the 2050s 500-year flood zone. Prior to calculating the index values, population count was 
disaggregated from the census block or census tract levels to the tax lot level using the 
methodology described in section 6.2.2. Any tax lots without residential units were omitted from 
the final tax lot population count. 
 
The 2011 MapPLUTO tax lot dataset was added to ArcGIS along with the block group and 
census tract cartographic boundary shapefiles. The three datasets were joined using a one-to-one 
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spatial join, and cases where total residential units are equal to zero were eliminated. The dataset 
was then exported as a dbf file and opened in SPSS. Sociodemographic datasets at the block 
group and census tract level were also opened in SPSS and the three datasets were merged based 
on their GeoID variables. This resulted in a citywide dataset with all cases at the tax lot level but 
also containing sociodemographic data at the block group and census tract levels.  
 
The next step was to disaggregate the sociodemographic data to the tax lot level. To do this in 
SPSS, first the residential units variable was aggregated from the tax lot up to the block group 
and census tract levels. Then each sociodemographic variable was disaggregated from the block 
group or census tract level to the tax lot level using residential units as the auxiliary variable (see 
section 6.2.2 for a detailed description of dasymetric disaggregation). The sociodemographic 
variables were then transformed from count values to rate values (values per block group or 
census tract population), by dividing the raw counts by the appropriate denominator (see Table 
6.1 for descriptions of the variables and their respective denominators). This brought the number 
of indicators in the social vulnerability index to fourteen and eliminated their respective 
measurement scales. The dataset was exported and opened in ArcGIS. 
 
With the indicators dataset at the tax lot level open, the shapefile for the 500-year flood scenario 
for the 2050s was also added to ArcGIS. Using the select by location function, the tax lots from 
the indicator dataset whose centroids were located within the 500-year 2050s flood scenario were 
selected. These selections were then exported as a shapefile. The indicator rate values were then 
assigned a percentile rank to determine the top tenth percentile values at the tax lot level for each 
of the fourteen indictor datasets. The top tenth percentile values were recoded to the number one 
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and all other values were recoded to the number zero. The recoded percentile values were then 
summed across all fourteen indicator values for each tax lot, yielding a maximum potential value 
of fourteen and a minimum value of zero. The actual results never reached the maximum value 
of 14 but instead ranged from 0 to 10. 
 
There is a notable difference in the citywide and 500-year 2050s flood zone methodologies that 
is reflected in their resulting index values. First, the citywide vulnerability index was evaluated at 
the census block group level while the 500-year 2050s flood scenario was evaluated at the tax lot 
level. This was done to more accurately delineate the population considered ‘flooded’ near the 
inland flood zone boundaries by using a smaller unit of analysis, the tax lot. Second, when 
determining the top tenth percentile values in each indicator dataset, values are evaluated against 
all other values in the dataset. As a result there is a shift toward higher social vulnerability index 
values in the 500-year 2050s flood zone relative to the citywide social vulnerability index 
dataset, due to the influence on the citywide dataset of census blocks with high index values 
located outside of flood zones. Despite this difference it was important to evaluate the 500-year 
2050s flood zone unto itself to capture the range of vulnerability within affected tax lots. This 
difference would not be as pronounced had the citywide index values simply been applied to the 
tax lots in the flood zones. 
 
6.6. Index IV: Critical Facilities Index 
In addition to indices of flood exposure, floodwater hazard, and social vulnerability, an index of 
critical facilities was created from the facilities that provide services to or temporarily house a 
portion of the population discussed in Chapter 5. These facilities were grouped into two 
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categories: Group 1 consists of facilities with a population needing direct assistance for mobility 
(i.e., disabled persons and/or the elderly) and Group 2 considers facilities with complex 
evacuation and/or recovery needs. These facilities are considered to be ‘critical’ in the context of 
emergency preparedness and response because they may need additional support or resources to 
care for the population they serve in the event of a flood. The critical facilities index attempts to 
determine which residents will be most affected by the loss of essential services or temporary 
housing due to flooding by identifying critical facilities located in flood zones and aggregating 
them per tax lot. 
 
6.6.1. Critical Facilities Index Methodology 
The index of critical facilities was developed in ArcGIS and SPSS. The index considers all 
facilities within the extent of the 500-year flood boundary for the 2050s, the largest flood extent 
used in this work. In ArcGIS, the Group 1 and 2 facilities that intersect the 500-year flood zone 
for the 2050s were selected from the citywide critical facilities database and exported as a point 
shapefile (Table 6.2). Tax lots from MapPLUTO that intersect these point facilities were also 
selected and exported as a shapefile. The MapPLUTO polygon and facilities point data were 
joined into one file using a one-to-many spatial join that merged the tax lot and facilities 
attributes. Next, residential high-rise buildings (greater than or equal to seven floors in height) 
located in the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s were selected from the 2011 MapPLUTO 
dataset. The high-rise and merged tax lot and facilities datasets were imported into SPSS and 
merged on a common variable. Duplicate cases were identified and added together to give a total 
count for each tax lot of critical facilities situated within. This count ranged from 0 to 18. 
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Facilities	  in	  the	  500-­‐Year	  Zone	  
in	  the	  2050s:	  Listed	  by	  Type	   Bronx	   Brooklyn	   Manhattan	   Queens	  
Staten	  
Island	   Total	  	  
GROUP	  1	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Hospitals	  and	  Residential	  
Health	  Centers	   10	   17	   15	   18	   4	   64	  
Residential	  Disability	  Centers	   46	   52	   31	   16	   15	   160	  
High	  Rise	  Buildings	   31	   157	   319	   67	   3	   577	  
GROUP	  2	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Correctional	  Facilities	   12	   1	   2	   0	   0	   15	  
Residential	  Chemical	  
Dependency	  Centers	   0	   3	   16	   2	   1	   22	  
Group	  Homes	   1	   8	   8	   11	   1	   29	  
Residential	  Mental	  Health	  
Facilities	   7	   2	   25	   2	   7	   43	  
Day	  Care	  Centers	  and	  Schools	   54	   301	   261	   108	   28	   752	  
Temporary/Transitional	  
Housing	   2	   9	   16	   4	   0	   31	  
TOTAL	   163	   550	   693	   228	   59	   1,693	  
Table 6.2. The number of facilities listed by borough and citywide that were selected for use in 
the critical facilities index. This count includes only the facilities situated in the 500-year flood 
zone for the 2050s. 
 
6.7. Index V: Overall Storm Surge Flood Risk Index 
Every tax lot within the 2050s 500-year floodplain (116,019 tax lots) was selected for inclusion 
in the storm surge exposure, storm surge floodwater contaminants, and critical facilities indices. 
The social vulnerability index was calculated only for tax lots containing residential units with a 
population greater than zero for a total of 115,364 lots, a slightly smaller number than the 
previous indices. Figure 6.8 illustrates how the four indices were constructed and combined to 
form the overall flood risk index. The first column lists the index name and the indicators used in 
its construction. The second column describes the process by which the indicators were used to 
develop values that reflect the intended measurement of the index. The ‘Results’ column lists the 
range of output values for each index. Min-max linear scaling was then used to place all indices 
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into a common and dimensionless measurement scale of values between 0 - 25. The scaled 
values were added together to form the overall flood risk index. The rationale for scaling 
between 0 - 25 for each of the indices was to be able to evaluate the final composite index on a 
scale of 0 - 100. Though the overall flood risk index has a potential range of 0 - 100, the highest 
values reached just over 53 indicating that none of the tax lots scored maximum values for each 
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6.7.1. Inverse Distance Weighting 
Inverse distance weighting (IDW) was used to better visualize the tax lot data in the 2050s 500-
year floodplain viewed at the citywide scale by developing a continuous surface of index values. 
IDW is a deterministic interpolation technique that creates surfaces from a known set of points. It 
is founded upon the assumption that points proximal to one another have more closely related 
values than points that are further apart. IDW predicts a value at a location using the measured 
values surrounding that location, with neighboring values having greater weight than those 
located further away (Figure 6.8). Weights are proportional to the inverse of the distance 
between the predicted and measured points, raised to a power value. 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Example of inverse distance weighting interpolation where the red dot is the 
unknown point for which we are calculating a value (Z(x)) and the green dots are points with 
known values (in bold) at given distances (italics) from the red dot. The generalized IDW 
equation (top) is expressed using the red and green dot values and distances in the bottom 
equation. Because each value is divided by its distance squared, the closer points have greater 
influence on the calculated value (Z(x)) than the distant points. 
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The overall flood risk index was converted from polygon to points in ArcGIS. The inverse 
distance weighting tool was applied with the following parameters: fixed search radius of ¼ mile 
(1,320 feet), power value of 2, and output cell size of 250 ft. The result was clipped to the 
boundaries of the five boroughs. This process was applied to each of the four individual indices 
plus the overall storm surge flood risk index. 
 
6.7.2. Local Indices of Spatial Autocorrelation 
Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) are used to assess the hypothesis of spatial 
randomness by identifying significant spatial clusters of high or low values or spatial outliers for 
a given location. The Anselin Local Moran’s I tool for ArcGIS generates a local Moran’s I value, 
a z-score (standard deviation), a p-values (probability), and a cluster/outlier code for each feature 
being evaluated. If the data is distributed normally the following two assumptions can be made: 
1) the data that fall in the middle of the bell-curve reflect the expected outcome of the analysis, 
and 2) the data in the tails of the distribution where the z-scores are large and the p-values are 
small suggest something more interesting - that the observed spatial pattern is likely not random. 
The critical z-scores and p-values for corresponding confidence levels are shown in Table 6.3. 
This work uses a confidence level of 95% to reject the null hypothesis of spatial randomness. 
 
Table 6.3. The critical z-scores and 
p-values for corresponding 
confidence levels. Source: ArcGIS 









< -1.65 or > +1.65 < 0.10 90% 
< -1.96 or > +1.96 < 0.05 95% 
< -2.58 or > +2.58 < 0.01 99% 
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Five cluster/outlier codes are possible as output: not significant (p > 0.05; less than 95% 
confidence level), clusters of high values (high-high) and clusters of low values (low-low) that 
reflect positive local spatial autocorrelation, outliers in which a high value is surrounded by low 
values (high-low) and outliers in which a low value is surrounded by high values (low-high), 
both of which reflect negative local spatial autocorrelation. Local indicators of spatial 
autocorrelation were calculated for overall storm surge flood risk index values in the 500-year 
2050s floodplain and mapped at both the citywide and neighborhood levels. Using the Anselin 
Local Moran’s I tool in ArcGIS, spatial relationships between data points were conceptualized as 
inverse distance squared meaning that neighboring values have greater influence on the value of 
analysis than features farther away. With the squared option selected, the neighborhood influence 
drops off sharply so only the closest values will have significant influence on the value being 
analyzed. Distances between values were calculated using a Euclidean (straight line) method. No 
standardization of spatial weights was applied. 
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Chapter 7: Results and Discussion 
 
Following the methodologies described in chapter 6, this section describes the results of this 
research. It includes the following analyses: area and population estimates for current and future 
flood zones; indices of storm surge exposure, storm surge floodwater contaminants, social 
vulnerability, and at-risk critical facilities; a composite overall storm surge flood risk index; and 
spatial autocorrelation analysis. 
 
Of the indices, three were calculated at the tax lot level but exclude lots without a residential 
population (i.e., no residential units according to the MapPLUTO database). The exception is the 
critical facilities index, which counts any tax lot where a facility is located, including tax lots 
without a residential population. The composite overall storm surge flood risk index contains 
both residential and non-residential tax lots. All results are mapped at the citywide and 
neighborhood scales with tax lots displayed to the boundaries of the 500-year flood in the 2050s, 
the largest floodplain extent used in this study. The surfaces of the citywide maps were 
interpolated via inverse distance weighting for better visualization. Choropleth maps are 
presented at a higher resolution for the following four areas: 
• Southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens  
• Lower Manhattan 
• Eastern Staten Island 
• Eastern Bronx including City Island  
These four well-populated areas are projected to experience extensive flooding during a 500-year 
flood in the 2050s and as such were selected for closer study.  
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7.1. Citywide Flood Extent and Population At-Risk 
When discussing the population at-risk to future flood events it is important to note that the 
population estimates used in this work are derived from the 2010 US Census only, and that 
estimates of future population are not applied. This is because future population projections do 
not account for the local distribution of population growth and change. The NYC Department of 
City Planning developed borough and citywide estimates of population changes through the 
2040s (The New York City Department of City Planning 2013) and project a citywide population 
of 9 million for 2040, a 9.5% increase relative to the 2010 population of 8.2 million. The 
boroughs of the Bronx and Brooklyn are expected to experience the greatest percent growth, 
14% and 11.3% respectively, with the smallest increase in growth projected for Manhattan at 
6.7%.  
 
However, despite these borough-wide projections, future changes in local-level populations are 
difficult to predict, as they are largely dependent upon changes in housing and zoning policy. 
Furthermore, future populations in coastal areas may vary even more dramatically than that of 
the city as a whole due to the following factors. First, there is the market demand for waterfront 
living combined with the pressure to house additional NYC residents both of which encourage 
residential floodplain development. Second, the NY Rising Buyout and Acquisition Programs by 
which the State purchases homes at high risk to repeated flooding, has engendered a retreat 
among coastal residents looking to move to a less flood-prone area instead of rebuilding in the 
floodplain. The highest risk areas - known as enhanced buyout areas - are to be maintained in 
perpetuity as coastal buffer zones, permanently reducing the local population. Purchases outside 
the enhanced buyout areas are eligible for redevelopment “…in a resilient manner” which 
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includes the possibility of residential construction (New York State Governors Office of Storm 
Recovery n.d.). For these reasons future population estimates of the NYC boroughs are highly 
uncertain and inapplicable for this tax lot level analysis, however current population estimates 
are a reasonable proxy to evaluate relative population changes in flood zones of different sizes.   
 
Table 7.1 shows the flood area and residential population calculations for each of the seven past, 
current, and future flood scenarios as well as the percent difference in these values. Percent 
difference is calculated both relative to the previous flood zone and relative to the baseline of 
FEMA’s first 100-year flood map for New York City (1983). This scenario is included in the 
table for comparison with present day (2013) 100-year flood estimates. 
 
Flood	  Zone	   Area	  (mi2)	  
%	  Change	  Area	  
Population	  	  













FEMA	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  1983	   30.6	   -­‐	   -­‐	   189,386	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
FEMA	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   44.9	   47%	   47%	   385,254	   103%	   103%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2020s	   58.8	   31%	   92%	   587,265	   52%	   210%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2050s	   71.2	   21%	   133%	   787,596	   34%	   316%	  
FEMA	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   63.4	   -­‐	   107%	   687,733	   -­‐	   263%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2020s	   82.1	   29%	   168%	   1,012,045	   47%	   434%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2050s	   89.5	   9%	   192%	   1,196,422	   18%	   532%	  
 Table 7.1. The size of past, current, and projected future 100- and 500-year floodplains for New 
York City and the residential population in the flood zones as per the 2010 Census. 
 
At 30.6 mi2 in size, the 1983 original FEMA 100-year floodplain for New York City is 10% of 
the city’s 304.8 mi2 area. It contains a modern-day population of 189,386, which is 2% of the 
city’s 8.2 million residents (as per the 2010 US Census). Population density increases moving 
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inland so it is expected that as the 100-year floodplain increases in size the number of affected 
population will increase sharply at first. This was indeed evident in the calculation of floodplains 
in FEMA’s Preliminary Work Maps (PWM) for New York City released in June 2013. The 100-
year flood area increased 47% from the 1983 floodplain area to 44.9 mi2 and the affected 
population increased over 100% to 385,254. According to New York City Panel on Climate 
Change (NPCC) projections the size of the PWM 100-year floodplain could increase 31% by the 
2020s (in a scenario of 11 inches of sea-level rise) and another 21% to 71.2 mi2 by the 2050s 
(with 31 inches of sea-level rise). The size of the current 500-year floodplain is 63.4 mi2 and it is 
projected to increase to 82.1 mi2 in the 2020s and to 89.5 mi2 - almost 1/3 of the city’s land area - 
by the 2050s. Approximately 1.2 million residents could be at-risk to the 500-year flood in the 
2050s, which is nearly 15% of the present-day population.  
 
It might be expected that the 100- and 500-year flood areas would increase moderately in size 
with 11 inches of sea-level rise in the 2020s and then increase more noticeably with an additional 
20 inches of sea-level rise in the 2050s (for a total of 31 inches of sea-level rise in the 2050s 
relative to the current flood area). However the opposite is true. For both the 100- and 500-year 
flood scenarios flood area increases by approximately 30% in the 2020s relative to current 
scenarios, and then 21% and 9% respectively in the 2050s relative to the 2020s despite the 
greater sea-level rise in this interval. This trend is also observed in the population at-risk for each 
flood scenario. The population at-risk increases approximately 50% in the 2020s relative to 
current scenarios, and then 34% and 18% respectively in the 2050s relative to the 2020s. The 
increased rate of flood inundation between the current and 2020s scenarios, relative to the rate of 
inundation between the 2020s to 2050s scenarios, is likely due to the changes in topography and 
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slope as floodwaters move from the coast inland. When the slope of the land is shallow small 
vertical changes in flood elevation translate to greater horizontal flooding than with steeper 
slopes. On average the topographic gradient becomes steeper from the coastline to the interior 
resulting in a broader floodplain closer to the coastline for a given increment of vertical flood 
elevation. 
 
Though not covered in this work, it has been noted that areas with low slopes have higher 
uncertainty when mapping floodplains than areas with high slopes (NOAA 2010). Large vertical 
errors in flood elevation will have a limited horizontal expression on steeper slopes. In contrast, 
small vertical errors in flood elevation that can generate a large horizontal error on low slopes. 
Uncertainty in the current and future NPCC flood maps is an important limitation of this study 
that is discussed further in chapter 8. 
 
7.2. Flood Extent and Population At-Risk by Borough 
The movement of storm surge is a dynamic process influenced by local topography, bathymetry, 
land use and infrastructure and resulting in local differences in the rate and extent of flooding. 




Figure 7.1. Area in square miles of the current and future 100- and 500-year flood zones for the 
five boroughs of New York City. The purple bars represent 500-year flood scenarios and the blue 
bars represent 100-year flood scenarios. 
 
The borough of Queens experiences the greatest flood extent for all six flood scenarios followed 
closely by Brooklyn, then Staten Island, the Bronx and Manhattan. Queens experiences roughly 
three times the flood extent of the Bronx and five times that of Manhattan, a difference in some 
scenarios of nearly 25 square miles. The difference between the 100- and 500-year flood extents 
for a given timeslice is most pronounced within the boroughs of Brooklyn and Queens. The 
current 100- and 500-year flood areas are nearly equal in the Bronx but this changes significantly 
in the 2020s and 2050s with the 500-year exceeding the 100-year flood. This means that not only 
do the boroughs experience different floodplains for a given flood but the rate at which the 
floodplains increase in size varies by borough. Also, as was noted citywide, the 100- and 500-
year flood areas and population impacts in each borough increase more sharply with 11 inches of 
sea-level rise in the 2020s and then more moderately with an additional 20 inches of sea-level 
rise in the 2050s. 
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Figure 7.2. Residential population at-risk to the current and future 100- and 500-year flood 
zones for the five boroughs of New York City. The purple bars represent 500-year flood 
scenarios and the blue bars represent 100-year flood scenarios. Source: 2010 U.S. Census. 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the differences in population at-risk to the 100- and 500-year flood for each 
borough. All population estimates are based on the counts of the 2010 U.S. Census, and not on 
projections of future population. What is clear in the comparison of figures 7.1 and 7.2 is that the 
number of residents at-risk to flooding by borough does not necessarily correspond to that 
borough’s flood extent. Though surpassed by Queens in terms of flood size, Brooklyn has the 
largest population at-risk to flooding for all six flood scenarios with over 21% of the 2.5 million 
residents subject to flooding by a 500-year flood in the 2050s. Manhattan has the second largest 
population at-risk in all flood scenarios except for the current 100-year flood (topped by 
Queens). It is the most densely populated county in the United States, so despite having the 
smallest floodplain of the five boroughs for a 500-year flood in the 2050s (6.3 mi2) almost 19% 
of Manhattan residents have the potential to be at-risk. Queens has the third largest population at-
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risk overall followed by Staten Island and the Bronx, though the Bronx at-risk population 
exceeds that of Staten Island in the 500-year floodplain for the 2020s and 2050s.  
 
The difference in population at-risk relative to the size of the flood extent is closely tied to land 
use in the coastal areas of the boroughs. Some sections of the coast are zoned for open space and 
recreation, commercial uses, or industry/manufacturing with limited to non-existent residential 
population. Therefore residential communities buffered from the open water by industrial or 
commercial neighborhoods may not be affected by the current 100-year flood but will 
increasingly become affected by floods in the 2020s and 2050s as floodwaters move further 
inland to the residentially zoned areas. For example, large portions of land subject to flooding in 
Queens are part of the Gateway National Recreation Area, including the uninhabited intertidal 
salt marshes of the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge, and the parks of Fort Tilden, Breezy Point Tip, 
and Jacob Riis (see Appendix A for a neighborhood map of New York City). The John F. 
Kennedy (JFK) International Airport also occupies a large area of land on the eastern shores of 
Jamaica Bay and is subject to flooding in every flood scenario except the current 100-year flood. 
For this reason, though Queens experiences the largest area of flooding it does not have the 
largest at-risk population. 
 
Other boroughs have sections of non-residential land use along the coast. For example, the 
southern Brooklyn coastline is home to the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge, coastal landfill sites, 
several parks and open spaces, and the former airport Floyd Bennett Field. Also the northwest 
Brooklyn neighborhoods of Sunset Park, Red Hook and the Navy Yard are zoned almost 
exclusively for manufacturing at the water’s edge.  In addition to the many parks at the water’s 
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edge of the Bronx, the world’s largest produce market is zoned for manufacturing in the 
waterfront neighborhood of Hunts Point and multiple sites of manufacturing are situated along 
the banks of the Harlem River. Each of these areas can sustain flooding without direct impact to 
residential populations. 
 
The six flood scenarios result in different flood extents and populations at-risk for a given 
timeslice, as well as different rates of flooding (i.e., percent change over time) when evaluated 
borough-by-borough. The charts in figure 7.3 show area in square miles (left) and population at-
risk (right) to the current and future 100- and 500-year flood zones for each of the five boroughs. 
The axes for each chart are scaled to reflect the values for that borough. The left Y-axis of the 





Figure 7.3. Area in square miles (left) and population at-risk (right) to the current and future 
100- and 500-year flood zones for each of the five New York City boroughs. The bar graphs are 
stacked with the darker green on the bottom representing the 100-year flood and the lighter green 
above representing the 500-year flood. The left Y-axis of the flood areas chart (left) is in square 
miles. The left Y-axis of the population chart (right) is a raw count and the right Y-axis shows 
percent of total borough population. 
 
Though Brooklyn ranks second to Queens in terms of flood extent, it experiences the largest 
amount of floodplain growth from the current 100-year flood scenario to a 500-year flood in the 
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2050s and the largest increase of at-risk population. Manhattan has the smallest amount of 
floodplain growth from the current 100-year flood scenario to a 500-year flood in the 2050s, 
despite more than doubling in size from 3 to 6.3 mi2, but is has the second largest increase of at-
risk population. Staten Island has the smallest increase in at-risk population growth, though still 
more than doubling from 28,958 to 63,343 residents, and the second smallest amount of 
floodplain growth. These examples illustrate that trends in future flood extent and affected 
population will vary at the borough level. An understanding of the variations in flood impacts 
and risk at the borough and, where possible, community level is important not only for 
emergency management and response, but also for planners and policy makers who are 
managing population growth and development in coastal zones that are increasingly at-risk. 
 
The variations and trends in flood extent and population exposure to current and future 100-and 
500-year flood events the can be summarized as follows: 
• Sea-level rise will increase the extent of the 100- and 500-year floodplains in the future.  
Citywide, the additional 31 inches of sea-level rise by the 2050s results in 59% greater 
flood area than present for the 100-year flood and 41% greater flood area than present for 
the 500-year flood.  
• The number and percentage of residents in sea-level rise enhanced flood zones also 
shows an increasing trend. By the 2050s, the citywide population in the 100-year flood 
zone more than doubles and the population in the 500-year flood zone increases 74% 
relative to the present. This trend is not due to an increase in population in these areas, 
but rather to the increase in the extent of flooding which affects a larger portion of the 
population. 
 133 
• The distribution of flood extent and affected population varies by borough with Queens 
experiencing the greatest flood extent and Brooklyn having the largest population at-risk. 
• The current 100-year flood will nearly equal the current 500-year flood by the 2020s and 
will exceed the current 500-year flood by the 2050s. 
 
7.3. Indices at the Citywide Scale 
The indices of storm surge exposure, storm surge floodwater contaminants, social vulnerability, 
and at-risk critical facilities and the composite overall flood risk index were mapped at the 
citywide scale to the extent of the 500-year flood boundary for the 2050s, the largest flood extent 
used in this work. Each index was scaled to values between 0 and 25 with light purple indicating 
low values and dark purple representing high values. Results were calculated at the tax lot level 
and the map surfaces were interpolated using inverse distance weighting. This was done to more 
easily visualize the high-resolution dataset at the citywide scale.   
 
In the storm surge exposure index shown in Figure 7.4 areas of low floodwater elevation rank 
low relative to areas of high base flood elevations and/or wave action which rank high on the 
index scale. The eastern shores of Staten Island, the southern shore of Brooklyn and Queens 
including the Rockaway Peninsula, and the easternmost portion of the Bronx and northern 
Queens show the highest exposure to storm surge. These areas are subject to greater flood 
heights and wave action relative to other areas of coastline for two primary reasons: 1) their 
proximity and orientation to the Atlantic Ocean makes Brooklyn, southern Queens and Staten 
Island vulnerable to surge moving in from the open ocean and 2) the bottleneck effects of waters 
being pushed westward by winds and waves to the intersection of the East River and the Long 
 134 
Island Sound expose the Bronx and Queens to high floodwater elevations. It should be noted 
however that the distribution and severity of storm surge is greatly affected by the timing of the 
storm event relative to the daily high and low tides, particularly since tidal peaks are not 
coincident around the city (Georgas et al. 2014). 
 
Figure 7.4. The index of exposure to floodwaters within the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s in 
New York City. Data for the index was generated at the tax lot level and the map surface was 
interpolated via inverse distance weighting. Tax lots without a residential population were not 
included. 
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The storm surge exposure index was not developed using historical flood data but rather from 
scenarios of current and future floods modeled by FEMA and the NPCC. However a field-
verified Hurricane Sandy floodplain developed by FEMA14 using high-water marks and tide 
gauge data shows many of the same flooding “hotspots” seen in Figure 7.4, thereby supporting 
the modeled flood scenarios. It should be noted that this index captures the potential for storm 
surge exposure along the NYC coastline, but the actual values during a storm event will depend 
on the timing of landfall or peak storm intensity relative to astronomical tides.  
 
The storm surge floodwater contaminants index (Figure 7.5) considers the following potential 
contaminant sources: Chemical Bulk Storage, Petroleum Bulk Storage, and Major Oil Storage 
Facilities (MOSF), Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) facilities, State Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (SPDES) facilities, Level II State Superfund Sites, Brownfields, Water 
Pollution Control Plants, and Combined Sewage Overflow (CSO) Outfalls. The index was 
constructed such that facilities with the greatest volume of hazardous materials affect a greater 
number of tax lots than facilities using, storing, or handling small amounts of hazardous 
materials. However, high-volume facilities have the same influence on an individual tax lot as 
low-volume facilities (i.e., they are counted only once in the index) so in this regard no 
distinctions were made based on volume. The index is also unable to distinguish among the 
toxicity of materials, partially because the exact and complete listing of handled materials was 
unavailable. Therefore the impact of each facility in the index is in the number of tax lots subject 
to potential contamination, a number determined by the facility buffer radius. In this way high 
                                                
14 See the FEMA Modeling Task Force (MOTF)-Hurricane Sandy Impact Analysis at 
http://fema.maps.arcgis.com/home/item.html?id=307dd522499d4a44a33d7296a5da5ea0 
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scores on the index map reflect a dense cluster of facilities and low scores reflect a low density 
of facilities.  
 
 
Figure 7.5. The storm surge floodwater contaminants index within the 500-year flood zone for 
the 2050s in New York City. Data for the index was generated at the tax lot level and the map 
surface was interpolated via inverse distance weighting. Tax lots without a residential population 
were not included. 
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Distinctly high values are shown in Manhattan, with some moderate values in the westernmost 
part of Queens and a hot spot in the Bronx, southern Brooklyn and JKF airport in Queens. The 
type of potential hazard exerting the most influence in this index are the petroleum bulk storage 
facilities, which number over 25,000 in NYC. Despite being buffered to only ¼ mile the 
petroleum bulk storage buffer zones are so numerous that some tax lots were intersected by over 
200 separate buffers. The density of petroleum bulk storage facilities in Manhattan is the primary 
cause of high values in that area. The hot spot on the Coney Island Peninsula of southern 
Brooklyn is also a cluster of bulk petroleum and chemical storage facilities. Finally, JFK airport 
in Queens ranks high on the floodwater contaminants index because it is a very large tax lot that 
contains or is proximal to major oil storage facilities, SPDES major and minor facilities, TRI 
facilities, petroleum and chemical storage facilities, and the Jamaica Bay water pollution control 
plant. 
 
Social vulnerability index values (Figure 7.6) are notably high in the Bronx, the East Harlem and 
Lower East Side (LES) neighborhoods of Manhattan, in select neighborhoods around the 
perimeter of Brooklyn, and in the Far Rockaway neighborhood of Queens on the Rockaway 
Peninsula. Tax lots that score high on the social vulnerability index do so by having values in the 
top 10th percentile for several of fourteen vulnerability indicators. The vulnerability indicators 
with the greatest influence on the index score vary between neighborhoods, and are described in 
greater detail in the case studies that follow. The east coast of Staten Island, Coney Island 
peninsula, the Edgewater Park neighborhood of the eastern Bronx, and the College Point 
neighborhood of northern Queens each contained some of the lowest values on the social 
vulnerability index.  
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Figure 7.6. The index of social vulnerability within the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s in 
New York City. Data for each index was generated at the tax lot level and the map surfaces were 




One additional observation of note is in reference to the citywide social vulnerability index 
shown in Figure 7.7. The values shown in Figure 7.7 differ from those shown in the index of 
social vulnerability for the 500-year flood zone in Figure 7.6 because the citywide values in 
Figure 7.7 are determined from an analysis of all census blocks in the city, even those beyond the 
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flood zones. The reason for including an assessment of social vulnerability citywide is to check 
for spatial coincidence between social vulnerability values and the 500-year 2050s flood zone. In 
Figure 7.7, the flood zone is overlain on the social vulnerability data to view the values both 
within and outside of the flood zone. There does not appear to be spatial coincidence between 
areas with the highest social vulnerability values and areas of high physical vulnerability (i.e. the 
flood zones). Most areas experiencing high social vulnerability are located outside of the flood 
zones and social vulnerability values within flood zones are of medium to low levels.  
 
 
Figure 7.7. The citywide index of social vulnerability for the New York City population shown 
at the census block level. The 500-year flood scenario for the 2050s is overlain in a hatch pattern. 
Sources: US Census 2010; American Community Survey 5-Year, 2006 - 2010, the New York 
City Panel on Climate Change. 
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In contrast to the previous induces, the index of critical at-risk facilities (Figure 7.8) has few 
moderate values with most scores ranking as either high or low. Hot spots include the Coney 
Island Peninsula, eastern portions of the Rockaway Peninsula, neighborhoods along the eastern 
shores of Manhattan, the Kingsbridge neighborhood of the Bronx, and JFK airport, among 
others. The facilities included in this index are not weighted by the type of critical service they 
provide, but are strictly a count of the number of critical facilities per tax lot. Buffers were not 
used to approximate impacts on neighboring tax lots, therefore the areas scoring highest on the 




Figure 7.8. The index of critical facilities within the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s in New 
York City. Data for each index was generated at the tax lot level and the map surfaces were 
interpolated via inverse distance weighting. Unlike the other indices, tax lots without a 
residential population were included. 
 
Figures 7.4 through 7.8 use color to illustrate areas of high and low risk or vulnerability but do 
not specify index values nor they frequency with which these values occur. Instead frequency 
distribution histograms of the scaled values of each of the indices were created in SPSS software 
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to better understand the distribution of each index data set (Figure 7.9). For each histogram the 
frequency count is on the y-axis, index values are on the x-axis, and the minimum, maximum, 
standard deviation and mean values are listed on the chart area. The dataset size (N = 116,031) is 
the same for each index and represents the total number of tax lots evaluated in the 500-year 
flood zone for the 2050s.  
 
Peak frequencies for the storm surge exposure index reveal a multimodal distribution shown in 
Figure 7.9A. The most frequent values represent areas located between the current 100- and 500-
year flood zones (scaled value of 13.89) followed by the current 100-year flood zone with base 
flood elevations of 10 feet (scaled value of 19.44). The least frequent values represent the 
projected 500-year flood zone for the 2050s (scaled value of 2.78) and the current 100-year flood 
with breaking wave action (scaled value of 25). In contrast the storm surge floodwater 
contaminants index (Figure 7.9B) is right-skewed with only one distinct peak frequency value at 
0.11 corresponding to a raw value of 1. Though the raw values range from 0 - 227 buffer 
intersections per tax lot, low values make up the vast majority of the cases with values above 3 







Figure 7.9. Frequency distribution histograms for the scaled values of each of the four individual 
indices: A) storm surge exposure, B) storm surge floodwater contaminants, C) social 
vulnerability, and D) critical facilities. The frequency count is on the y-axis and the index values 
are on the x-axis.  
 
The social vulnerability index values (Figure 7.9C) show a right-skewed distribution with 66% 
tax lots ranking 0 or 1 in raw values. Frequencies then decline exponentially as they move 
toward higher values. The tall spike near the origin of the histogram of critical facilities index 
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values (Figure 7.9D) reveals that nearly 99% of tax lots ranked 0, meaning that just over 1% of 
tax lots contained critical facilities as defined in this work. The design of the critical facilities 
index biases results to a high frequency of 0 values by restricting the starting data set in terms of 
facility type and impact area. If more facilities were included in the index and their areas of 





Figure 7.10. The overall storm surge flood risk index within the 500-year flood zone for the 
2050s in New York City is calculated from the combination of the following four indices: the 
index of storm surge exposure, the index of exposure to storm surge floodwater contaminants, 
the social vulnerability index, and the index of at-risk critical facilities. The index surface was 
interpolated using inverse distance weighting. Tax lots without a residential population were not 
included. 
 
The four individual indices, with index scores from 0 - 25, were added together to form the 
combined overall storm surge flood risk index shown in Figure 7.10. Though the combined 
overall storm surge flood risk index has a potential range of 0 - 100, the highest values reached 
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just over 53 indicating that none of the tax lots scored maximum values for each of the four 
individual indices. The histogram in Figure 7.11 shows the distribution and frequency of the 
values in the overall storm surge flood risk index. Though the mean value is nearly 18 the most 
frequent values are in the low 20s, with frequencies climbing from 0 toward peak values and 
then falling off shortly thereafter. Values are infrequent near the min and max of the distribution. 
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Figure 7.11. Frequency distribution histogram for the overall storm surge flood risk index. The 
frequency count is on the y-axis and the index values are on the x-axis. 
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In Figure 7.12 the contribution of each of the four individual index values to the overall storm 
surge flood risk index can be traced by comparing areas in the overall index to the same areas in 
the composite indices. This visualization is incredibly useful for determining which of the 
individual indices most influences the over flood risk index score. For example, the eastern shore 
of Staten Island, an area that experienced high storm surge elevations and suffered extensive 
structural damage during Hurricane Sandy, shows high values on the index of exposure to 
floodwaters. However the area ranks only moderately high on the overall flood risk index 
because of its low rankings in the other three indices: social vulnerability, exposure to storm 
surge floodwater contaminants, and critical at-risk facilities. In this case, floodwater heights and 
wave action (exposure) are clearly the dominant influence on the overall storm surge flood risk 
index. The Coney Island Peninsula was also heavily affected by floodwater elevations and wave 
action (exposure) and scored high on both the storm surge exposure and overall storm surge 




Figure 7.12. The storm surge exposure index (A), the storm surge floodwater contaminants 
index (B), the social vulnerability index (C), the index of at-risk critical facilities (D), and the 
overall storm surge flood risk index within the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s. 
 
By contrast, nearly all of the areas in Manhattan subject to the 500-year flood in the 2050s 
ranked high on the overall storm surge flood risk index despite experiencing lower storm surge 
elevations than other boroughs. Manhattan ranked consistently high on the storm surge 
floodwater contaminants index, moderately high on the social vulnerability index, and showed 
many hot spots of critical at-risk facilities. In combination these rankings result in a high score 
on the overall storm surge flood risk index.  Spots along the Rockaway Peninsula ranked high to 
moderately high on the overall risk index because of their high ranking on the storm surge 
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exposure index, and the few areas of high values on the social vulnerability and critical at-risk 
facilities indices. A few smaller high-ranking areas, such as those in the Bronx and northern 
Brooklyn, can be better evaluated at the neighborhood scale. 
 
In summary, several important observations about the citywide overall storm surge flood risk 
index are noted: 
• Flood areas further from the coastline ranked the lower on the overall storm surge flood risk 
index than coastal areas, and this transition from high coastal to low interior values can best 
be observed along the eastern coast of Staten Island, in southern Brooklyn, and in Southern 
Queens.  
• With the exception of the index of critical at-risk facilities, index scores tend to be clustered 
into areas of high, moderate, and low values, suggesting the data is spatially correlated. And 
the transition in values from one area to the next is gradual, not abrupt. There are very few, if 
any, areas of high values surrounded by low values or vice versa. This observation is further 
realized using tests of spatial autocorrelation in section 7.5.  
• Of all the boroughs, Manhattan’s 500-year 2050s flood zone had the greatest percentage of 
high index values and was most influenced by high scores on the index of at-risk critical 
facilities.  
• The influence of the four individual indices on the overall storm surge flood risk index values 
varies with location. This emphasizes the geographic component of vulnerability analysis and 
the intersection of physical and social vulnerabilities as a place-based interaction. 
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7.4. Indices at the Neighborhood Scale 
Index values were also displayed at neighborhood scales to more closely view the local 
distribution of values. The population density and diversity of New York City creates a 
landscape of physical and social vulnerabilities that differ at very local scales. Understanding the 
influence of these local variations on the overall flood risk index is important for a 
comprehensive assessment of vulnerability. Local level maps of the overall flood index were 
created from the citywide maps, but displayed as choropleth maps at the tax lot level instead of 
interpolating to form a continuous surface. The following four areas projected to experience 
extensive flooding during a 500-year flood in the 2050s were selected from the NYC coastline: 
southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens; Lower Manhattan; eastern Staten Island; and 
eastern Bronx. Mean values of overall flood risk are highest in Lower Manhattan followed by 
eastern Staten Island, southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens, and eastern Bronx, with 
average scores of 30, 19, 17, and 14 respectively. The following sections describe these 
neighborhoods, note areas of high and low index values, and discuss the impact of these values 
on the overall flood risk index. Tax lots without a residential population are not considered for 
the social vulnerability index. 
 
7.4.1. South Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens 
The southern Brooklyn neighborhoods on the Coney Island peninsula and those surrounding 
Jamaica Bay, Queens, including the Rockaway Peninsula, experience the most extensive 
flooding in all of the five boroughs and as such were selected for closer study (Figure 7.13). The 
broad extent of flooding in this area is due to the low land elevation and the orientation and 
proximity of the coastline to the Atlantic Ocean. The coastline consists of sensitive environments 
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such as sandy beaches, salt marsh and grasslands that, unlike the coastlines of the New York 
Harbor, are exposed to direct storm surge and wave action from the Atlantic Ocean.  
 
Figure 7.13. Neighborhoods of southern Brooklyn and Queens in the 500-year flood zone for the 
2050s (flood zone in light blue). Census tracts are outlined in grey. Federal National Parks 
Service lands and parks owned by the City of New York are in green. The JFK Airport is 
indicated in grey. 
 
Jamaica Bay 
Situated along the coastline of southern Brooklyn and Queens are federal and New York City 
owned parks and open spaces created for recreation and preservation (Figure 7.13). The majority 
of the parkland is part of the Gateway National Recreation Area, consisting of the Jamaica Bay 
Wildlife Refuge; Fort Tilden, Jacob Riis Park, and Breezy Point Tip on the Rockaway Peninsula; 
and the decommissioned airfield Floyd Bennett Field. Jamaica Bay is the approximately 40 
square mile estuary at the center of these parklands and open spaces. It is a semi-enclosed body 
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of water consisting of a network of channels and marshy areas with one residential 
neighborhood, Broad Channel, in the middle. Its only connection to the ocean is through the 
Rockaway Inlet on its western end. With the exception of storm events, the Bay is largely 
sheltered from the Atlantic Ocean by the Rockaway Peninsula. The Jamaica Bay area is mostly 
open water but also consists of salt marsh, sand dunes, grasslands, and woodlands. It serves as a 
major stop on the Atlantic Flyway bird migration route, provides recreational and outdoor 
opportunities for millions of urban residents, and contributes to the overall environmental health 
of the region through the provision of ecological services.  
 
Multiple non-profits and community organizations such as The Nature Conservancy, Jamaica 
Bay Ecowatchers, and the Rockaway Waterfront Alliance; city agencies such as the NYC 
Department of Parks, the NYC Department of Environmental Protection, the US Army Corps of 
Engineers, and the NYC Office of Recovery and Resilience; and educational institutions and 
programs such as New York Eco-Schools, are currently engaged in the stewardship, study, 
and/or management of the Bay and surrounding environs. The Science and Resilience Institute at 
Jamaica Bay (SRIJB), a recently formed high-level research center dedicated to the study of 
coastal resilience issues, has developed a mission to increase our understanding of how 
disturbances impact natural and human systems in the Bay and in other urban watersheds. A 
current pressing issue in NYC is the development of plans to fortify the Bay and protect its 
residents from sea-level rise enhanced storm events. This work could support the research goals 
of SRIJB and other organizations and agencies and contribute to the discussion of creating 
resiliency by providing insight into the physical and social vulnerability of Jamaica Bay residents 
to current and potential future flood events.  
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Rockaway Peninsula  
The Rockaway Peninsula section of Queens is part of the outer beaches of Long Island formed 
by the littoral drift of sand during the last glacial retreat. It is exposed to the Atlantic Ocean 
along its southern shores and separated from Brooklyn and the rest of Queens by Jamaica Bay to 
its northwest. With the exception of the western neighborhood of Breezy Point, the Rockaway 
Peninsula consists of non-residential parkland on its western end, becomes increasingly 
populated toward its center, and then most heavily populated in the easternmost neighborhood of 
Far Rockaway. Though one or two-family homes make up 86% of the residential buildings, 55% 
of all housing units are located in multi-family buildings. Seventy-eight percent of residential 
buildings were constructed before modern construction standards were adopted (NYC Office of 
the Mayor 2013). This is relevant in the context of post-Hurricane Sandy building damage 
assessments conducted by the NYC Department of Buildings. The percentage of buildings 
marked as damaged or destroyed was higher on the Rockaway Peninsula relative to the citywide 
percentage, indicating both the physical vulnerability of the peninsula and of the building stock.  
 
Bridge and subway infrastructure serve as a critical links connecting the peninsula to the rest of 
the city. Residents are served by three bridges to the mainland: two connecting through the 
Broad Channel neighborhood in Jamaica Bay, and the third connecting Jacob Riis Park to Floyd 
Bennett Field across the Rockaway Inlet. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) 8th 
Avenue Express (A) line runs parallel to the Broad Channel bridges operating from Howard 
Beach, Queens, south across the Bay and then east to the Far Rockaway neighborhood. The 
shuttle (S) line runs from Broad Channel south across the Bay and then west to the Rockaway 
Park neighborhood. MTA bus service is also available across the three bridges.  
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Hurricane Sandy’s Impacts 
Southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens have great physically vulnerability to both 
floodwater heights and wave action during storm surge events. When Hurricane Sandy struck in 
October 2012, tide gauges and high water marks around Jamaica Bay recorded storm surge 
elevations between 10 and 13 feet (United States Geological Survey 2014). The storm surge 
breached the East Pond of the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge in at least two places and scoured a 
50-foot channel into the West Pond creating a tidal lagoon (Riepe n.d.). In addition to physical 
changes to the coastline, Sandy’s floodwaters affected sectors such as transportation, 
telecommunications, public health, and energy, both within and outside of the flood zones. For 
example, the A train viaduct connecting Howard Beach, Broad Channel, and the Rockaways was 
washed away in two locations and not restored until May 2013, seven months after the storm. 
Electrical system failure caused four of NYCs wastewater pollution control plants (WPCP) in the 
Jamaica Bay area to shutdown completely during the storm and affected operations at other 
facilities throughout the City. The Coney Island WPCP and Rockaway WPCP were knocked 
offline for two hours and three days respectively, discharging their effluent directly into the 
waters of Jamaica Bay. Ultimately 560 gallons of untreated and 800 gallons of partially treated 
and disinfected wastewater were released into NYC waterways. Despite this massive release, 
impacts to the Jamaica Bay ecosystem were minimal and the marshes and wildlife survived with 
very little loss.    
 
Flood Indices 
Figure 7.14 shows the four indices that compose the overall storm surge flood risk index in 
southern Brooklyn and Queens with values displayed at the tax lot level. Figure 7.14A shows the 
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tax lots as they rank in terms of storm surge exposure. For the current 100-year storm, the tax 
lots ranked ‘high’ are projected to experience floodwater elevations in excess of 10 feet (Zone 
AE) and tax lots ranked ‘medium’ will have floodwater elevations of 10 feet (see Figure 3.2 for 
an overview of FEMA designated flood zones). The ‘low-med’ tax lots are subject to 
floodwaters less than 10 feet in elevation. Though zones of high velocity breaking waves greater 
than 3 feet in height (Zone VE) are ranked highest on this index, they do not occur in areas of 
residential tax lots. VE zones occur over areas of open water, and then typically transition to AE 
Zones (wave action smaller than 3 feet) as they move ashore and reach infrastructure or other 
land cover. Along the southern shore of the Rockaway Peninsula the transition from VE to AE 
zones occurs abruptly at face of beachfront property. Regardless of this downgrade in 
classification the boardwalk and other beachfront infrastructure and properties experienced 
significant damage from Hurricane Sandy’s storm surge. Also note that areas further inland that 
experience of high floodwater elevations and smaller breaking waves (AE) are also vulnerable to 
moderate to significant storm surge damage.  
 
The tax lots ranking highest on the storm surge exposure index include the Breezy Point and 
southern Rockaway Park neighborhoods on the Rockaway Peninsula, along with Gerritsen Beach 
and the majority of the Coney Island Peninsula. Moderately high values are found along the 
Rockaway Peninsula though the elevation of the Far Rockaway neighborhood results in lower 
flood elevations to the east. Storm surge exposure index values are highest closest to the 
shoreline and become progressively smaller as floodwaters move inland. 
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Figure 7.14B shows the tax lots as they rank in terms of potential storm surge floodwater 
contaminants through a count of sites that handle or store hazardous wastes. Overall the southern 
Brooklyn and Queens area does not score high on this index with only one tax lot, JFK airport, 
ranking ‘medium-high’. As mentioned in section 7.3, JFK is proximal to major oil storage 
facilities, SPDES major and minor facilities, TRI facilities, petroleum and chemical storage 
facilities, and the Jamaica Bay water pollution control plant (WPCP). The vast majority of 
neighborhoods rank ‘low’ with Brighton Beach ranking ‘medium’ due an average of 50 to 60 
counts of bulk petroleum and chemical storage facilities per tax lot. To the north of Brighton 
Beach, Marine Park averages between 40 and 50 bulk storage counts per tax lot. The Rockaway 
Beach neighborhood scores ‘low-medium’ with an average of 10 bulk petroleum or chemical 
storage facilities per tax lot but the area is also influenced by the Jamaica WPCP, a SPDES 
Major site, six combined sewage overflow outfall sites, and a Superfund site. 
  
 
Figure 7.14. The storm
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The highest social vulnerability index values (Figure 7.14C) in the southern Brooklyn and 
Queens 500-year 2050s flood zone were calculated for tax lots that ranked in the top tenth 
percentile values for 7 or 8 of the 14 indicators of social vulnerability. High ranking tax lots (in 
dark purple) were located on the eastern end of Rockaway Peninsula, the New Lots and East 
New York areas of Brooklyn, and the Coney Island and Brighton Beach neighborhoods of the 
Coney Island Peninsula (see Figure 7.13 for neighborhood map). The indicators most frequently 
included (i.e., top tenth percentile values) in the tax lots ranked ‘high’ are listed as follows in 
descending order: speak English less than ‘well’, live in a multi-unit structure, crowded housing 
(greater than 1 person per room), single householder with children, 65 years of age or older, no 
vehicle, 10 years of age or younger, and no high school diploma. The prominence of non-native 
English speakers is in part due to a strong concentration of Russian speaking immigrants in the 
Brighton Beach and Coney Island neighborhoods. Living below the poverty line, low household 
income, and minority status infrequently ranked in the top tenth percentile of these tax lots. 
Unemployment and group quarters status (group homes) did not contribute to the highest-ranking 
tax lots. ‘Medium’ to ‘medium-high’ social vulnerability values are found in the Breezy Point, 
Coney Island, Brighton Beach, and Arverne neighborhoods, with the lowest values in the 
neighborhoods to the north and west of Floyd Bennett Field. 
 
With the exception of a few tax lots, the vast majority of areas scored ‘low’ on the critical 
facilities index (Figure 7.14D). The tax lots with the highest values had five or more critical 
facilities situated within them. Lots ranked ‘medium’ have two critical facilities within, and 
those ranking ‘low’ had no critical facilities. Notably JFK airport scored a ‘medium’ value on 
this index due to the presence of infant and preschool programs on the tax lot. 
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The overall storm surge flood risk index for southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens shows 
‘high’ and ‘medium-high’ values in the Far Rockaway, Coney Island, and Brighton Beach 
neighborhoods (Figure 7.15). These tax lots scored ‘high’ on the storm surge exposure and social 
vulnerability indices, and Brighton Beach also scored ‘medium’ on the floodwater contaminants 
index. JFK airport is one of the few tax lots that ranked ‘medium’ on the overall storm surge 
floodwater index due to its scores on the floodwater contaminants, storm surge exposure, and 
critical facilities indices. It does not have a residential population and therefore was not included 
in the social vulnerability index. Other tax lots that ranked ‘medium’ do have a residential 
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7.4.2. Lower Manhattan 
The neighborhoods of Lower Manhattan, shown in Figure 7.16, are some of the densest in the 
city, with Stuyvesant Town, the Lower East Side, and Chinatown housing a combined average of 
92,160 people per square mile (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013). This average is more than three 
times greater than the citywide population density of 27,742 people per square mile (U.S. Census 
2013) and more than 33% greater than the population density of Manhattan (69,468 people per 
square mile as per the U.S. Census 2010), the most densely populated county in the country.  The 
area is bounded to the east by the East River, the south by the New York Bay, and to the west by 
the Hudson River. Bulkheads reinforce most of the coastline, which is then buffered from 
residential buildings by parklands, open space, and major roadways.  
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Figure 7.16. Neighborhoods of Lower Manhattan in the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s (flood 
zone in light blue). Census tracts are outlined in grey. 
 
In addition to being some of the densest neighborhoods in the city, Stuyvesant Town, the Lower 
East Side, and Chinatown experience poverty rates of 12%, 31%, and 43% respectively.  Several 
of the public housing developments operated by the New York City Housing Authority 
(NYCHA) are situated here. These neighborhoods are characterized as strongly residential with 
street level retail stores, and the vast majority of the population residing in multi-story attached 
buildings or high-rise developments in park-like surroundings. The neighborhoods along the 
Hudson River to the west are also residential but contain significantly more commercial and 
retail space. Also, in contrast to the east side, the demographics of the west side neighborhoods 
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describe median household incomes well above the city average, high property values for owner 
occupied residential units, and a strong proportion of homeowners. In fact with median 
household incomes in Battery Park City, Tribeca, and the West Village two to three times the 
city median, they are by far the most affluent neighborhoods in southern Manhattan, and a strong 
contrast to the neighborhoods of the east side. 
 
Flood Indices 
It might be expected that the discrepancy in income between the east and west side 
neighborhoods would be reflected in the index of social vulnerability and potentially in the siting 
of facilities containing potential floodwater hazards. And in fact the greatest area of tax lots 
ranking ‘high’ on the overall storm surge flood risk index in Lower Manhattan are in the 
Chinatown, Lower East Side, and Stuyvesant Town neighborhoods. This section examines the 





Figure 7.17. The storm surge exposure index (A), storm surge floodwater contaminants index 
(B), social vulnerability index (C), critical facilities index (D), and the overall storm surge flood 
risk index (right) for lower Manhattan. Tax lots are ranked from low to high values and the 500-
year flood zone for the 2050s is shown in transparent blue (right). 
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Figure 7.17 shows the four indices that compose the overall flood risk index in Lower Manhattan 
with values displayed at the tax lot level. Figure 7.17A shows tax lots ranked in terms of 
exposure to current and future scenarios of storm surge. Unlike other flooded areas the city, tax 
lots along the entire east and west coastlines are projected to experience 100-year floodwater 
elevations in excess of 10 feet (Zone AE, ranked ‘high’ and shaded dark purple). Zone AE 
flooding affects a greater portion of the population along the East River shores than the Hudson 
River shores, in part due to the population density of the east side neighborhoods. According to 
FEMA’s current 100-year flood maps for NYC there are very few tax lots projected to 
experience floodwater elevations of exactly 10 feet (ranked ‘medium-high’). This is in contrast 
to the Brooklyn-Queens study area that showed a large number of tax lots impacted by 10 feet of 
surge. Instead flood zones in lower Manhattan transition from elevations of 11 feet or greater 
(Zone AE) directly into areas in the 500-year flood zone (Zone X). Tax lots in Zone X areas are 
ranked ‘medium’. As was noted in southern Brooklyn and Queens, flood exposure index values 
are highest closest to the shoreline and become smaller as floodwaters move inland. The tax lots 
shaded light purple are projected to experience flooding only in a 500-year future flood scenario. 
 
The tax lots of the 500-year 2050s flood zone of Chinatown were ranked ‘high’ on the social 
vulnerability index (Figure 7.17C), followed by a cluster of ‘medium-high’ values in the Lower 
East Side and a few small clusters of ‘medium-high’ tax lots in the neighborhoods along the west 
side. These tax lots were ranked in the top tenth percentile values for 7 or 8 of the 14 indicators 
of social vulnerability. The indicators consistently included (i.e., top tenth percentile values) in 
the highest ranked tax lots are listed as follows: speak English less than ‘well’, live in a multi-
unit structure, crowded housing (greater than 1 person per room), single householder with 
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children, 65 years of age or older, live in a group quarters arrangement, and no high school 
diploma. Minority status was also included in the majority of highest-ranking tax lots. Having 
children 10 years of age or younger ranked only once in the top tenth percentile of these tax lots. 
Unemployment, poverty, and density did not contribute to the highest-ranking tax lots.  
‘Medium’ to ‘medium-high’ values of social vulnerability are found in the East Village. Lower 
East Side, and Stuyvesant Town neighborhoods, with ‘medium’ values dominating the west side 
of Manhattan.  The handful of ‘low’ social vulnerability values are scattered throughout the area, 
comprising the few residential tax lots on the Financial District and several health services 
facilities to the north in Gramercy.  
 
The vast majority of the area scored ‘low’ on the critical facilities index (Figure 7.17D), with a 
few tax lots ranked ‘medium’ and a very small number ranking ‘medium-high’. The lots with the 
highest values had four to five or more critical facilities situated within. For example, the 
Bellevue Hospital in Gramercy ranked ‘medium-high’ because of its many services including 
inpatient care, day care programs, and detoxification center. Beth Israel Medical Center in 
Stuyvesant Town also offers detoxification, rehabilitation, and psychiatric services. These 
facilities rank ‘medium-high’ on the critical facilities index for the multitude of functions they 
perform. Lots ranked ‘medium’ have two to three critical facilities within, and on the east side of 
Lower Manhattan these are mostly day care centers, after school programs, and schools. Lots 
ranking ‘low’ had no critical facilities. 
 
The overall storm surge flood risk index for Lower Manhattan shows most of the ‘high’ values in 
neighborhoods along the East River with very few high values along the west side. This is 
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because east side tax lots scored ‘high’ on the storm surge exposure and storm surge floodwater 
contaminants indices, and ‘medium-high’ on the social vulnerability index. ‘Medium-high’ 
vulnerability tax lots are distributed fairly equally throughout the area and their values are a 
product of ‘medium’ to ‘high’ scores in at least two other indices. Overall flood risk values 
scoring ‘medium’ are more abundant on the west side, ‘low-medium’ ranked tax lots are 
disbursed widely but are relatively few, and only three of over 3,300 tax lots were classified as 
‘low’. Lower Manhattan has the highest average overall flood risk index value of any of the case 
study areas. 
 
7.4.3. Eastern Shore of Staten Island 
The neighborhoods along the eastern shores of Staten Island, stretching approximately three 
miles from the Oakwood Beach neighborhood to South Beach (Figure 7.18), have generally 
‘low’ to ‘medium’ overall flood risk values. This area is characterized as a series of low-density 
residential communities with small business corridors serving mixed income families. The 
median household income of $68,000 is above the citywide average as are rates of home 
ownership at 68% (NYC Office of the Mayor 2013). Population density is well below city 
average. The majority (84%) of housing units consist of detached 1- and 2- family bungalow 
style wood-frame construction homes spaced closely together with a few areas of semi-attached 
or attached homes. Over half of these homes were constructed prior to the implementation of 
FEMA’s flood resistant construction standards in 1983. Multi-family walk-up and elevator 
buildings comprise a combined 15% of the housing units in the area. 
 
 168 
According to a post-Hurricane Sandy damage assessment conducted by the New York City 
Department of Buildings, Staten Island suffered major structural damages from Sandy. The 
number of buildings tagged as damaged or destroyed was higher in the South Beach, Midland 
Beach, New Dorp Beach, and Oakwood Beach neighborhoods than the citywide average (NYC 
Office of the Mayor 2013). This is in part due to damaging wave action that extended inland 
from the coast and also due to the type of building stock that dominates the area. The NYC 
Department of Buildings determined that the 1- and 2- family low-rise wood-frame buildings 
constructed prior to 1983 to be some of the most vulnerable to storm surge and these structures 
comprise 90% of all buildings in the eastern shore area. In some instances bungalows were 
wiped clean from their foundations. 
 
The eastern shores are also particularly susceptible to high floodwater depths due to the 
intersection of topography and the built environment. From South Beach to Midland Beach, the 
four-lane Father Cappodano Boulevard divides the residential areas to the west from the 
parkland, boardwalk, and promenade that line the beachfront. It also marks a change in 
topography with the boulevard built at higher elevation than the residential land to the west, 
resulting in a depression that fills and retains the floodwaters that breach the roadway. 
Floodwater depths in the depressed land can exceed those of waters closer to shore. Depths 
above ground of greater than 10 feet were experienced to the west of the boulevard in the New 




Figure 7.18. The storm surge exposure index (A), storm surge floodwater contaminants index 
(B), social vulnerability index (C), critical facilities index (D), and the overall storm surge flood 
risk index (right) for the eastern shore of Staten Island. Tax lots are ranked from low to high 
values and the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s is colored light blue. 
 
 
Figure 7.18 shows the four indices that compose the overall storm surge flood risk index along 
the eastern shores of Staten Island with values displayed at the tax lot level. This area is situated 
in the New York Bight (see section 2.1) making it particularly vulnerable to storm surge. Figure 
7.18A captures this physical vulnerability, showing tax lots ranked in terms of exposure to 
current and storm surge flood scenarios. The majority of lots adjacent to the coast rank ‘high’ 
(Zone AE, shaded dark purple) on the storm surge exposure index with 100-year floodwater 
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elevations in excess of 10 feet. Hospital and mental health facilities in the neighborhood of South 
Beach provide the exception with a rank of ‘medium’ indicating flooding only during the 500-
year flood event. No tax lots experienced 100-year floodwaters of exactly 10 feet in elevation 
(Zone AE).  Instead, as is the case in lower Manhattan, flood zones transition from elevations of 
11 feet or greater (Zone AE) directly into areas in the 500-year flood zone (Zone X). Tax lots in 
Zone X areas are ranked ‘medium’. The small number of tax lots ranked ‘low-med’ and ‘low’ 
are projected to experience flooding only in a 100- and 500-year future flood scenario. Once 
again flood exposure index values are highest closest to the shoreline and become smaller as 
floodwaters move inland.  
 
The potential for storm surge floodwater contaminants (Figure 7.18B) is not a major concern 
along the eastern shores of Staten Island. All tax lots ranked in the ‘low’ category of the 
floodwater contaminants index with no values exceeding scores of nine. Of the nine potential 
hazard sources, only three types are present in the area: petroleum or chemical bulk storage 
facilities, the Oakwood Beach water pollution control plant, and State Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (SPDES) permit facilities. However these facilities were not abundant 
enough to warrant even a ‘low-medium’ score on the index. 
 
The social vulnerability index (Figure 7.18C) values do not show great range with all tax lots 
ranked either ‘low’ or ‘low-medium’. The ‘low-medium’ tax lots were ranked in the top tenth 
percentile values for 1 to 3 of the 14 indicators of social vulnerability. The indicators included 
most frequently (i.e., top tenth percentile values) in the ‘low-medium’ ranked tax lots are listed 
in descending order: no access to a vehicle, live in a group quarters arrangement, live in a multi-
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unit structure, speak English less than ‘well’, and having children 10 years of age or younger. 
Minority status, crowded housing (greater than 1 person per room), single householder status 
with children, and being 65 years of age or older were included in the top ranked lots 
infrequently. Unemployment, poverty, density, and no high school diploma did not contribute to 
the highest-ranking tax lots.   
 
With the exception of a very small number of tax lots, the entire Staten Island case study area 
ranked ‘low’ on the critical facilities index (Figure 7.18D) with no facilities to account for. A 
few lots, including New Dorp High School, scored greater than zero on the index and ranked 
‘low-medium’. The most obvious anomalies in this index are the large lots ranking ‘high’ and 
‘medium’ in the neighborhood of South Beach. These lots were categorized as containing 13 and 
3 critical facilities respectively, however this number is a reflection of the diversity of services 
these facilities provide rather than an accounting of separate facilities per tax lot. For example, 
the South Beach Psychiatric Center ranks ‘high’ and is categorized as providing day care, 
inpatient detoxification and rehabilitation, residential disability services, and psychiatric services 
including mental health transitional residences. The Staten Island University Hospital ranks 
‘medium’ for providing different types of specialized inpatient care. Each of these services are 
listed separately in the facilities database for NYC and count toward the critical facilities total 
per tax lot. 
 
The overall storm surge flood risk index for eastern Staten Island is dominated by ‘medium’ 
values along the coast and stretching inland before transitioning to ‘low-medium’ and then ‘low’ 
values at the landward edge of the floodplain. The South Beach Psychiatric Center and Staten 
 172 
Island University Hospital tax lots are the exception to this pattern ranking ‘medium-high’. The 
distribution of overall storm surge flood risk values resembles the storm surge exposure index, 
suggesting physical vulnerability as the dominant influence. The other indices - storm surge 
floodwater contaminants, social vulnerability, and critical facilities - all score very low and have 
much less influence on the overall storm surge flood risk index values. Of the four case study 
areas eastern Staten Island has the second highest average overall flood risk index value. 
 
7.4.4. Eastern Bronx, City Island 
The eastern shores of the Bronx, including the neighborhoods of County Club, Edgewater Park, 
Throgs Neck, and City Island, show ‘low’ to ‘medium’ overall flood risk values (Fig 7.19). In 
fact, relative to the other case study areas, the eastern Bronx and City Island have the lowest 
average overall storm surge flood risk values. This area was selected for closer study due to its 
high storm surge exposure rankings, but its physical vulnerability is moderated by low social 
vulnerability, low exposure to floodwater contaminants, and few at-risk critical facilities. The 










Overall Storm Surge Flood Risk Index 
for Eastern Bronx, City Island 
 
Figure 7.19. The overall storm surge flood risk index for the Eastern Bronx, including City 
Island. Tax lots are ranked from low to high values, and the 500-year flood zone for the 2050s is 
shown in transparent blue. 
 
City Island is part of the Pelham Islands group off the eastern shores of the Bronx. The island is 
small, approximately 0.4 square miles in area, and bounded by Long Island Sound to the east, 
Eastchester Bay to the west, and connected to the mainland by the City Island Bridge at the north 
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end. It is home to 4,456 residents, according to the 2010 US Census, making population density 
well below the citywide average. Demographic data describes residents as 80% white, 10% 
Hispanic, and 10% Black, Asian, or other, with median household incomes of $73,100 relative to 
citywide average $55,246 (2010 US Census). City Island shows ‘medium’ overall storm surge 
flood risk values at the northern tip and western shores of the island. These values mirror well 
the ‘high’ values shown in Figure 7.20 on the storm surge exposure index (Figure 7.20A), 
indicating areas of floodwater elevations greater than 10 feet. ‘Low-medium’ and ‘low’ values of 
overall storm surge flood risk are observed on the Island throughout the rest of the 500-year 
flood zone for the 2050s. No ‘high’ or ‘medium-high’ values are observed. With few exceptions 
the Island ranks ‘low-medium’ on the social vulnerability index (Figure 7.20C), and ‘low’ on 






Figure 7.20. The storm surge floodwater exposure index (A), storm surge floodwater 
contaminants index (B), social vulnerability index (C), critical facilities index (D) for eastern 
shores of the Bronx, including City Island. Tax lots are ranked from low to high values. 
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County Club is a predominantly upper middle class neighborhood of the Bronx with a large 
Italian-American population. It is bounded by Pelham Bay Park to the north and Eastchester Bay 
to the east and the New England Throughway (I-95) to the west. Though low relative to the 
citywide average, the population density of County Club is the highest relative to the other 
neighborhoods in this area. The population of 3,419 residents is composed by race as follows: 
85% white, 12% Hispanic, and 3% Asian or other. The median household income is $64,410, 
higher than the citywide average (US Census 2010). Country Club has tax lots ranking mostly 
‘low’ and ‘low-medium’ on the overall storm surge flood risk index, with lots closer to the coast 
ranking ‘medium’ and one lot ranking ‘medium-high’. These ‘medium-high’ and ‘medium’ 
value lots are strongly influenced by the ‘high’ values shown on the storm surge exposure index 
(Figure 7.20A), indicating areas of floodwater elevations greater than 10 feet. Social 
vulnerability index values (Figure 7.20C) are slightly elevated in the southern part of the 
neighborhood, perhaps contributing to ‘low-medium’ overall flood risk index values. The area 
ranks almost entirely ‘low’ on both the floodwater contaminants and critical facilities indices. 
 
Edgewater Park is a small community of bungalows converted to year-round homes that is 
situated between Eastchester Bay to the east and north and the Throgs Neck Expressway to the 
west and south. Its low-density population of 999 is the smallest of the area neighborhoods and 
demographic data describes residents as 63% white, 26% Hispanic, and 11% black, Asian, and 
other. Like the other local neighborhoods, the median household income of $71,965 is above the 
citywide average (US Census 2010). Edgewater Park ranks mostly ‘low’ and ‘low-medium’ on 
the overall storm surge flood risk index, with a few ‘medium’ values in the northern and 
southern ends of the neighborhood. These ‘medium’ values rank ‘high’ on the storm surge 
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exposure index in Figure 7.20A. The neighborhood ranks ‘low-medium’ on the social 
vulnerability index (Figure 7.20C), and ‘low’ on the floodwater contaminants and critical 
facilities indices (Figures 7.20C, 7.20D). 
 
Throgs Neck refers to the southernmost neighborhood in this area that ends in narrow spit of land 
extending south into the East River. For the purposes of this analysis the Throgs Neck 
neighborhood captures all tax lots to the southwest of Edgewater Park as divided by the Throgs 
Neck Expressway. Though its population of 19,594 is higher than other neighborhoods in the 
area, population density is still below the citywide average. Demographic data describes Throgs 
Neck residents as 48% white, 33% Hispanic, 13% black, and 6% Asian or other. The median 
household income is $65,731, a value higher than the citywide average (US Census 2010). 
Throgs Neck ranks ‘low’ to ‘medium’ on the overall flood risk index with clusters of ‘medium’ 
values on the western and eastern sides of the neighborhood. As was the case in other 
neighborhoods, the overall storm surge flood risk values mirror those of the storm surge 
exposure index (Figure 7.20A), suggesting that physical vulnerability is the dominant influence 
in overall flood vulnerability. The southern coastline is protected in sections by bluffs that extend 
up to 50 feet above the water and either protect the neighborhood from floodwaters, or decrease 
their physical vulnerability to flood heights and wave action. The cluster of low storm surge 
exposure values seen on the southern shores of Throgs Neck is a function of the elevation of the 
bluffs, as is the absence of floodwaters along the western edge of the spit. The neighborhood 
ranks ‘low’ and ‘low-medium’ on the social vulnerability index (Figure 7.20C), and ‘low’ on the 
floodwater contaminants and critical facilities indices (Figure 7.20B and 7.20D). 
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Each of the four locations discussed above were selected for study at the tax lot scale due to the 
projected extent of floodwater exposure to the 500-year flood extent in the 2050s projected in 
these areas.  
 
The purpose of examining vulnerability and risk at local scales is to better illustrate how pre-
existing characteristics of neighborhoods contribute to a landscape of high and low overall storm 
surge flood risk values. For some areas the greatest threat is the potential for floodwater 
contamination from nearby TRI or wastewater treatment facilities. In other neighborhoods, social 
vulnerability is high and poses great threat to the community even when physical vulnerability is 
low. In still other areas, residents of group quarters facilities such as hospitals and group homes 
may find themselves unable to respond to a storm surge threat, even if physical and social 
vulnerability are low. It’s important to realize that different vulnerabilities tend to overlap many 
areas creating local spots of increased vulnerability. 
 
7.5. Local Indices of Spatial Autocorrelation 
Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) statistics were calculated in the citywide 500-
year floodplain for the 2050s to test the null hypothesis of spatial randomness for the overall 
flood risk index values. The results shown in Figure 7.21 are classified as follows: not significant 
(p > 0.05; less than 95% confidence level), clusters of high index values (high-high) and clusters 
of low values (low-low) both of which reflect positive local spatial autocorrelation, outliers in 
which a high value is surrounded by low values (high-low) and outliers in which a low value is 
surrounded by high values (low-high), both of which reflect negative local spatial 
autocorrelation. Both positive and negative spatial autocorrelation are found throughout the 500-
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year 2050s floodplain with areas of positive autocorrelation far outnumbering areas of negative 
autocorrelation. This suggests that, more often than not, the values of the overall storm surge 
flood risk index are not random in their distribution but instead are similar to neighboring values 
and likely reflect the spatial component of the datasets from which the overall flood risk index 
was constructed. For example, tax lot level values of floodwater heights, social vulnerability, and 
exposure to floodwater contaminants are more similar to neighboring values than distant values. 
It should be noted that part of the reason that neighboring values are similar is that, for the social 
vulnerability index, the sociodemographic data was disaggregated from block group and census 
tract levels down to the tax lot levels. This means the variables are not independent at the tax lot 
level but rather reflect the values of the larger geography from which they were derived. As such 
more clustering is expected. However this methodology was not applied to the other three 
indices so disaggregation related clustering is not expected in those results. 
 
An analysis of autocorrelation among the datasets emphasizes the relevance of spatial context 
when evaluating physical and social vulnerabilities. The data set values used in the overall flood 
risk index are not randomly distributed but instead show local influence. Community needs in 
the context of emergency preparedness and response likely reflect the patterns of distribution and 
clustering viewed in Figure 7.21. The results are better viewed at the neighborhood scale in the 




Figure 7.21. Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) were calculated using the Anselin 
Local Moran’s I tool in ArcGIS. Positive autocorrelation is indicated by clusters of high values 
(purple) and clusters of low values (pink). Negative autocorrelation is indicated by high values 










A closer look at the southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens neighborhood shows that high-
high value clusters (purple) are mainly situated close to the coastline in areas such as the Coney 
Island peninsula and the Rockaway Peninsula, with smaller clusters in the Howard Beach 
neighborhood of Queens and the Gravesend neighborhood of Brooklyn (Figure 7.22). Low-low 
value clusters (pink) are found all along the landward most edge of the flood zone furthest from 
the coastline in neighborhoods such as Georgetown, and Canarsie in Brooklyn, and Brookville 
and Rosedale in Queens (see Figure 7.11 for a neighborhood map). In between the high-high and 
low-low value clusters is large area of tax lots whose values were not significant (p > 0.05).  
There are a few tax areas of high-low negative spatial autocorrelation (yellow), the most obvious 
being JFK airport but also a few lots in the New Lots, East New York, and Paerdegat Basin 
neighborhoods. This is likely because JFK is quite anomalous relative to surrounding residential 
tax lots in that it is a very large, low population tax lot that earned the highest score on the storm 
surge floodwater contaminants index, a moderate score on the floodwater exposure and critical 
facilities indices (the moderate score on the critical facilities index was still one of the highest 
scores in the flood zone), and a low score on the social vulnerability index. These characteristics 
are in contrast to nearly every one of the neighboring tax lots, hence the high-low negative 
autocorrelation. Low value tax lots surrounded by high value lots (green) are very few with the 







Southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens 
 
Figure 7.22. Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) values at the tax lot level for 
southern Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens. 
 
High-high values clusters (purple) are the most prominent feature in Figure 7.23, a map of Local 
Moran’s I values for Lower Manhattan, indicating strong positive spatial correlation throughout 
the area. Lots of low-high values (green) and values of non-significance (grey) are equally 
present in very low numbers. There were no tax lots showing positive spatial autocorrelation as 











Figure 7.23. Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) 
values at the tax lot level for Lower Manhattan. 
 
The majority of tax lots on the eastern shores of Staten Island (Figure 7.24) are classified as not 
significant (grey) by the local Moran’s I test. Areas of low-low value positive spatial 
autocorrelation (pink) rim the landward most edge of the flood zone as was observed in southern 
Brooklyn and Jamaica Bay, Queens. The large area of high-high autocorrelation (purple) in the 
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South Beach neighborhood is the Staten Island University Hospital and South Beach Psychiatric 
Center. Other high-high values are found along the Midland Beach coastline as well near the 
terminus of the flood zone inland from Midland Beach. Only two tax lots show negative spatial 
autocorrelation, one with high-low values (yellow) and the other with low-high values (green). 
 
 
 Eastern Shore Staten Island 
 
Figure 7.24. Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) values at the tax lot level for 
eastern Staten Island. 
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Eastern Bronx, City Island 
 
Figure 7.25. Local indicators of spatial autocorrelation (LISA) 
values at the tax lot level for eastern Bronx, City Island. 
 
The eastern shores of the Bronx (Figure 7.25) are dominated by positive spatial autocorrelation 
in the form of low-low values (pink). A few tax lots classified as showing high-high correlation 
(purple) are situated that the northern tip of City Island and to the south of the Edgewater Park 
neighborhood in Throgs Neck. The rest of Throgs Neck has mostly not significant (grey) values. 
Negative autocorrelation in the form of high-low values (yellow) are found in low numbers on 
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City Island and in the County Club neighborhood. Only one instance of low-high values (green), 
located in the Throgs Neck neighborhood, is observed.  
 
7.6. Theoretical Contributions 
This work builds upon the hazards-of-place model of place vulnerability developed by Cutter 
(1996) by promoting the use of multiple indices in the creation of an overall place-based flood 
risk index. The use of additional physical and social vulnerability indices to augment traditional 
indices is an innovative way to capture elements of local level vulnerability specific to New 
York City. As discussed in section 2.2, the hazards-of-place model begins with the interaction of 
risk and mitigation producing the hazard potential. In the context of this work, risk refers to the 
likelihood of occurrence of the 100- and 500-year flood events in NYC and the consequence of 
such events. Mitigation can serve to reduce risk through effective policies or it can amplify risk 
through poor or absent mitigation efforts. The hazard potential is then either moderated or 
enhanced through a geographic filter and the social fabric of the place to form the biophysical 
and social vulnerabilities. In combination, these two form the overall vulnerability of place. 
 
The index of overall risk to storm surge flooding is based on the components and interactions of 
the hazards-of-place model, but it differs in in three fundamental ways. First mitigation is treated 
as a possible outcome of the use of the indices but not as an index input. Though continued 
mitigation efforts in NYC may reduce flood risk and ultimately reduce the hazard potential, 
mitigation is difficult to quantify and without a measured value cannot be incorporated into the 
overall flood risk index. However, by illustrating the landscape of flood risk values the overall 
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flood risk index could be used in the development of targeted mitigation strategies both citywide 
and at the community level. 
 
 Second, the four individual indices and overall flood risk index were developed without 
reference to a specific measure of hazard potential. Though hazard potential in the hazards-of-
place model is foundational to the production of biophysical and social vulnerabilities, this 
concept is also challenging to quantify and include in the overall index. However the primary 
physical vulnerability datasets - FEMA’s 100- and 500-year modeled flood extents - that were 
used to delineate the coastal flood study area and develop the index of storm surge exposure are 
based on flood probability and as such inherently include measures of risk. They also account for 
measures that can mitigate flood extent such as land use/land type and physical barriers. So these 
important datasets do bring elements of risk and mitigation into the overall flood risk index 
though perhaps not in the order intended in the hazards-of-place model. 
 
Finally, this work goes beyond the use of previously developed indices to develop new indices 
that measure elements physical and social vulnerability specific to the hyper-heterogeneous and 
hyper-dense population of New York City. In the hazard-of-place model, the hazard potential is 
filtered using socioeconomic indicators to produce the social vulnerability. Though an index of 
social vulnerability was developed in this research, an index of critical at-risk facilities was also 
created to measure how populations may become increasingly vulnerable when critical social 
services are compromised during a storm event. This is particularly relevant in NYC where 
critical facilities are abundant, serve large portions of the population, and an integral part of daily 
life. In combination the two indices offer a broader measure of social vulnerability that looks 
beyond socioeconomic and sociodemographic indicators.  
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The hazard potential is also filtered through its geographic context to produce the biophysical 
vulnerability. The storm surge exposure index provides site-specific measures of physical 
vulnerability based on flood heights and wave action. In addition, the storm surge floodwater 
contaminants index accounts for the multitude of hazardous wastes sites that could potentially 
release toxic materials into floodwaters during a flood event. If released, these hazardous 
materials could infiltrate homes and businesses and pose health risks to residents and individuals 
involved in clean up efforts. In combination the two indices offer a measure of physical 
vulnerability that is more comprehensive than what is commonly used in flood vulnerability 
studies: simple exposure to floodwaters.   
 
7.7. Index Validation and Sensitivity Analysis 
Validation of indices of social and natural hazards vulnerability is used to assess the robustness 
and reliability of the index values, and is particularly important if indices are intended to be used 
as a decision-making tool. A common method of validation for physical models is to compare 
modeled results to a set of measured external reference data. However social vulnerability and 
other multidimensional models that incorporate social processes are not directly observable and 
rely instead on proxy data such as economic losses due to natural hazard, mortality, or 
infrastructure damage to approximate empirical measurement. Proxy data can be difficult to find 
and is only effective when the assumed correlation with the dimension being measured is 
accurate and consistent over the study area, and this is not always the case (Cutter and Finch 
2008). Another method uses recovery outcomes from a natural hazard event to validate indices 
developed based on pre-event data. This approach has been used infrequently to date but was 
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recently applied to metrics of community resilience in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (Burton 
2015). 
 
When proxy or post-event data is not available or plausible, sensitivity analysis can be used to 
provide internal index validation through an evaluation of the methods and data used for index 
construction (Tate 2012). Sensitivity analysis examines how choices of input data and 
methodology affect the output by changing one input parameter at a time while the other 
parameters are held constant and measuring the resulting changes in index output. Through 
sensitivity analysis, modelers can assess the influence of different index parameters and make 
informed decisions about how to improve model robustness. Though this method has been 
applied to the construction of the social vulnerability index, results have been contradictory as to 
the influence of indicator selection in the index output (Schmidtlein et al. 2008; Chakraborty, 
Tobin, and Montz 2005).  
 
This work does not yet include internal or external validation of the individual and composite 
flood risk indices. With few templates to draw from, the storm surge floodwater contaminants, 
critical facilities, and overall flood risk indices were instead developed using expert judgment of 
the subject matter, conservative index construction, and careful data selection with detailed 
justification provided for choices of data and design. By contrast the social vulnerability index 
was constructed based on the methods employed in a multitude of previous studies, and was 
most influenced by previous vulnerability indices created for New York City. The storm surge 
exposure index was also constructed using expert judgment, but this process was fairly 
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straightforward as the dataset is self-sorted into exposure categories that are easily ranked. Index 
validation and sensitivity analysis as future work are discussed in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
 
This section draws conclusions from two sets of results: first, the analysis of current and future 
flood extents and populations at-risk to flooding, both citywide and by borough; and second the 
construction and application of the overall storm surge flood risk index for New York City. It 
also includes a discussion of study limitations brought about by lack of data and data omissions, 
uncertainties in foundational datasets, and broad assumptions in methodology. Future work is 
discussed throughout and the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications for 
New York City. 
 
As sea levels rise, the land area subjected to flood events increases in size and more people are 
potentially affected by flooding. However this work shows that increases in sea levels, flood 
areas, and affected population do not always correlate in proportion to each other in New York 
City. Each of the five boroughs experiences different floodplains extents for a given flood 
volume (i.e., the 100- or 500-year flood) and for given increments of sea-level rise indicating that 
the physical expression of flood events in New York City is very much dependent on local 
geographies. This research also demonstrates that increases in sea-level rise and increases in 
flood extents are not proportional. For example, the area and population affected citywide by the 
100- and 500-year floods increases more sharply with a smaller increment of sea-level rise from 
current levels to the 2020s (11 inches) than it does with a greater increment of sea-level rise (20 
inches) from the 2020s to the 2050s. This result is contrary to what might be expected, however 
it is a function of the influence exerted by the near shore topography and the built environment, 
both of which can attenuate (or enhance) both sea-level rise and floodplain extents. In addition, 
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this analysis indicates that the number of additional residents at-risk to flooding through the 
2020s and 2050s does not correspond proportionally to increases in flood extent (i.e., a 5% 
increase in flood area does not correlate to a 5% increase in population at-risk). This is because 
flooding in areas zoned for commercial, manufacturing, and open space increases the land area 
flooded without increasing the affected population. 
 
The contribution of different sources of physical and social vulnerability to overall storm surge 
flood risk at the neighborhood level is also examined. One of the intentions of this work is to 
discern which elements of vulnerability exert the most influence on overall storm surge flood 
risk, and how this influence varies with location. In three of the four case study areas, physical 
vulnerability is the greatest influence on the overall storm surge flood risk index with floodwater 
contaminants dominating the fourth index. This result emphasizes the local component of overall 
storm surge flood risk and indicates that the dominant vulnerabilities will vary at the 
neighborhood scale.  
 
Examining vulnerability and risk at local scales can better illustrate how pre-existing 
characteristics of neighborhoods contribute to a landscape of high and low overall flood risk 
values. This information is valuable in the context of long-term hazard mitigation and coastal 
resilience planning, and also in the shorter timeframe of emergency management and response. 
Different neighborhoods require different types and levels of mitigation measures, hazard 
preparedness, and response and recovery assistance to flood hazards. For some locations the 
greatest threat is the potential for floodwater contaminants while in other areas social 
vulnerability compromises the ability of the community to recover from even low exposure flood 
 193 
events. In many locations several elements of vulnerability overlap to create a heightened overall 
risk to flood events. These areas may require more intensive or specialized planning to protect 
people and infrastructure from flood impacts. 
 
Finally, overall storm surge flood risk index values were tested at the tax lot level for spatial 
randomness. The results indicate that the majority of index values show statistically significant 
spatial autocorrelation with neighboring index values. This correlation means that most of the 








When constructing the social vulnerability, exposure to floodwater contaminants, critical 
facilities, and overall flood indices no weighting strategy was applied. Weighting is used to add 
emphasis to certain variables of an index using empirical evidence or expert judgment. Though it 
is clear that some variables have greater influence over the outcome of an index than other 
variables, without a defensible method to distinguish and quantify this difference it is best 
omitted. The only weighted index was that of exposure to floodwaters, which assigned higher 
scores to areas of high flood elevations and destructive zones of wave action than to areas of 
lower elevation flooding. This was possible because these areas were already defined and 
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delineated by FEMA and the NPCC. The absence of weighting strategy is an appropriate choice 
for the indices mentioned above and ultimately serves to eliminate any biases introduced through 
using judgment alone. However without comparative studies or external reference data it is 
difficult to evaluate whether the omission of weighting schemes produces results that are more 
accurate than weighted results. 
 
For example, in the index of potential floodwater hazards the sheer volume of petroleum and 
chemical bulk storage facilities in some areas overwhelmed the influence of other larger and 
more toxic hazardous waste sites. By using a raw count of facilities per tax lot, a heating oil 
storage tank was effectively equal in impact to a wastewater treatment plant. A weighting 
scheme that considers the volume and toxicity of hazardous wastes handled and stored at sites 
might better represent the threat posed to the surrounding neighborhood. However the data 
necessary to employ this type of weighting scheme was not available for this work. And 
regardless, one element that cannot be quantified is the actual potential for leaks and spills of 
toxic materials at any given site due to flooding. For this reason it is assumed that all sites have 
equal potential to release hazardous materials during a flood event. 
 
Circular Buffers 
In the floodwater hazards index, circular buffers were constructed around facilities that store or 
handle hazardous wastes to approximate the movement and distribution of potential toxic 
releases during flood events. However, the use of buffers in this manner is overly simplistic in 
assuming that toxic wastes will disperse from their source in a manner that is equal and uniform 
when in fact they will likely be influenced by the direction of currents and disruptions presented 
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by infrastructure or other surface features. Thus, circular buffers are an unrealistic representation 
of both the movement of storm surge and the movement of point source hazardous wastes within 
storm surge but they are used for lack of a better alternative. The most accurate approximations 
of the movement of current and future storm surge in the open ocean and onto land are achieved 
through computational numeric hydrodynamic models, a process beyond the scope of this work.  
 
Omitted Data 
One aspect of this work that stands in contrast to other contemporary work on the topic is the 
omission from the index of critical facilities of police, fire, and emergency medical services 
(EMS) - all of which provide essential care to the community. The goal of the critical facilities 
index is to identify the population potentially affected by facility failure by identifying the spatial 
correlation between facility location and the area they serve. However, spatial information on 
emergency services facilities was limited to point locations of their stations without reference to 
the communities they respond to. In the case of NYC emergency services, a system of 
redundancy ensures that communities are served even when their primary station is compromised 
(see Section 5.2 for a more detailed discussion of emergency service networks in NYC). So the 
use of facilities location data (point data) would not have reflected the intent of critical facilities 
index and would have made inaccurate associations between facility locations and populations 
at-risk from their failure.  
 
Future Demographic Characteristics 
A significant limitation is the lack of knowledge regarding future population count, 
demographics and distribution, as well as changes to zoning, land use, and development in New 
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York City. Population characteristics for this study were derived from modern surveys using 
current population statistics that were applied to both current and future flood zones. Therefore 
this approach assumes that current and future populations will be equivalent in count and 
characteristics. This assumption is obviously inaccurate, however without the ability to model 
future demographics and population distribution it is also the default. It is difficult to discern 
how this assumption affects the results for future flood scenarios. For example, the current 
populations in the 100- and 500-year flood zones are not a clear over or underestimate of future 
population in those flood zones. Though the City of New York projects population to increase 
through the 21st century and speculates that much of the growth in residential units may occur 
along the coastal corridors, this process is emerging slowly and not yet clearly defined.  
 
Uncertainty in Future Flood Shapefiles 
There is inherent uncertainty in the flood extent shapefiles used to delineate future flood events. 
NPCC flood shapefiles contain numerous sources of potential error as a result of the datasets and 
methodologies used in their development. Error in the topographic elevation data, sea-level rise 
projections, and FEMA model outputs all contribute to this uncertainty and limit the accuracy of 
the shapefiles. The population, facilities, and infrastructure within the future flood zones inherit 
this uncertainty by virtue of being defined as ‘flooded’ by the shapefile extents. Though not 
quantified, the uncertainty of future flood areas is lowest near the coastline and greatest near the 
inland boundaries of the flood extents and it is possible that small changes to the flood extent 
boundary could result in large changes to the ‘flooded’ population. For this reason, where 
possible future work should consider using flood data that incorporates confidence intervals in 
their modeled results. 
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Uncertainties in Index Reliability 
As mentioned in section 7.6, this work pushes forward the uses of multiple indices in the creation 
of an overall place-based flood risk index. The use of unique indices to represent aspects of 
geographic and social filters specific to NYC is a novel contribution to the hazards-of-place 
model and an innovative approach to developing a place-based storm surge risk index. Much of 
the subjectivity of the indices has been removed through the rational explanation of the decisions 
used in their construction, decisions based on expert judgment of the subject matter. Indices were 
constructed conservatively without weighting schemes and with care to select data that supports 
the intent of a given index. However eventually, in order to more objectively assess index 
reliability in measuring the intended parameter, future work should use external reference data 
where possible for validation of both the indices used in the creation of the overall flood risk 
index, and the overall flood risk index itself. Sensitivity analysis should also be applied to 
validate the indices internally and improve robustness by selecting the best data sets and 
construction methods. These efforts would prepare the indices for use as decision-making tools 
in scenarios of flood mitigation and resilience planning as well as emergency preparedness and 
response.  
 
8.2. Policy Implications for New York City 
This research provides a methodology for a local-level analysis of areas and populations most at-
risk to flood hazards in New York City, and illustrates the importance and influence of both the 
physical and social aspects of vulnerability in identifying the geographic areas (neighborhoods 
and communities) most likely to suffer during flood events. An understanding of the spatial 
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distribution of the components of flood risk is key in developing targeted hazard mitigation and 
climate change policies, and improving emergency preparedness and response.   
 
Policies that protect coastal communities from flood hazards address both physical and social 
vulnerabilities. Two indices representative of physical vulnerability, the storm surge floodwater 
exposure and floodwater contaminants indices, are included in this work and describe both the 
location of physically vulnerable neighborhoods and the degree of vulnerability. This 
information can be used to develop place-based coastal resilience policies aimed at fortifying the 
physical environment as appropriate for that neighborhood. These measures may include 
installing or raising bulkheads, seawalls or other breakwater systems; creating systems of levees 
or dikes; nourishing scoured beaches; restoring or creating natural wetland buffer systems; and 
updating flood resistant construction codes to reflect future flood elevations and incorporate 
advances in design and engineering. 
 
It should be noted that though this work considers the impacts of a storm surge flood event, 
future work might consider how the cumulative effect of storm surge combined with intense 
rainfall might impact the movement, timing, and drainage of floodwaters. Though coastal 
flooding dominates in NYC, fluvial and urban street flooding occurs during intense rainfall 
events resulting in overflows in residential and municipal drainage systems. Coastal flooding 
may reach greater extents and take longer to recede with storm drains already overfull. For these 




Two indices representative of social vulnerability, the social vulnerability and at-risk critical 
facilities indices, are also included in this work and describe the distribution of socially 
vulnerable neighborhoods and their degree of vulnerability. Coastal resilience incentives that 
address social vulnerabilities to hazards are non-structural in nature. They are often focused on 
fortifying local economies through a variety of means such as development and revitalization 
investment projects for low-income neighborhoods, the promotion and support of local 
merchants, and job creation and career services programs to diminish unemployment. Other 
strategies include offering flood hazard mitigation grants to nursing homes, adult care or other 
facilities in need, expanding community hazard response teams, and working with FEMA to 
allow greater access and options to property owners. 
 
The City of New York released its post-Hurricane Sandy analysis and action plan in June of 
2013. This report, PlaNYC: A Stronger More Resilient New York, includes strategies for 
community rebuilding and increasing resilience of major waterfront neighborhoods across the 
city. These strategies include measures and initiatives for protecting the coasts, buildings, and 
critical infrastructure, and for promoting community and economic recovery. Most of these 
initiatives are subject to available funding and involve physical changes to structures that would 
make them more resilient to floodwaters and a few are focused on reinforcing community 
networks and lifelines. However the report does not quantify the degree of protection offered by 
these new measures in terms of the future flood elevations to which neighborhoods will be 
subjected.  
 
The intention of coastal resilience plans is to determine a level of exposure, in the context of sea-
level rise, to which a given area can and should be protected now and in the future. Though this 
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level of exposure would manifest as various flood protection measures in different 
neighborhoods throughout the city, the aim is for all neighborhoods to be afforded the same level 
of protection. This research offers a means by which to create local targets for future flood 
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9.2. Appendix B: Flood Area and Population Calculations Citywide 





FEMA	  Original	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  1983	   30.6	   -­‐	   189,386	   -­‐	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  100	  Year	  Flood,	  2013	   44.9	   47%	   385,254	   103%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   58.8	   31%	   587,265	   52%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2050s	   71.2	   21%	   787,596	   34%	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   63.4	   -­‐	   687,733	   -­‐	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   82.1	   29%	   1,012,045	   47%	  















%	  of	  Total	  
Pop	  
FEMA	  Original	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  1983	   4	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	  	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  100	  Year	  Flood,	  2013	   3.8	   -­‐5%	   11,446	   	  	   0.83%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   5.3	   39%	   19,513	   70%	   1.41%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2050s	   6.6	   25%	   34,120	   75%	   2.46%	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   3.9	   -­‐	   11,868	   -­‐	   0.86%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   8	   105%	   56,032	   372%	   4.05%	  











%	  of	  Total	  
Pop	  
FEMA	  Original	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  1983	   6	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	  	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  100	  Year	  Flood,	  2013	   11.1	   85%	   171,504	   	  	   6.85%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   14.6	   32%	   248,702	   45%	   9.93%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2050s	   18.9	   29%	   340,131	   37%	   13.58%	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   18.1	   -­‐	   325,484	   -­‐	   12.99%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   24.1	   33%	   464,352	   43%	   18.54%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2050s	   26.4	   10%	   534,153	   15%	   21.33%	  













%	  of	  Total	  
Pop	  
FEMA	  Original	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  1983	   2.4	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	  	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  100	  Year	  Flood,	  2013	   3	   25%	   77,265	   	  	   4.87%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   4.2	   40%	   144,154	   87%	   9.09%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2050s	   5	   19%	   197,679	   37%	   12.46%	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   4.4	   -­‐	   157,057	   -­‐	   9.90%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   5.7	   30%	   245,662	   56%	   15.49%	  














%	  of	  Total	  
Pop	  
FEMA	  Original	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  1983	   11.9	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	  	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  100	  Year	  Flood,	  2013	   16.6	   39%	   96,079	   	  	   4.31%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   22.6	   36%	   138,488	   44%	   6.21%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2050s	   27.2	   20%	   171,563	   24%	   7.69%	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   24.3	   -­‐	   148,302	   -­‐	   6.65%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   29.2	   20%	   189,755	   28%	   8.51%	  










%	  of	  Total	  
Pop	  
FEMA	  Original	  100-­‐Year	  Flood,	  1983	   7.9	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   	  	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  100	  Year	  Flood,	  2013	   10.3	   30%	   28,958	   	  	   6.18%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   12.8	   24%	   36,407	   26%	   7.77%	  
NPCC2	  100-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2050s	   13.5	   5%	   44,101	   21%	   9.41%	  
FEMA	  WorkMap	  500-­‐Year	  Flood,	  2013	   12.7	   -­‐	   45,020	   -­‐	   9.60%	  
NPCC2	  500-­‐Year	  Flood	  for	  the	  2020s	   15.1	   19%	   56,243	   25%	   12.00%	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